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INTRODUCTION
5.1 Defining fraud and measuring its extent
Definitions
5.1.1. This chapter is concerned with the manner in which the Commission (and others)
address the problem of fraud and corruption.  Its scope is thus restricted to action taken in
relation to criminal or potentially criminal activities.  This is in contrast to the previous chapter,
which dealt with the processes of financial control (issues of sound and efficient management,
financial regularity, etc.), and the following chapter, which (in part) deals with action taken in
respect of individuals following personal and professional misconduct by way of disciplinary
measures.  Clearly there is overlap between the three, but it is important that the conceptual
distinctions be drawn because the appropriate response of the institution varies depending on the
nature of the problem.
5.1.2. This chapter therefore cannot but start with the distinction to be made between fraud and
irregularity.  Confusion between the two is the perennial source of alarmist (and inaccurate)
headlines which declare anything between five and ten percent of the European Union’s budget
to be "lost in fraud".  Fraud is not an equivalent concept in the legal systems of Member States -
in some the term has no legal meaning at all - but the European Union does possess a workable
definition, to be applied in the context of criminal law:1
"... Fraud affecting the European Communities’ financial interest shall consist of :
a) in respect of expenditure, an intentional act or omission relating to:
• the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or documents, which
has as its effect the misappropriation or wrongful retention of funds from the general budget
of the European Communities or budgets managed by, or on behalf of, the European
Communities
• non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, with the same effect,
• the misapplication of such funds for purposes other than those for which they were
originally granted
b) In respect of revenue, an intentional act or omission relating to:
• the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or documents, which
has as its effect the illegal diminution of the resources of the general budget of the European
Communities or budgets managed by, or on behalf of, the European Communities
• non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, with the same effect,
• misapplication of a legally obtained benefit, with the same effect."
                                                
1 Definition quoted from the "Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial
interests" Article 1(1)a - OJ C316 of 27.11.95.  (See also 5.7.1 and Annex 2)
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5.1.3. An irregularity, on the other hand, is a contravention of rules and/or procedures which
does not necessarily involve either illicit gain or intention, defined as follows:2
"’Irregularity’ shall mean any infringement of a provision of Community law resulting from an
act or omission by an economic operator, which has, or would have, the effect of prejudicing the
general budget of the Communities or budgets managed by them, either by reducing or losing
revenue accruing from own resources collected directly on behalf of the Communities, or by an
unjustified item of expenditure"
5.1.4. By this definition, quoted from a Community regulation, an irregularity is not a criminal
matter but an administrative one.  It is thus exposed to the possibility of an administrative
sanction rather than a criminal one.  Thus a distinction is immediately drawn between the sphere
of criminal law and the sphere of administrative law.  It is to be a vital distinction in this chapter,
but one that is not unambiguous, for though an irregularity is not a criminal offence in a judicial
sense, it is possible that a fraud, which is a criminal matter, lies behind an irregularity.
5.1.5. It is in consideration of the above that discussion of irregularities is central to the
discussion of fraud. They represent the soil in which fraud can grow. Consequently, taking one
step further back, tolerance of the slack administrative practices, poor regulations, over-
complicated payment mechanisms, excessive exceptions and derogations, lack of transparency,
etc., which tend to lead to abundant irregularities and errors3, amounts to a tolerance of a
relatively high level of fraud.
5.1.6. Corruption, which can be viewed as a "special case" of fraud, is also defined in a
European Union text (in a manner limited, spuriously perhaps, to EU interests), the first protocol
to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests4.  A
distinction is drawn between passive and active corruption, i.e. being corrupted and corrupting
another:
"...the deliberate action of an official, who, directly or through an intermediary, requests or
receives advantages of any kind whatsoever, for himself or a third party, or accepts a promise of
such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in accordance with his duty or in the exercise of
his functions in breach of his official duties in a way which damages or is likely to damage the
European Communities’ financial interests shall constitute passive corruption"
(...)
"...the deliberate action of whosoever promises or gives, directly or through an intermediary, an
advantage of any kind whatsoever to an official for himself or a third party, for him to act or
refrain from acting in accordance with his duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of
his official duties in a way which damages or is likely to damage the European Communities’financial interests shall constitute active corruption"
                                                
2 Quoted from Council Regulation 2988/95 Article 1 (2) (See also 5.6.2 ff and Annex 2)
3 It is sufficient to consider the annual conclusions of the Court of Auditors’ "Statement of Assurance" to
appreciate the extent of the irregularity problem.
4 Articles 2 and 3 of the first Protocol (OJ C313 of 23.10.96). (See also 5.7.5) This Protocol’s scope has
been completed and broadened by a "Convention relating to active and passive corruption on the part of
both Community and Members States’ officials" drawn up by Council act of 26 May 1997 (OJ C195 of
25.6.1997).
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Incidence of fraud
5.1.7. Fraud is by definition a hidden activity.  It is only possible to assess its impact and extent
by indirect means, for example by counting convictions for fraud, by extrapolating from
confirmed occurrences, by citing reports of suspected fraud or irregularities likely to conceal
fraud, by examining investigations in course and so on.  To complicate matters further, an
important variable is detection rates, whereby relative success in the detection and prosecution
of fraud can give the appearance of a greater overall problem than where detection and
prosecution are less effective and hence reveal fewer cases of fraud.
5.1.8. The approach taken by the Commission to measuring the extent of fraud is to rely on the
official communication of irregularities by the Member States5 and the resulting enquires (in the
field of shared management) or on inquiries carried out (in case of direct management).  Though
highly imperfect, no better method exists.
5.1.9. The first remark to be made is that the relationship between the number of cases and the
amounts concerned is far from a simple one.  UCLAF’s figures show that a mere 5% of the cases
under examination account for well over half the total amounts in question.  Put differently, a
few big frauds are disproportionately important vis-à-vis a mass of smaller frauds.  The
importance of this point will become apparent when it comes to the investigation of fraud.  Any
serious attempt to deal with the bulk of the losses in value terms will involve the investigation of
large-scale fraud operations.  Experience shows these to be usually highly sophisticated,
transfrontier operations, frequently the work of organised crime.  The response has to be up to
the scale of the task.
5.1.10. Secondly, one unambiguous conclusion which can be drawn from the Commission's
statistics is that the vast bulk of irregularities, both in terms of cases and the amounts involved,
occur in the fields of traditional own resources (essentially revenue from customs duties),
agricultural expenditure and structural fund expenditure.  In other words, in those parts of the
budget which are jointly managed by the Commission and the Member States  (see Chapter 3).
Given that these areas account for about 80% of total expenditure and the bulk of revenue
collection directly from third parties, this observation is in itself not surprising.  It does serve
however to make two important points.  First, the Commission's own efforts to combat fraud can
only be seen as part of the solution to the fraud problem - the Member States, which are in the
front line as far as most fraud or potential fraud is concerned, are the primary line of defence.
The Commission's role is thus above all one of guidance, coordination, legislation, etc.  Second,
the problem of fraud affecting directly managed expenditure is put into perspective - in the
overall total, and notwithstanding the recent attention cases in this area have attracted, the
amounts concerned are comparatively small.
5.1.11. This second point is not made to minimise the importance of the Commission effectively
tackling the problems associated with direct expenditure.  On the contrary, it is precisely in this
area where the Commission can and must most of all demonstrate its commitment to the fight
against fraud.  In the light of the role the Commission plays, and hopes to play in the future, in
the political life of Europe, nothing less than total commitment to the fight against fraud, and
maximum effectiveness in this commitment, is acceptable.
                                                
5 Under regulations nos. 1552/89 (Own Resources), 595/91 (EAGGF), 1681/94 & 1831/94 (Structural
Funds). The figures communicated under these regulations are reported in UCLAF’s Annual Report on
the Fight  Against Fraud(Last published 6 May 1998 for 1997 – COM(98)276
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5.1.12. Exactly the same point applies to the fight against internal fraud and corruption.
Though, according to the latest information, the number of UCLAF investigations involving
Commission officials is a relatively low 30, the political impact of such cases and the
importance of the manner in which the Commission deals with them far exceed their monetary
impact.  The issue here, more so than in the myriad cases of fraud elsewhere, is one of trust.
The Commission’s ambitions, which depend on the ambitions of ordinary Europeans for the
European Union as a whole, can only be realised if the institution earns and retains the
confidence of those it serves.
5.2 Aspects of the fight against fraud
5.2.1. The fight against fraud is a multifaceted one, covering prevention, detection and
sanction. There are thus a range of activities and a wide range of responsibilities involved, not
all of which fall exclusively within the sphere of competence of the Commission.  To
summarise:
Prevention
a) Quality of legal documentation:
• well-drafted, "fraud-proofed" legislation
• simple and transparent rules and procedures;
• well-drafted contracts
b) Transparent and efficiently-managed tender procedures
c) Effective control and monitoring procedures on the ground
d) Effective internal audit in the Commission and in partner organisations
e) A tight administrative "culture" (both formal and informal)
Detection and investigation
f) Effective, competent and qualified law-enforcement in Member States
g) An effective investigative capacity at the European level
h) Good coordination and information exchange between anti-fraud services
i) Good internal cooperation between Commission services
j) Adequate legal basis for investigations
k) An anti-fraud culture - guarantees for whistle-blowers
Prosecution and sanction
l) Willingness and ability of national judicial authorities to prosecute EU fraud cases
m) Good cooperation between Member States’ judicial authorities
n) Adequate legal framework for the prosecution of EU fraud, including of EU officials
o) Effective coordination of administrative, disciplinary and judicial procedures
p) Speedy resolution of fraud litigation in Member States’ criminal courts
5.2.2. Many of these subject areas are covered elsewhere in this report, especially those
relating to the prevention of fraud.  The present chapter will thus concentrate on the mechanisms
for the detection and investigation of fraud, and the possibilities for prosecutions and resolution
of fraud litigation and the subsequent application of sanctions.
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5.3 Political impetus
5.3.1. In many, if not all, parts of the European Union, fraud is big news.  Stories about the loss
of taxpayers’ money through fraud and corruption have been a constant feature of media
coverage of "Europe" for many years.  Although distortion and scaremongering have been an
equally constant aspect of such coverage, it has served the useful purpose of ensuring that the
issue of dealing with fraud has never been forgotten, even though it was perhaps submerged
beneath perhaps more inspiring political projects in the expansionist Delors era in the minds of
the European political classes.
5.3.2. Probably because of the popular and media interest in "fraud", it has been the European
Union’s sole directly-elected institution, the European Parliament, which has consistently made
the running on anti-fraud policy, above all in the form of its Committee on Budgetary Control.
The latter body has pursued its often thankless task with a great deal of persistence, with the
result that all the principal anti-fraud and control mechanisms currently in existence one way or
another had their genesis in this Committee.
5.3.3. The purpose of this observation is not to heap praise upon any particular grouping of
politicians (it is - or should be - normal that the responsible committee of parliament lies behind
many policy initiatives), but to make the point that the prime anti-fraud impetus must begin at
the political level, not only in the European Parliament but throughout the institutions.  It is no
coincidence that most of the criticisms made by this Committee in its first and second reports
arise in the context of structures, practices, procedures and a culture which developed in a period
when concern about fraud and mismanagement had slipped off the mainstream political agenda.
5.3.4. The role of the democratic political structures of the European Union are examined later
in this report (chapter 7).  The present chapter, having noted the importance of political impetus,
will deal with its more concrete manifestations, mainly UCLAF, but now also OLAF.
5.4 History
UCLAF
5.4.1. A brief "potted history" of UCLAF, providing a chronology of its key developments, is
provided in Annex 1 at the end of this chapter.  The following is thus the briefest of summaries.
5.4.2. UCLAF originally emerged as a result of sustained parliamentary pressure for a direct
anti-fraud capacity within the Commission.  Though what Parliament envisaged was a "flying
squad" able to carry out inquiries in the Member States, UCLAF was initially constituted solely
as a body for the coordination of the Commission’s anti-fraud activities, which were hitherto
dispersed in the principal expenditure/revenue directorates-general.  The name it still bears
reflects this early role6.  UCLAF became operational in July 1988.
5.4.3. From that point on, and under constant pressure from the European Parliament,
UCLAF’s role and competences have been steadily upgraded.  The biggest single change
occurred in late 1994-early 1995, when three developments coincided.  First, the Parliament
voted 50 extra staff specifically for UCLAF.  Second, in doing so, it specified that the new staff
                                                
6 UCLAF (French acronym) = Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Fraude
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should fulfil an investigative role.  Third, in the light of these developments, the Commission
concentrated all its anti-fraud activities within UCLAF, transferring the relevant staff from the
operational directorates-general for agriculture (DG VI) and for customs and indirect taxation
(DG XXI).  Its enhanced role was subsequently reinforced by three significant pieces of
legislation7 and by the new Treaty of Amsterdam.  (These are discussed in the next section.)
5.4.4. A further important step in UCLAF’s development has been its increasing de facto
involvement in judicial procedures.  Tentative steps in the direction of attempting to ensure
better cooperation between national judicial authorities, especially in the preparation of
prosecutions, were given a boost by the findings of the European Parliament’s Committee of
Inquiry into the Community Transit System, which recommended UCLAF taking a more active
role in this field.8 (Again, this subject is developed in section 5.10 below.)
5.4.5. Finally, UCLAF is currently in the process of a further significant transformation, again
as the result of direct pressure from the European Parliament and again with a view to increasing
its operational effectiveness and independence.  The change from UCLAF to OLAF, a fraud
office operationally completely independent of the Commission, is reviewed in section 5.11
below.
OLAF9
5.4.6. The rules applying to the conduct of UCLAF’s inquiries are in the process of being
superseded by the new provisions relating to OLAF, which officially (though for the time being
only virtually) came into being on 1 June 199910.  They remain however of more than historical
interest as the same, or similar, principles will have to apply to OLAF inquiries.  Moreover, their
effectiveness (or otherwise) in regulating the relations of UCLAF with other services can
provide an indication of where potential difficulties will lie in the new institutional setup.
5.4.7. Except insofar as this chapter will specifically review the changes brought about as a
result of the move from UCLAF to OLAF, it will, in its descriptive and analytical sections, by
and large refer to UCLAF.  This is not only because all past and present experience necessarily
relates to UCLAF, but also because UCLAF will continue, for an indeterminate transitional
period, to be the Commission’s operational anti-fraud body.  Generally speaking, it is safe to
assume, unless otherwise indicated, that observations on the legal and operational attributes of
UCLAF will apply equally to OLAF.
                                                
7 1) Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (26.7.95 - OJ
C316 of 27.11.95)
2) Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2988/95 on the protection of the European Communities’
financial interests (18.12.95 - OJ L312 of 23.12.95)
3) Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2185/96 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections
carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests
against fraud and other irregularities (11.11.96 - OJ L292 of 15.11.96)
8 Final Report and Recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry into the Community Transit System
(A4-0053/97 of 19.2.97): see especially sections 8.2.5 and 15.2.2 and recommendation 18.
9 OLAF (French acronym): Office pour la Lutte Anti-Fraude
10 OLAF is discussed in detail below (Section 5.11)
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LEGAL FRAMEWORK11
5.5 Treaty provisions
Treaty establishing the European Community
5.5.1. Article 280 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), as modified by
the Amsterdam Treaty, contains the following explicit provisions on the fight against fraud
specifically affecting the EU budget:
Article 280 (ex Article 209a)
1.  The Community and the Member States shall counter fraud and any other illegal activities
affecting the financial interests of the Community through measures to be taken in accordance
with this Article, which shall act as a deterrent and be such as to afford effective protection in the
Member States.
2.  Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests
of the Community as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial interests.
3.  Without prejudice to other provisions of this Treaty, the Member States shall coordinate their
action aimed at protecting the financial interests of the Community against fraud. To this end
they shall organise, together with the Commission, close and regular cooperation between the
competent authorities.
4.  The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, after
consulting the Court of Auditors, shall adopt the necessary measures in the fields of the
prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community with a
view to affording effective and equivalent protection in the Member States. These measures shall
not concern the application of national criminal law or the national administration of justice.
5.  The Commission, in cooperation with Member States, shall each year submit to the European
Parliament and to the Council a report on the measures taken for the implementation of this
Article.
5.5.2. This treaty article in paragraph three gives the Commission - and thus UCLAF (now
OLAF) - together with the Member States a role in all "action aimed at protecting the financial
interests of the  Community against fraud".  Specifically, the Commission and the Member
States are called upon to participate in "close and regular cooperation between the competent
authorities".  Thus UCLAF acquires a formal responsibility not only in the coordination of
investigations and the collation of intelligence, but also in prosecutions of anti-EC fraud.
5.5.3. The preparation and adoption of anti-fraud measures connected with the financial
interests of the Community (in practice not always easy to distinguish from other anti-fraud
measures), are brought in paragraph 4 firmly within the Community framework, under the co-
decision procedure between the Council and Parliament12, this being the principal novelty of this
article in comparison with the previous version (TEC Article 209a)13.  In this case, however,
measures affecting the "application of national criminal law or the national administration of
                                                
11 This part of the chapter provides a brief discursive overview of the legal framework in place.  A table
showing the legislation in force, including more detailed summaries of its provisions, can be found in
Annex 2
12 TEC Article 251 (ex 189b)
13 Also reproduced in Annex 2
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justice" are specifically excluded.  It is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to interpret
these provisions.
Treaty on European Union
5.5.4. Fighting crime in a broader sense, including through the application of criminal law, is
nevertheless addressed in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in Title VI as amended by the
Amsterdam Treaty: "Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters".  This
part of the Treaty, which is outside the Community framework, introduces provisions aimed at
tackling cross-border crime generally, covering areas such as police and customs cooperation -
including through Europol - (Article 30), judicial cooperation and the prevention of conflicts of
jurisdiction between Member States (Article 31), operations outside the Member State of origin
(Article 32) and the possible approximation or harmonisation of national criminal laws through
the adoption of framework decisions or the establishment of conventions (Article 34).  The
Court of Justice may be given jurisdiction, under certain conditions, to give preliminary rulings
regarding such framework decisions or conventions and their implementing measures (Article
35 (ex K.7) TEU. The general aim of the Union is set out in Article 29 (ex K.1):
Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union’s objective shall be to
provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by
developing common action among the Member States in the fields of police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters and by preventing and combating racism and xenophobia
.
That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, organised or otherwise, in
particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking
and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud, through:
— closer cooperation between police forces, customs authorities and other competent
authorities in the Member States, both directly and through the European Police Office(Europol), in accordance with the provisions of Articles 30 and 32;
— closer cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities of the Member States in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 31(a) to (d) and 32;
— approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the Member States, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 31(e).
5.5.5. In practice, it is clear that these general provisions on combating crime will also concern
the fight against fraud affecting the Community budget.  Frequently frauds to the detriment of
the EU are only part of a wider fraud affecting national or private interests - an obvious example
being VAT fraud, where a loss of revenue is suffered both by the EU budget and by national
exchequers.  From the point of view of the fight against EU fraud, and the mechanisms
employed in this fight, notably UCLAF/OLAF, there is therefore a major interest in the broader
measures provided for in Articles 29-34 of the TEU.
5.5.6. At the same time, the distinction between measures relating to anti-EC fraud (TEC, thus
the Community framework, i.e. "First Pillar") and measures to combat EU crime in general
(TEU, thus outside the Community framework, i.e. "Third Pillar") draws the key conceptual
lines in the sand. On the one hand, there exists the possibility for the Community, using the co-
decision procedure set out in Article 251 (ex-189b) TEC, to adopt administrative legislation
specifically aimed at tackling anti-EC fraud, without explicitly touching on criminal matters,
and for the Commission to assist and coordinate all action aimed at dealing with such fraud.  On
the other hand, any "legislative" measures touching on criminal law are exclusively the
competence of the Member States, who may, in the context of the TEU choose to coordinate
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their action, using the procedure set out in Article 34 (ex K.6) TEU (requiring unanimity),
notably through the establishment of framework decisions or conventions.14
5.5.7. It is obvious that the distinction made (EU-fraud = Community = administrative
measures versus crime in general = Member States = criminal law measures) is an artificial one
and one which inevitably places UCLAF/OLAF in an ambiguous position.  The ramifications of
this ambiguity will be apparent in the course of this chapter.
5.6 "First pillar" provisions: administrative powers
External inquiries
5.6.1. The administrative measures in place and the powers given to the Commission (thus
UCLAF15) to deal with fraud affecting the European Communities’ financial interests fall into
two categories, external and internal.  The former category, which concerns the fight against
fraud generally, and thus involves Commission (UCLAF, now OLAF) intervention on the
ground in the Member States, is governed by formal Community legislation.   This section is a
brief review of this legislation.
Council Regulation 2988/95 - The protection of the financial interests of the European
Communities16
5.6.2. This regulation, contemporary with the Convention of the same name (see below), was
intended to provide a framework for, though not supersede, the anti-fraud activities of the
European Community already carried out under a disparate range of pre-existing sectoral
regulations. It therefore  establishes a number of general principles.
5.6.3. The regulation studiously avoids the term "fraud" with its criminal law connotations, by
employing the word "irregularity", intentional or otherwise.17  In the same spirit, the regulation
consistently uses the adjective administrative to qualify the measures and sanctions for which it
provides.
5.6.4. The importance of the regulation lies firstly in its mere existence, namely that it
introduces a framework for the Commission’s action against fraud in all sectors of the budget.
Concretely, it provides the Commission with the authority to carry out administrative checks,
introduce specific measures and apply administrative sanctions (including fines) in the
protection of the European Communities’ financial interests.  In accordance with the Treaty
principle that Community financial interests shall receive the same priority as national
                                                
14 It is to be noted however that such measures may (and do) reserve a role for the Community
institutions, including the Commission (hence UCLAF/OLAF) and, optionally, the Court of Justice.
15 UCLAF, in its present form, exists only by virtue of internal Commission decisions.  Its powers and
obligations are delegated to it by the Commission, whose own position is defined in legislation.
16 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2988/95 of 18.12.95 - OJ L312 of 23.12.95
17 The definition of "irregularity" employed in this regulation has already been cited at paragraph 5.1.3
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interests18, it also places Member States and their services under an obligation to take measures
to protect the European Communities’ financial interests and to cooperate with the Commission
for this purpose.  (For details see Annex 2)
Council Regulation 2185/96 - On-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the
Commission in order to protect the financial interests of the European Communities19
5.6.5. This regulation lays down provisions for the administrative on-the-spot checks and
inspections foreseen in Regulation 2988/95 (Article 10).  It is a similar attempt to pull together a
range of disparate rules (contained in sectoral regulations) into a common framework.
5.6.6. The effect of the regulation is to empower the Commission (in practice UCLAF) to carry
out inspections of an administrative nature in the Member States on its own authority and under
its own responsibility (Article 6(1)).  These shall be carried out: (i)  to detect serious
irregularities or irregularities with a transnational dimension, (ii) in response to a weak control
environment or (iii) at the request of the Member State (Article 2). The inspectors are given
parity in terms of  powers, access to persons, premises and documents with an equivalent
national administrative service (Article 7(1)) and their inspection report has the same legal value
as its national equivalent (Article 8(3)). The Commission is placed under an obligation to notify
in advance and cooperate with the relevant national authorities (Article 4) and must, after an
inspection, communicate its results to them(Article 8(2)).  National inspectors may, but need not
necessarily, participate in the inspection. (For details see Annex 2)
5.6.7. As a point of information, this regulation was applied 17 times in 1997 and 24 times in
1998. (It should be noted that it may still be more convenient for UCLAF/OLAF to operate
under older, sectoral regulations, depending on the circumstances of the case.)
Other regulations
5.6.8. As has been mentioned, a number of sector specific regulations also provide the
Commission with powers to act in the fight against fraud.  Their is little point enumerating these
here, but examples include: Regulations nos. 1552/89 (Own Resources), 595/91 (EAGGF),
1681/94 & 1831/94 (Structural Funds).
Internal inquiries
5.6.9. As far as inquiries within the Commission are concerned, there is clearly a great deal of
scope for UCLAF/OLAF’s powers to be extended by way of internal Commission decisions,
while remaining within the scope of formally administrative action.  Until July 1998, a
surprisingly informal and ad hoc approach prevailed.  Thereafter, following the internal ructions
over the ECHO inquiry already referred to and a critical report from the Court of Auditors (see
below) UCLAF’s internal powers were formalised.
                                                
18 Article 280(2) (quoted above at 5.5.1).  NB This does not of course necessarily mean that the same
degree of protection will be provided throughout the Union.
19 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2185/96 of 11.11.96 - OJ L292 of 15.11.96
DOC_EN\DV\381\381230EN.doc 15
5.6.10. It should be noted that it is in the context of internal inquiries that the position of OLAF
has evolved most vis-à-vis UCLAF.  The following is a resumé of UCLAF's position, OLAF
will be discussed in Section 5.11.
Conduct of UCLAF internal inquiries: early provisions
5.6.11. The explicit instructions or procedures which existed prior to the Commission Decision
of 14 July 1998 covered only restricted fields, as follows:
• Notes from the Secretary-General concerning the obligations of officials vis-à-vis
UCLAF and the latter's access to information.  The first of these notes20 incidentally
confirmed the right of the Director of UCLAF to "initiate any investigation" as he saw
fit.
• "Demarcation" agreements, specifying the competences of different services:
. Division of responsibilities between UCLAF and DGs VI and XXI on fraud-
related matters (SEC(95)249 of 10.2.95)
. Cooperation and complementarity between Financial Control and UCLAF. (Note
SG(94)D/141.662 and annex of 6.7.94)
• Agreement with the Court of Auditors on the exchange of information relating to
possible fraud. (Exchange of letters between Mr Weber, responsible member of the
Court (25.7.95) and Mrs Gradin, responsible commissioner (4.10.95))
Conduct of UCLAF internal inquiries: the Commission Decision of 14 July 1998
5.6.12. Following a Communication entitled "Improving Action against Incompetence,
Financial Irregularities, Fraud and Corruption"21, which, albeit in rather vague terms, promised
to tighten up internal provisions on the fight against fraud, the Commission adopted on 14 July
1998 a Decision on the conduct of UCLAF's inquiries.  Although formally concerned with all
UCLAF inquiries, be they external or internal, the Commission decision notes (Article 2) that its
activities outside the Commission are regulated by Council regulations 2988/95 and 2185/96,
together with the various sectoral regulations covering revenue and expenditure.  The Decision
is thus essentially concerned with regulating the conduct of inquiries within the Commission
and/or the mutual obligations of UCLAF and other Commission services in relation to
investigations.  As the covering communication from the Commission President, and
Commissioners Gradin and Liikanen points out, the Decision "consolidates already existing
practices".
                                                
20 Note SG(95)D/141.038 dated 1 February 1995
21 SEC(97)2198 of 18.11.97
DOC_EN\DV\381\381230EN.doc 16
5.6.13. Most importantly, this Decision:
• obliges directors-general and heads of service to report to UCLAF all suspicion of
fraud in their services affecting the European Communities’ financial interests (other
officials may inform either their hierarchical superiors or UCLAF directly);
• authorises the director of UCLAF to undertake internal investigations on his own
initiative (he shall inform the secretary-general at the same time);
• obliges all officials fully to cooperate with UCLAF inspectors and to provide
unrestricted access to all information and documentation;
• imposes a requirement on UCLAF to inform the senior officials responsible in
advance of inspections and of any indication that Commission officials may be involved,
except in exceptional circumstances;
• empowers the Director of UCLAF on his own authority to notify the relevant national
judicial authorities of cases where criminal proceedings may be appropriate and to
report to the AIPN where disciplinary action is indicated;
5.6.14. The above provisions were subsequently clarified by "Detailed Rules of Application"
(Dec. 1998), which specify the internal procedures and responsibilities required for the
application of these principles.
5.6.15. It is worth remembering that both the main Commission decision and the rules of
application on UCLAF were adopted at a time when the Commission was under severe pressure
on fraud issues from the European Parliament and the OLAF idea was already in the air.  As
with many recent developments concerning UCLAF, it is impossible not to see them as an
attempt both to head off external pressure for a more convincing effort to deal with fraud and
corruption within the Commission and, as a fall-back position, to write the ground rules for
whatever finally emerged as the result of such pressure.
5.7 "Third pillar" provisions: activities in the field of criminal law
Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests22
5.7.1. As the Convention and its protocols remain outside the European Community legal
framework and were adopted under the intergovernmental provisions of the "third pillar" to
come into force they require ratification by all the Member States in accordance with national
constitutional arrangements.  At the time of writing, only four Member States had ratified the
Convention.23 In the meantime, the Convention and its protocols are being used "informally" by
UCLAF/OLAF.
                                                
22 Drawn up by Council Act of 26 July 1995 - OJ C316 of 27.11.95
23 Austria, Germany, Finland and Sweden
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5.7.2. In contrast to the regulations outlined above, the Convention deals with the criminal
aspects of fraud affecting the EU budget under the general umbrella of the TEU provisions on
tackling crime in general.  Though it correspondingly reflects the habitual trepidation with
which this subject is addressed, it nevertheless represents a step forward.
5.7.3. The Convention  establishes a shared definition of fraud affecting the Communities’
financial interests24 and that offences meeting this definition will be treated as criminal offences
punishable by criminal penalties, including custodial sentences for serious cases (Articles 1 and
2). It further includes provisions to ensure that rules on jurisdiction and/or extradition between
Member States cannot provide loopholes to avoid prosecution for fraud (Articles 4 and 5) while
placing Member States under an obligation to cooperate in the fields of criminal investigation,
prosecution and sanction of fraud (Article 6).
The two principal Protocols to the Convention25
5.7.4. The first two protocols to the Convention, the most important ones for present
purposes26, put flesh on these relatively bare bones in their respective subject areas.
5.7.5. In the first, dealing with corruption of public servants, a shared definition of such
"corruption" of Community and national officials damaging to the European Communities’
financial interests is established27 and agreement is reached on it being treated as a criminal
offence.
5.7.6. The second is more of a patchwork, including a range of disparate subjects. It is agreed:
first, that money laundering is to be made a criminal offence in all Member States (Article 2);
second, that legal persons are to be made criminally liable for offences of fraud, corruption and
money laundering (Articles 3 and 4); third, that the proceeds of fraud against the financial
interests of the European Communities are to be subject to confiscation (Article 5); and fourth,
that the Commission is explicitly required to cooperate with Member States, both by providing
technical and operational assistance (Article 7(1)) and by participating in the exchange of
information, "so as to establish the facts and to ensure effective action against fraud, active and
passive corruption and money laundering" (Article 7(2)).
Europol
5.7.7. Under the general heading of third pillar measures aimed at combating fraud, mention
should be made of the creation of Europol, which is given an explicit role in promoting
                                                
24 Article 1 (Already cited in paragraph 5.1.2)
25 First Protocol on corruption drawn up by Council Act of 27 September 1996 - OJ C313 of 23.10.96
Second Protocol on the liability of legal persons, confiscation, money laundering and cooperation
between Member States drawn up by Council Act of 19 June 1997 - OJ C221 of 19.7.97
26 A third protocol exists on the "interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice ...
of the Convention on the protection of the financial interests of the European Communities" (Council
Act of 29.11.1996 - OJ C151 of 20.5.1997)
27 The definition of corruption employed in this Protocol is cited at 5.1.6, along with reference to the
related Convention of 26.5.97.
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cooperation between national police forces, customs services and other authorities in Articles 29
and 30 of the Treaty on European Union, for example by coordinating individual operations,
providing specific expertise, promoting liaison arrangements and centralising information on
cross-border crime.
5.8 Remarks on the legal framework
5.8.1. The legal framework described briefly above is characterised by a number of recurring
themes.
• Both the European Community legislation and the EU Convention are driven by a need
to establish a general framework, above and beyond the provisions of separate sectoral
legislation, for the investigation and sanction of fraud.
• All texts touch on matters relating to the criminal jurisdiction of Member States while
cautiously avoiding any apparent infringement of national sovereignty.  This is at the
same time a recognition of the political sensitivity of the subject and a de facto
acknowledgement that the fraud problem cannot seriously be addressed without criminal
legislation taking on a European dimension.
• A strong emphasis is placed on effective cooperation between and coordination of the
actions of Member States in the investigation, prosecution and punishment of fraud.  In
the administrative area, the Commission (i.e. UCLAF/OLAF) is given an increasingly
prominent and explicit role in achieving these.  In the criminal area, operational
cooperation between police and other enforcement services of the Member States is
reinforced, the collection and storage of intelligence data organised and judicial
cooperation strengthened.
• The independent powers of the Commission in the administrative sphere (internally
and externally), including its capacity to carry out investigations on a par with national
authorities in the Member States, have increased significantly. In the criminal sphere, the
Commission has become increasingly involved in the promotion of cooperation (e.g. by
way of its duty to provide technical assistance, its involvement in the exchange of
information, etc.)
5.8.2. The result of the various legislative and non-legislative processes described in this
section, is a rather incoherent and ineffective legal framework.  This is apparent at the outset
from the simple observation that, although the Council clearly perceives the need for concerted
action in the field of criminal law, the fruit of its labours, the Convention and its protocols, have
not, in the absence of the necessary ratification by national parliaments, yet come into force and
will not do so for some time to come.  On the other hand, the legislation which is in force, the
Treaty and the regulations, has provided the Commission with significant powers in the
administrative area.
5.8.3. The distinction which has thus arisen between administrative and criminal jurisdiction is
however not as clear as this contrast might suggest.  UCLAF/OLAF possesses sweeping powers
to investigate and gather intelligence on irregularities affecting the European Communities’
financial interests and to carry out, on its own responsibility, on-the-spot "administrative"
inspections.  This work will, by its very nature, involve UCLAF/OLAF in criminal
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investigations and criminal intelligence, albeit without itself possessing the police powers
needed to gather some of it.
5.8.4. This factor will come into play most obviously in the context of external investigations.
UCLAF/OLAF’s assistance to Member States relates to both criminal and administrative
matters. Thus it is implicit in the legislation that UCLAF/OLAF has a role in the sphere of
criminal investigations and prosecutions, even though this role is never openly acknowledged by
the same legislation in force.  Moreover, there is a mismatch between the scope of
UCLAF/OLAF’s investigations and information-gathering, which is Europe-wide, and the
competence of the judicial authorities it in effect serves, which have strictly national
jurisdictions.
5.8.5. This issue has a special dimension when the potentially criminal acts under investigation
are within the Commission, where UCLAF/OLAF is in reality the sole investigative body able
to initiate fraud inquiries.  In such cases, no judicial authority holds jurisdiction until such time
as, in effect, the Commission grants such jurisdiction by waiving the immunities of officials
and/or the inviolability of Commission premises.
5.8.6. These questions are more than purely theoretical ones.  Coordination between national
judicial authorities when dealing with "European" fraud cases and the relationship between the
Commission and national judicial authorities have been a constant source of difficulty, with the
result, that prosecution for frauds to the detriment of the European Communities’ financial
interests remain extremely rare and even more rarely successful.
5.8.7. This chapter will henceforth seek to look beyond the legal rules, firstly to the practice -
namely how UCLAF, now OLAF, and the European Union’s prosecution of fraud work in
reality - and secondly to attempt a "blueprint" for the future of the fight against fraud.
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FIGHTING FRAUD IN PRACTICE
5.9 The functioning of UCLAF
The rationale behind UCLAF
5.9.1. The formal evolution of UCLAF described in the preceding sections has almost always
been the result of an attempt to respond to perceived failings in the European Union’s response
to fraud.  It has thus been designed piecemeal in order to plug the gaps in the system as they
became impossible to ignore.  Examples of such "gaps" include (in roughly chronological
order):
• poor coordination between Commission services in the fight against fraud,
• poor information exchange with and between Member States,
• poor cooperation (even rivalry) between DGXX and UCLAF,
• poor coordination of enquiries into EU fraud carried out by different Member States’
authorities,
• the need for the Commission to be able to participate in/carry out on-the-spot
inquiries,
• a need for a central intelligence-gathering body concerned with EU fraud,
• ineffective prosecutions of EU fraud through low national priority for such action,
poor communication and cooperation between judicial authorities (consequently a low
conviction rate),
• the need for an independent body able to carry out inquiries within the Commission
and able to deal directly with the judicial authorities.
5.9.2. These needs are real ones, interconnected ones and ones which could not collectively be
met by any other body.  However, the process by which UCLAF has taken shape has left a
variety of open questions, which apply as much to OLAF in the future as to UCLAF in the past.
Three in particular suggest themselves:
• Is UCLAF/OLAF necessarily the only or the best body to meet the needs identified?
• How well did UCLAF carry out its tasks?
• Does UCLAF/OLAF fully meet the needs of the EU in the fight against fraud?
5.9.3. The simplest response to these questions is that plainly UCLAF is not the Union’s
definitive response to fraud.  The mere fact that OLAF has just come into being makes this point
clear. The evolution continues and, one suspects, is bound to do so for some time yet.  The next
section will consider the deeper, abstract reasons for which UCLAF, henceforth OLAF, is not -
cannot be - the end of the story.  The present section, by contrast, will look at the reality on the
ground.
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Court of Auditors’ report 8/98
5.9.4. So bound up were all concerned with the Commission’s need to equip itself with a body
dedicated to the fight against fraud and to provide that body with the necessary powers, that the
Court of Auditors’ special report 8/9828, which examines UCLAF in the same critical way as it
would any other Commission service, came as something of a shock.
5.9.5. The main weaknesses of UCLAF identified by the Court may be summarised as follows:
a) Policy on and organisational arrangements for inquiries, both within the Commission
and in relation to Member States’ judicial authorities, were poorly defined or over-
complicated.  (Here, the Commission decision of 14 July 1998, which the Court’s
report pre-dates, represents a partial response to the Court’s criticism.)
b) Security measures and procedures were frequently not correctly implemented.  Staff
were not properly vetted and rules on confidential information were inconsistently
applied.
c) An excessive proportion of UCLAF’s staff were temporary agents, leading to a lack of
continuity.
d) Electronic databases (the basis of much intelligence gathering work) were neither
fully operational nor effective.  The use made of the databases was in practice very
limited.
e) Management information on UCLAF’s caseload of 1,327 open files (as at April 1997)
was inadequate to ensure their correct handling.  No standard procedures for
documentation or for the pursuit of inquiries were in existence, nor were measures in
place to ensure that case files were maintained to the standards of criminal evidence
required in Member States.
f) UCLAF’s cooperation with Member States was hampered by the manner in which the
privileges and immunities of EU staff are handled by the Commission, while national
legislation in turn imposed serious practical constraints on UCLAF’s inspections in
Member States.
5.9.6. The criticisms of the Court are worrying, and indeed were one of the factors which
encouraged the European Parliament to press for the creation of a new, reinforced (and more
independent) anti-fraud unit, OLAF.29  The criticisms fall into two main categories: those
concerning UCLAF’s efficiency, internal organisation and general functioning, and those which
concern its position within the Commission and its relationship with national judicial
authorities.
                                                
28
"Special Report No 8/98 on the Commission’s services specifically involved in the fight against fraud,
notably the 'unité de coordination de la lutte anti-fraude' (UCLAF) together with the Commission's
replies" - OJ C230 of 22 July 1998
29 See Bösch report A4-0297/98, adopted by European Parliament on 7 October 1998
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5.9.7. In terms of the first category, it is of course vital that UCLAF function as efficiently and
effectively as possible.  If it is to earn the respect - and thus full wholehearted cooperation - of
both th Member States’ investigative and judicial authorities and the staff and services of the
Commission, UCLAF must show that its investigations are rigorous, objective, procedurally
correct, reasonably rapid and, above all, produce results.  It is the quality of the management and
staff of UCLAF which, in the first instance, will determine whether it is able to achieve this.
The Court’s findings indicate that UCLAF (now OLAF) has some way to go in this area.
5.9.8. As to the second category, UCLAF can also point to "structural" failings elsewhere.  The
Court of Auditors is clear that the legal framework within which UCLAF works is undeveloped
and that procedural rules and the constraints of national legislation place serious hindrances in
the way of successful inquiries.  Moreover, it challenges the Commission’s good faith (at least
on occasions): suggesting that it does not possess a "zero tolerance" policy towards corruption
on the part of its officials, applies the privileges and immunities of Community officials too
restrictively and hesitates to refer cases to the competent judicial authorities.  It mentions
occasions when "dossiers have been withheld from UCLAF investigators" and "incriminating
documents have been systematically destroyed"30, finding that this indicates that UCLAF is
insufficiently empowered within the Commission.
5.9.9. In other words, the Court finds a two-way problem: structurally UCLAF does not have
sufficient status, but at the same time operationally it does not make the most of the status it has.
The two are, needless to say, connected.
The standing of UCLAF, conduct of inquiries
5.9.10. The findings of the Court chime with those of the Committee.  Although the Committee
has not examined the internal workings of UCLAF in the detail of the audit carried out by the
Court, it has perceived in the course of its work a counterproductive tension between UCLAF
and other Commission services.  Several of the operational services with whom the Committee
have had contacts have expressed some reserves about the functioning of UCLAF, while some
have seen its involvement as a positive obstacle to the resolution of an affair.  To be fair, much
reticence can be traced to the particularly strict requirements of confidentiality under which
UCLAF, by the very nature of its job, must work.  Investigators can thus be seen as intrusive
and arrogant.  Moreover, as is well known, no-one loves a cop...
5.9.11. Notwithstanding such unavoidable professional handicaps, it remains the case that
UCLAF has encountered problems in its relations with Commission services to which it would
do well to pay serious attention. Bitter recriminations have surrounded its handling of some
internal cases, with UCLAF having been perceived, rightly or wrongly, as excessively secretive
or not wholly objective.  On the other hand, UCLAF may be right in pointing to a strong
defensive reflex on the part of services within which internal inquiries are carried out. It is
undeniable that far from treating UCLAF as an ally in the fight against fraud, services often
perceive it as an antagonist with whom cooperation is to be kept to an indispensable minimum.
5.9.12. As far as the outside world is concerned, UCLAF continues to experience - though for
different reasons - difficulties with its counterparts and interlocutors in Member States.  Partly
through sensitivities over sovereignty, partly through ignorance of UCLAF’s role, partly through
                                                
30 Special report 8/98 para. 2.33
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reserves over providing detailed criminal intelligence to a body which is part of the Commission
and allegedly too because of doubts about UCLAF’s functional competence, some of the
national investigative authorities are less than fully enthusiastic about cooperating with UCLAF.
Nevertheless, progress is being made, thanks in part to a policy of recruiting from the ranks of
national bodies, in improving the situation.  Where relations are good and the reciprocal roles
well understood, UCLAF has proved itself able to provide genuine added-value, leading to a
number of highly-successful operations (for example in the fight against large-scale organised
cigarette smuggling).
5.9.13. One result of a better understanding with national authorities has been a move to formal
bilateral cooperation agreements.  To date, one such agreement exists, with the Italian Guardia
di Finanza, while three more are close to finalisation and another nine "on the table". More such
agreements can be expected if and when UCLAF (now OLAF) succeeds in convincing national
counterparts not only of its formal powers and status but also of its professionalism, reliability
and usefulness.
Relations with Commission audit and control services
5.9.14. If operational services of the Commission show some reticence in their dealings with
UCLAF, those in a similar line of work tend also to be critical.  The most notable example is
DG XX (Financial Control), the audit division of which has played a crucial role in uncovering
many of the cases of fraud detected by the Commission.  As indicated at the beginning of this
chapter, the detection of administrative and/or financial irregularities is the basis of the detection
of most fraud, certainly in the Community context.  The skills of the auditor are often highly
relevant in the constitution of a fraud file.  In practice, as the Committee itself has seen, UCLAF
leans heavily on the findings of DG XX auditors in the preparation of its cases.  There is thus a
large overlap between the work of the internal audit service and that of the anti-fraud unit,
especially as UCLAF is itself only an administrative body by statute and thus does not always
possess in its own right the police-style powers which are needed to go significantly beyond
auditors can do.
5.9.15. This fact accounts for the dissatisfaction expressed to the Committee by several auditors
as to UCLAF’s conduct of investigations.  The commonest complaint is that when files are
handed over to UCLAF because they contain indications of fraud, they "disappear" with no
visible follow-up.
5.9.16. The internal agreement defining the respective tasks of UCLAF and DG XX (Financial
Control) referred to in paragraph 5.6.11 is of surprisingly little help in this context. Essentially,
this document defines the respective tasks of the two departments, outlines areas where their
activities potentially overlap and indicates which information should be exchanged.  In practical
terms, the document amounts to little more than a general undertaking to exchange relevant
information and does not really resolve the day-to-day overlaps in competence which are bound
to arise.  Because of the interrelation between irregularities and fraud, they do so constantly.
5.9.17. The issue is not so much that overlaps of competence occur, but that of how an
investigation should then proceed.  In the context of its first report31, the Committee found that
once a suspicion of fraud arose in any given case, UCLAF took over the investigation. The
                                                
31 Especially paragraphs 9.4.15-18
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subsequent de facto exclusion of DG XX from the dossier was often counterproductive in that
the skills of the auditor remained necessary in the context of the inquiry, rather than those
possessed by UCLAF, whose staff typically have a different professional profile32.  It is in the
nature of UCLAF’s role that a great deal of its work will be in the field of what in the vogue
term is known as "forensic accountancy".33
Is UCLAF (OLAF) necessary?
5.9.18. Indeed, if, as this report elsewhere proposes (chapter 4), the internal audit function is to
be significantly reinforced, the considerations above pose a question as to the nature of the
added-value provided by a separate fraud unit. Some would go as far as to challenge its very
existence: to put it more provocatively, is UCLAF/OLAF necessary?
5.9.19. The Committee would answer in the affirmative, whilst pointing out that it is salutary to
ask the question, in that it concentrates the mind on the fact that, in spite of the functional
overlaps, UCLAF (henceforth OLAF) is in law and in fact something very different from an
audit service.
5.9.20. Function: It is worth recalling the essential functions of internal audit and the fraud unit.
The former is primarily a diagnostic management tool, the purpose of which is to verify the
regularity and efficiency of financial management and identify systemic weaknesses; the latter is
a body set up to investigate specific cases of fraud and corruption within the scope of criminal
law and, in accordance with the requirements of "due process",  to prepare the file for whatever
follow-up it is to receive.  Although his findings may be relevant to a fraud inquiry, the auditor
is not primarily concerned with the detection of criminal offences, nor necessarily possesses the
skills to identify and investigate it, especially if the legal requirements of a criminal
investigation (attention to the rights of defence, etc) are to be respected..
5.9.21. Independence: First and foremost, an investigative body must be - and be seen to be -
independent of any influences which might compromise the objectivity, even impartiality, of its
inquiries and other activities.  The vision of internal audit favoured by this Committee - as a tool
of management at the disposal of the President - will arguably have the side-effect of
diminishing the independence of the audit service with respect to the Commission hierarchy.  At
the same time, the move to OLAF is specifically designed to reinforce the fraud unit’s
independence by distancing it from the Commission.
5.9.22. Relations with Member States: Independence is also one of the virtues which can
reinforce cooperation with Member States’ investigative and judicial services, some of which
have hesitated to deal on an equal footing with a body which remained organisationally part of
the large (and thus probably leaky) administration of the Commission.  (Such hesitation
particularly relates to the provision of information, which, for reasons of due process, must
remain confidential.) Moreover, UCLAF’s "criminal" competences depend on effective
cooperation with those Member State authorities in possession of the necessary investigative
                                                
32 By specialisation/background, the investigative staff of UCLAF (80 persons) is currently composed as
follows: 25 customs investigators, 15 agricultural inspectors, 7 police, 8 tax inspectors, 8
accountants/financial inspectors, 2 magistrates, 2 lawyers, 2 computer specialists, 3 administration and
8 others.
33 i.e. accountancy aimed at detecting and/or investigating crime
DOC_EN\DV\381\381230EN.doc 25
powers.  Understanding of and competence in criminal investigation techniques, powers and due
process are thus vital to UCLAF and do not form part of a professional training in audit.
5.9.23. Competences in the judicial sphere: A key part of UCLAF’s task is to ensure appropriate
judicial action is taken on the basis of fraud investigations.  It has thus received not only the
right to initiate inquiries, but also the right to decide, in cases where it has been responsible for
the investigation, when files should be submitted to the judicial authorities for (i) further
investigation with police powers, and (ii) possible prosecution.  In cases where it acts primarily
as a coordinator between Member State investigators, it assumes an important role in the
preparation of prosecutions and should be able to assist with the preparation of cases and the
provision of evidence in a form usable in criminal courts thus becoming a party to the secrecy
which characterises criminal proceedings for the sake of the suspect’s rights of defence.
5.9.24. Intelligence and information-gathering: one of the foremost "gaps" which UCLAF has to
plug is the gathering of criminal intelligence on a Europe-wide basis.  Experience has repeatedly
shown that the fragmentation of criminal investigation and jurisdiction - and hence of
intelligence - between 15 Member States (and beyond) is a substantial weakness in the fight
against crime organised across borders, thus showing the need for a central collation point.34  At
least as far as the European Communities’ financial interests are concerned, only a specialised
and secure anti-fraud unit can fulfil this sensitive role.
5.9.25. So the need for UCLAF/OLAF does exist.  This does not however prevent the reality of
functional overlaps with other services, notably the audit service, within the Commission. The
problem is thus essentially one of ensuring that UCLAF/OLAF possesses the professional
competence it needs to accomplish its task as effectively as possible.
Results
5.9.26. It is the right and responsibility of any public service organisation to be judged by its
results. So much of the discussion of UCLAF revolves around points of legal and other principle
that its results are neglected.  This is in part because "results" are extraordinarily difficult to
measure in this context.  UCLAF’s central role, of coordination and facilitation of fraud
investigations and prosecutions in the Member States, is not one which allows for the easy
identification of a success rate", as the ultimate outcome of UCLAF activities is affected by
numerous variables beyond its direct control.  Even in the case of internal investigations, where
UCLAF is - at least in the first instance - the sole investigating authority, a "result" in terms of
administrative, disciplinary or judicial sanctions depends on other authorities.
5.9.27. Figures provided by UCLAF (May 1999) illustrate the difficulties of measuring results.
Since 1996, 298 criminal prosecutions have been opened in respect of cases where UCLAF was
involved. 51 of these involved more than one national jurisdiction.  Only 13 of the 298
prosecutions have so far produced any judgement.  In internal cases, of the thirty inquiries
carried out by UCLAF, twelve have so far led to criminal prosecutions, but none to a conviction.
5.9.28. Another possibility is to look at the number of inquiries opened and closed by UCLAF.
The following table shows the situation as at 10 May 1999 for cases opened since 1996:
                                                
34 The European Parliament’s Committee of Inquiry into the Community Transit System makes this point
powerfully and at length. (Final report A4-0053/97)
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Own resources EAGGF G’tee Structural actions Direct exp. TotalsYear
Opened
Opened Still
open
Opened Still
open
Opened Still
open
Opened Still
open
Opened Still
open
1996 110 84 72 48 90 76 47 39 319 247
1997 83 72 48 28 60 54 41 34 232 188
1998 97 97 73 54 41 40 24 22 235 213
5-1999 28 28 18 18 6 5 11 10 63 61
Totals 318 281 211 148 197 175 123 105 849 709
5.9.29. These figures, which display a tendency for UCLAF enquiries to remain open for
prolonged periods should obviously be treated with caution.  A "case", for example, could be
anything from a relatively minor one-off irregularity involving a small amount, to a multi-
million Euro fraud committed by organised criminals.  It is reasonable for UCLAF to prioritise
its "big" cases. Clearly too, cases opened more recently can hardly be expected to have been
closed.  Moreover, the ability or otherwise of UCLAF to close a file may depend on others
rather than itself.  Nevertheless, read in conjunction with the findings of the Court of Auditors
(5.9.4-9), the very high ratio of cases remaining open (84%), and especially those for a
protracted period (79% from 1996/7) must be a cause for concern.
5.10 Intervention of national judicial authorities
Basic principles
5.10.1. In keeping with the principle that criminal law and the administration of justice remain
outside the Community framework, criminal investigation, prosecution and punishment of fraud
in the Member States against EU financial interests fall under the exclusive competence of
national jurisdictions.  Any criminal offence involving the European Communities’ financial
interests is thus investigated, prosecuted and sanctioned according to national rules.
5.10.2. Where acts of officials or members of the Commission itself are concerned, no Member
State automatically holds criminal jurisdiction.  Nor does any national authority automatically
have the right of access to Commission premises.  In practice, the competent Court is decided on
a case-by-case basis, depending where the facts in question took place.  For obvious reasons,
Belgium is the jurisdiction most often called upon to act in connection with Commission
officials.  To proceed with a criminal investigation, a national jurisdiction must request waivers
of official immunity (for suspects), of professional secrecy (for witnesses) and of the
inviolability of Commission premises (for searches and access to documents).35
                                                
35 In this context, it should be noted that the obligations of cooperation between the Commission and the
Member States work both ways.  According to the Court of Justice, the Commission must cooperate in
criminal investigations with the Member States’ authorities, in acceding as much as possible to requests
for waivers of immunity or of professional secrecy ("Zwartveld" ruling of 13.7.90 - Case C-2/88. Imm.
Rec. 1990, I-3365).
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External cases
5.10.3. The development of the European Union, and above all the creation of a single market, is
one (though far from the only one) of the factors which has served to make borders between
Member States largely irrelevant in economic terms.  This is a statement of fact rather than
ideology.  Customs formalities no longer exist between Member States of the Union, the
introduction of the Euro removes exchange costs from cross-border transactions, financial
markets already largely disregarded borders and the technology of money transfer means that
vast sums can move around the world at a moment’s notice.  Economic activity, licit and illicit,
is a Europe-wide affair, not to say a world-wide affair.
5.10.4. This Europe of free movement and exchange doubtless brings enormous benefits to its
people, but has proceeded in an asymmetrical fashion.  The protections that are provided to the
citizen against economic crime (other forms of crime lie outside the mandate of this
Committee), which includes fraudulent misappropriation of EU funds, have not kept pace.
Where economic activities, money and private individuals move freely across borders, criminal
jurisdiction stops.  This is far from a theoretical difficulty, but gives rise to a series of legal and
practical difficulties the extent of which is well known in professional circles but remains in
practical terms largely unacknowledged by the political world in general.
5.10.5. By way of example, one might refer to the Appel de Genève (Geneva Appeal) launched
by seven investigating magistrates from a variety of EU countries, plus Switzerland, in which
the signatories denounced the extreme difficulty, not to say near impossibility, of pursuing
international economic crime and called for the "[abolition] of outmoded protectionism in the
police and judicial fields". From the statistics submitted by one of signatories, it would appear
that only a limited percentage of the requests made for international assistance is granted and
that the percentage is no higher in the case of requests between Member States than those
involving third countries (34%).36
5.10.6. All attempts so far to respond to what is an acknowledged problem revolve around the
political mantra of "better cooperation".  Of course, it is impossible not to agree with calls for
better cooperation between police, customs and other investigative services, and indeed between
judiciaries. Such calls are easy to make, but the difficulties in achieving the desired level of
cooperation are formidable, for two principal sets of reasons.
5.10.7. Firstly, the mechanisms of cooperation are frequently slow, formalistic and inefficient,
and are likely to remain so as long as national systems remain significantly different. The
structures, resources, priorities, skills, techniques, rules and procedures of national equivalents
are often very different.  It is often difficult for an investigator or a prosecutor even to identify
the appropriate contact in another Member State, let alone obtain a swift and effective response
to a call for assistance.  Even in a supposedly integrated system such as customs, where a single
customs area is being administered, it has been found that investigative cooperation is more
form than substance:
                                                
36 Drawn from speech at public hearing of the European Parliament on the "Geneva Appeal" - 15-16 April
1996 (see EP working document DG IV/LIBE 101 FR p.40)
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"...cooperation between customs is ineffective.  This ineffectiveness begins with the
reluctance to share basic operational intelligence (...) and ends with practical
investigative cooperation which is, notwithstanding the best but necessarily limited
efforts of UCLAF, successful only on an occasional basis"37
5.10.8. If and when it comes to prosecutions, the same source is even more bleak:
"Even where cases of transit fraud are successfully investigated by the authorities, the
deterrent effect this may have is severely undermined by the legal difficulties in bringing
effective prosecutions in cases involving more than one country. Prosecutors point in the
first place to the practical obstacles to legal cooperation, which can be as simple as not
knowing whom to contact in another Member State, and to the formalistic and
burdensome procedures required to request assistance in a prosecution.
When cooperation is obtained, prosecutions can flounder on the differences between
national legal systems. Standards of evidence vary, creating potential problems with the
admissibility in court of documents and evidence from other Member States. At present
there is no agreement between Member States on definitions of fraud [pending
ratification of the Convention - ed.], the sanctions to be applied or the procedures by
which cross-border prosecutions can be brought. The result is that similar offences
receive substantially different treatment depending on the place of prosecution."38
5.10.9. Secondly, cooperation, however effective, can only take place when the need for it has
been identified.  The mere realisation that a fraud has taken place, particularly if the fraud is a
sophisticated international one and/or an EU-related one, is very often impossible from the
perspective of a single Member State.
5.10.10. The notion of cooperation is thus to be taken with a pinch of salt, a fact which has not
entirely escaped the European Union’s legislator, which has attempted to make the concept more
operational in a variety of ways. One example, responding in part to the second of the two
observations quoted above and operationalising Articles 29-31 of the EU Treaty, is the
European Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests.  This
though, five years after adoption, is not yet in force.  Another example is UCLAF.
5.10.11. UCLAF, for all the limitations outlined in this chapter, is a genuine attempt to
overcome some of the problems of making cooperation work in practice, although its small size
means that its impact remains limited.  Moreover, its activities are concentrated in the field of
investigation, rather than prosecution, though, with some prompting from the European
Parliament, it has recently started to build up its legal competences with a view to assisting
national prosecutors.  At present, this latter field of activity remains embryonic, and without any
formal status whatsoever.  Moreover, as soon as UCLAF becomes involved in the process of
prosecution, the question of its precise relations with judicial authorities arises.  In complicated
EU-centred  cases, UCLAF could find itself principally responsible for the preparation of a case,
though it would have to rely on the "police powers" of national authorities to obtain certain
                                                
37 European Parliament’s Committee of Inquiry into the Community Transit System - Final Report,
paragraph 7.6.2
38 Idem. Paragraphs 8.5.1 and 8.5.2
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kinds of evidence.  However, it works in cooperation with national authorities, not under the
direction of any judicial authority.  For work which is in nature, if not in name, a criminal
investigation, UCLAF has hitherto been worryingly free of any judicial control beyond the legal
review of a general kind exercised a posteriori by the Court of Justice over the Commission as a
whole.39
Internal cases
5.10.12. This lack of an overseeing judicial authority is much more obvious and potentially
damaging in cases involving Commission officials.  Here, UCLAF more overtly plays a de facto
role of criminal investigation, but answerable to whom and with the authority of whom?  As
noted above, jurisdiction over the Commission, its officials and buildings, is acquired on a case-
by-case basis by whatever national authority or authorities are competent.  But no judicial
authority holds permanent authority over UCLAF, authorises its investigations, verifies the
conduct and quality of its inquiries or ensures (until after the event, when it may be too late) that
its results meet admissible standards of evidence.  Bizarrely perhaps, UCLAF is equipping itself
with internal "judicial" expertise (i.e. a team of magistrates) in a partial response to this void.
5.10.13. The protection of EU officials may admittedly not be at the top of their list of
priorities, but a situation of this sort should be of some concern to civil libertarians.  The
provisions covering OLAF go some way to meet this objection, but are as yet insufficient.
5.10.14. Conversely, the absence of a judicial authority with any control over UCLAF or
OLAF, or any general competence for criminal offences committed by EU officials, adversely
affects the effectiveness with which judicial sanctions are applied.  The first obstacle to
expeditiousness in the judicial field is the requirement for national investigators and/or
prosecutors to obtain waivers of immunity.  Such waivers are granted by the Commission,
which is supposed to assess the request on the basis of the "interests of the Communities"40.  In
the cases examined by the Committee, the Commission has almost always acceded to a direct
request for waivers of immunity relatively quickly (though exceptions have occurred).  More
often, the reluctance, official or unofficial, to permit a national judiciary to exercise jurisdiction
over Commission officials is manifest at an earlier stage, when evidence is (i) being gathered or
(ii) is to be sent to judicial authorities.41 In spite of recent moves to reinforce UCLAF’s
independence in these fields, the mere fact that the immunity waiver system exists is the first
obstacle to effective judicial action.
5.10.15. It should be noted at this point that UCLAF investigations may also lead to
disciplinary measures, including - in theory - monetary sanctions against authorising officers
under Article 22 of the staff regulations.  In practice, the existence of this potential sanction has
done nothing to compensate for the inability of national prosecutors so far to bring successful
                                                
39 TEC Articles 230-234 (ex 173-177)
40 Staff Regulations, Art. 23: "The privileges and immunities enjoyed by officials are accorded solely in
the interests of the Communities..."
41 Following the Commission decision of 14 July 1998, the communication of a case file to judicial
authorities has been at the sole discretion of the Director of UCLAF.  Previously, the final decision fell
to the Secretary-General.
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criminal prosecutions.  No monetary sanction under Article 22 has ever yet been applied.  (The
problem of disciplinary sanctions is examined in chapter 6 of this report.)
5.10.16. The second problem is more closely related to the national judicial authorities
themselves. Since 1994, criminal prosecutions have been opened for alleged financial offences
in the case of twelve EU officials.  Not one has so far led to a conviction.  The Committee has
neither the intention nor the authority to comment on the merits of any case in particular, but
nevertheless finds it surprising that convictions in national criminal courts are so hard to obtain.
Reasons are likely to reflect those encountered outside the Commission: evidence is required
from different Member States, fraud mechanisms are complex and require a detailed
understanding of EU regulations and procedures, priority accorded to such cases is relatively
low, resources are limited etc.  Some of these problems are intrinsic to the nature of the offence
(complexity, etc.) but others are attributable to a lack of expertise on the part of prosecutors and
the dispersal of jurisdiction between different countries.
5.10.17. In one case, examined by the Committee, different parties to the same internal fraud
were under investigation by different national judiciaries, and at one stage were simultaneously
in custody.  Even so, and even though UCLAF did its best to bring the authorities together, no
effective coordination between them was possible.  Neither of the suspects has yet been brought
to trial.  In other actions, UCLAF has submitted the same dossier at the same time to different
national authorities with the result that some have acted, others have not.  Such inconsistent
follow-up, which may be down to a banal question of resources, substantially reduces the
likelihood that a corrupt official and his/her accomplices will ever pay a judicial price for their
actions.
REMEDIES
5.11 OLAF - an assessment
5.11.1. On 28 April 1999, the Commission decided to establish OLAF - "Office pour la lutte
anti-fraude"42.  The new Office came into being on 1 June 1999. At the same time, a new
regulation of the Council and the European Parliament was adopted to regulate the activities of
the Office43.  The decision and the regulation are the culmination of a process driven by the
European Parliament, and notably the rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Control,
Herbert Bösch, to increase the independence of the anti-fraud unit vis-à-vis the Commission
while at the same time bringing it under some kind of quasi-judicial supervision.  In effect,
OLAF responds to some of the objections to the status of UCLAF outlined above.
Powers, structures and competences
5.11.2. Much of the regulation delineating OLAF's powers and competences for internal
investigations is based on the Commission decision of 14 July 1998 on UCLAF.  There are
however some significant changes, the principal novelties of OLAF in relation to UCLAF being
as follows:
                                                
42 Commission decision of 28 April 1999 (SEC(99)802) - OJ L136 of 31.5.99
43 Regulation (EC) 1073/1999 of 25 May 1999 - OJ L136 of 31.5.99
DOC_EN\DV\381\381230EN.doc 31
• OLAF is empowered to carry out administrative inquiries, without notice, within all
the institutions and other bodies of the European Union. Inquiries may involve members
and staff of the institutions (Article 4). (A separate interinstitutional agreement puts this
provision into effect44).
• All institutions and other bodies are placed under a corresponding obligation fully to
cooperate in OLAF inquiries and to communicate to OLAF any information concerning
possible fraud. (Articles 4 and 7)45
• In accordance with the Staff Regulations (explicitly cited in the Regulation)46, an
official is entitled to submit a complaint to the Director of OLAF in respect of any act
committed by the Office as part of an investigation adversely affecting his/her interests.
It follows that the Court of Justice hereby assumes a right of judicial review over OLAF
investigations. (Article 14)
• Inquiry reports are formally required to meet the standards of evidence required in the
jurisdiction where they are liable to be used in a subsequent prosecution (Article 9).
OLAF reports also become sufficient in themselves to "establish ... the irregular nature
of the activities under investigation" (Article 2)
• OLAF’s activities will be monitored by a Supervisory Committee, composed of five
suitably qualified independent persons, nominated by common accord of the
Commission, the Council and the European Parliament (Article 11).  Its task will be to
give a general opinion on the activities of the Office, either on its own initiative or at the
request of the Director of OLAF.  It may not however interfere "with the conduct of
investigations in progress" (para.1). It shall report, annually at least, to the institutions.
• The Director of OLAF shall similarly be appointed by common accord of the
institutions, for a fixed five-year term (renewable once), on the basis of a shortlist
submitted by the Commission.  He/she shall report to the institutions on the activities of
OLAF, without compromising the confidentiality of investigations. (Article 12)
• The Director of OLAF shall be the appointing authority (AIPN) for the staff of OLAF.
• OLAF will be funded by way of a separate budget section in Part A (administrative
appropriations) of the Commission budget. (Article 13)
• It is foreseen that the total staff strength of OLAF will be in the region of 300, about
twice the numbers available to UCLAF.
                                                
44 Interinstitutional Agreement of 25 May 1999 between the European Parliament, the Council of the
European Union and the Commission of the European Communities concerning internal investigations
by the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) - 1999/352/EC, ECSC, EURATOM - OJ L136 of 31.5.1999
45 Modifications to the Staff Regulations are probably necessary to provide a reliable legal basis for this
provision.
46 Articles 90(2) and 91 of the Staff Regulations
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5.11.3. In reality, there are two fundamental aspects to the OLAF project: independence and
supervision.
5.11.4. It is to be noted that OLAF remains administratively part of the Commission, in light of
the fact that its formal powers in respect of the outside world (still, it should not be forgotten,
the lion’s share of its work) are attributed formally to the Commission. Moreover, it is useful for
OLAF to be "inside" the Commission, both for the purposes of inquiries and in order to
contribute to the shaping of legislation where there is a fraud interest.  At the same time
however, the legislator has ensured that OLAF is functionally and administratively independent,
notably in the appointment procedure for the director, the separate staff structure and the
separate budget. By these mechanisms, the degree of independence already given to the director
of UCLAF, in particular to initiate inquiries and to forward conclusions to the judicial
authorities, are guaranteed and reinforced.
5.11.5. In the light of its experience of the first report, and subsequent inquiries, the Committee
supports this reinforcement of UCLAF’s independence.  Occasions have arisen in the past where
the question of possible "political" interference from the Commission hierarchy has so
insistently been posed that the issue must be resolved beyond any doubt, if for no other reason
than to ensure confidence in the objectivity of anti-fraud inquiries.
5.11.6. It need hardly be repeated that such independence carries a risk, a risk which the
legislator has attempted to allay (i) by giving all the institutions a voice in the nomination of the
Director, (ii) by limiting the possibility of successive renewals of his/her term of office, (iii) by
setting up a formal reporting requirement to the EU institutions and (iv) by creating a
supervisory committee.
5.11.7. This final element is both the most interesting and unsatisfactory aspect of the OLAF
reform.  On the one hand, it is vital that there be some guarantor of the proper and effective
conduct of OLAF’s inquiries.  The qualifications specified for the members of the Committee47
clearly reflect a concern that the supervision exercised be akin to that of a judicial authority (e.g.
a juge de l’instruction), able to assess the conduct of investigations with a professional eye.  But
precisely here lies the problem, quasi-judicial authority is placed in the hands of a group whose
authority and status, with all respect for the future nominees, will be open to question.
5.11.8. The use of an ad hoc committee, or to use the popular parlance, the recourse to "wise
persons", is a useful occasional mechanism (the present report could hardly suggest otherwise),
but should never be more than an exceptional one.  The members of the OLAF Supervisory
Committee, whose names "emerge" in the somewhat mysterious processes which characterise
such appointments48, will, through no fault of their own, have a legitimacy problem which
sooner or later will have to be addressed.  This would be particularly the case if the Supervisory
Committee were to pass comment, though without breaking its obligation not to interfere in
current investigations, on the regularity of individual decisions taken and conduct of specific
inquiries carried out.
                                                
47
"...five independent outside persons who possess the qualifications required for appointment in their
respective countries to senior posts relating to the Office’s areas of activity" (Regulation 1073/1999,
Art. 11 (2)).
48 The decision of the Parliament, Council and Commission appointing the Supervisory Committee of
OLAF was made on 19 July 1999 (OJ C220 of 31.7.99)
DOC_EN\DV\381\381230EN.doc 33
Functioning of OLAF
5.11.9. At the same time as it addresses the important structural problems of UCLAF, OLAF
must provide a convincing response to the operational criticisms levelled at it, chiefly by the
Court of Auditors.  OLAF will be a new organisation with significantly increased resources and
institutional status, and must therefore represent something of a new start, avoiding an uncritical
"importation" of UCLAF’s organisation and structures.  It is not for the present report to go into
detail on the internal management of OLAF, this being a matter for its director, but two or three
specific themes do merit comment.
5.11.10. Information technology. The role of UCLAF as a central data and intelligence-
gathering point has been repeatedly stressed as an area in which its contribution can be crucial.
It has a perspective on the problem of EU fraud which cannot by definition be shared by any
other body, and potentially possesses a tool whereby its Treaty obligation to enable cooperation
between Member States can take very concrete form.  However, the Court of Auditors is
extremely critical of UCLAF’s activities in this area, which depend essentially on the use of
electronic data, a conclusion which has been confirmed by the Committee’s own observations.
It is therefore up to OLAF to remedy this failing through equipping itself with adequately
qualified staff and with a concerted effort in the exploitation of information technology.  As far
as possible, the potential synergies and exchange of information with Europol should be
maximised.
5.11.11. Competence in the field of audit. The operational dependence of UCLAF on audit
findings has already been noted, as has its own lack of competence in this area.  All the
considerations concerning the position of OLAF, plus the recommendations of this report on the
future of audit in the Commission persuade the Committee that it would be inappropriate to
integrate the internal audit service and OLAF.  However, in recognition of the likelihood that a
substantial proportion of OLAF’s cases will initially arise through the findings of the internal
audit service, and that further investigation will continue to rely in many respects on the skills of
the auditor, OLAF should equip itself with sufficient numbers of specialists in the field of
"forensic" accountancy.  It should moreover reach an operational working agreement with the
new Internal Audit Service (and until then with DG XX - see chapter 4) on cooperation and
information exchange as a matter of urgency.
5.11.12. Legal experts. UCLAF has begun, though as yet left uncompleted, the process of
constituting a team of legal experts from each Member State49.  At present, four such experts
have been recruited. OLAF should pursue this initiative, the underlying objective of which is to
respect the stipulation in the new regulation that OLAF files should be presented in a form
acceptable to and admissible in Member States’ courts.  The role of the legal experts/prosecutors
within what remains an administrative body should be to provide assistance and advice to the
Director of OLAF, to investigative staff in the context of specific inquiries and, as necessary to
national prosecutors dealing with EU cases.
                                                
49 Based on the recommendation of the Committee of Inquiry into the Community Transit system that the
Commission "establish a legal "clearing house", composed of national legal experts, whose task would
be to ensure that evidence for use in courts outside its Member State of origin corresponds to the
requirements of those courts." (Recommendation 18)
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5.11.13. Staff and resources.  The case-load of UCLAF is out of proportion with its resources.
While it is impossible to say what the "right" balance between workload and resources is, it is
essential that OLAF be adequately equipped to accomplish its task.  If a body established with
such relative fanfare, and as the subject of such expectations, proves unable to cope with the
task it has been given, it will be dead in the water from the outset.  However, while staff
numbers must be adequate to the task, the key question is one of quality.  Given the criticisms
levelled at UCLAF, the transfer of personnel from UCLAF to OLAF should also be the subject
of critical evaluation.
Conclusions on OLAF
5.11.14. OLAF is a step forward as compared with UCLAF.  It is an attempt to address the
problems which have insistently arisen, not just as questions of theory, but in connection with
specific inquiries, notably in the cases which indirectly set in train the series of events which led
to the resignation of the Commission. It should become fully operational without delay.
However, OLAF also represents unfinished business.  It is hard not to see the Supervisory
Committee and the presence of prosecution experts within OLAF as a provisional and ultimately
unsatisfactory solution to a question which insistently arises.
5.11.15. We thus return to the issue which has lurked constantly in the background of this
chapter. How can quasi-criminal investigations in UCLAF, the need for some judicial control
over such investigations and more effective criminal prosecutions of EU fraud be reconciled
with the principle that criminal jurisdiction is and for the foreseeable future will remain a
prerogative of national legal and judicial systems?
5.12 The legal framework - a blueprint
Introduction
5.12.1. It is a basic tenet of the Committee that it comes to its subject matter from "outside",
without any kind of preconceptions.  It has thus tried to base itself as rigorously as possible on
the evidence available to it and argue its case from first principles.
5.12.2. This point is worth repeating here because the subject of this section is one which evokes
strong political and ideological reactions.  As has been made clear throughout this chapter, the
administration of criminal justice touches national sensitivities in a way that many other subjects
do not, this being a factor which has exercised a strong influence over the formulation of
legislation affecting the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests.  For
present purposes, it is therefore to be emphasised the Committee is, as it were, "neutral" on the
subject.  It will put its case purely on the basis of the problem presented to it, though clearly it
would fail in its task if it were to ignore the current political circumstances
Premise
5.12.3. The Committee believes that this chapter has demonstrated that the distinction between
administrative measures and measures in the criminal field which formally conditions
UCLAF/OLAF’s work in the fight against fraud is not a reliable one.  The convenient fiction
that OLAF is a purely administrative service also exposes the European Union to a dual risk:
firstly that OLAF will enjoy de facto criminal investigation powers without proper supervision;
secondly, and conversely, that prosecutions for EU-related fraud will continue to be
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handicapped by the inability of national prosecutors to come to grips with internal EU and/or
transnational cases.
5.12.4. These two "missing" aspects of the legal framework are thus taken in turn.
Supervision of OLAF
5.12.5. As discussed in the previous section, the EU legislator has attempted to address the
problem of the supervision of the activities of an independent OLAF though the mechanism of a
Supervisory Committee.  This is a half-way-house about which the Committee has already
expressed its reservations.  In order to arrive at a more satisfactory system, it is worth briefly
considering what precisely OLAF’s supervisor should do. The important functions can be
outlined as follows:
• Protection of individual rights: OLAF has considerable powers of direct intervention
in the course of its inquiries and its findings can be highly prejudicial to the individuals
concerned, including in terms of possible criminal charges.  Under the rule of law,  the
investigative authority (OLAF) must be subject to a form of supervision designed to
ensure that inquiries are conducted objectively, civil rights are protected and correct
procedures are observed.
• Guarantor of "judicial standards": In a task which is complementary to the above (in
fact is in many respects identical), the supervisor should also ensure that the inquiries
conducted by OLAF are of sufficient quality to be usable in court: i.e. that procedures
are respected, individual rights duly protected, evidence adequately presented, etc.
• Quality control: Beyond such "passive" supervision of the standards observed in
inquiries, but for essentially the same reasons of presenting the best possible cases, the
supervisor should also ensure that investigations are adequately thoroughgoing, pursue
all avenues of inquiry, maximise cooperation between and sufficiently involve national
authorities, etc.
5.12.6. The functions outlined above, particularly the first two, which are of a judicial nature,
require not only expertise, but also total legitimacy.  The current Supervisory Committee fails
on both counts.  On expertise, not because of any doubts about the  personal qualifications of the
five individuals chosen, but because five individuals, working moreover on a part-time basis,
cannot know the judicial systems and procedures of fifteen Member States, examine all, or even
a representative sample of, inquiries in sufficient depth or adequately knowledgeable about the
investigative/law enforcement agencies of Member States, still less maintain contacts with them.
On legitimacy, for the reasons outlined above: the members of the Supervisory Committee are
nominated, according to criteria and processes which are vague, by a political authority and thus
enjoy neither the backing or status of any recognised judicial body.
5.12.7. The EU legislator has in fact recognised these limitations, with the result that the tasks of
the supervisor have been restricted (for example to the ex post review of the handling of cases
only - see 5.11.2 ff), with the effect that it cannot in any case meet the desiderata for the
supervisory body outlined above.
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5.12.8. The qualities an OLAF supervisor must have are therefore apparent.  For the purpose of
the first two functions, it must be a judicial body.  Moreover, it must have expertise in the
judicial procedures in all Member States and have contacts with and access to the courts and the
investigative services of all Member States.
5.12.9. The Committee can at present see no practical alternative to incorporating a judicial
supervision function of the type envisaged within the existing apparatus of the European Union.
Given that the function in question is substantially of a judicial nature - being akin to the control
of legality of investigations carried out by a supervising magistrate (e.g. the "juge de
l’instruction" - the judicial guarantor of the civil rights of suspects in inquiries) in several
European legal systems - the Committee would propose the creation of a special chamber of the
Court of First Instance (and, if necessary, also within the Court of Justice itself), with the
purpose of exercising judicial supervision over the inquiries of OLAF.
An EU Prosecutor’s Office
5.12.10. In contrast to the necessary neutrality of the judicial supervisor, the European Union
also stands in need of a judicial body which has the express purpose of defending its interests
(and thus the interests of the European public as a whole) through the judicial system, just as, in
national systems, public prosecutor’s offices represent the interests of the general public.
5.12.11. An EU public prosecutor’s office should be designed to provide the necessary
competence to present criminal cases relating to EU fraud throughout the Union, while leaving
the jurisdiction of national courts untouched and without implying any fundamental effects on
national legal systems. It could also solve the thorny issue of jurisdiction over the Commission
(and other EU institutions), its officials and premises, by making the very concepts of immunity
and inviolability redundant.  As far as legitimacy is concerned, this would be drawn from the
judicial structure decided upon.  The following are the essential principles which should
characterise the prosecution office:
• Its competence should be restricted to investigations and prosecutions concerning the
protection of the European Communities’ financial interests.
• Its investigation and prosecuting acts should have the same legal effect throughout the
EU in all Member States, in line with "the Union’s objective", laid down in TEU Article
29 (ex K.1), "... to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom,
security and justice".
• It should be integrated with the national prosecution services of Member States, in
order to be able to bring prosecutions in national courts, while retaining autonomy
insofar as the prioritisation of cases and the conduct of inquiries are concerned.
• It should have the authority to direct investigations both by OLAF and, through
national prosecution services according to national mechanisms, by the relevant national
authorities.
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• It should be responsible for ensuring optimum cooperation and coordination between
national prosecution services and/or prosecutions taking place before different national
courts.
• It should exercise direct, unrestricted jurisdiction over the members, staff and
premises of EU institutions and bodies (i.e. no requirement for waivers of immunity,
etc.)
• It should itself be subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.
5.12.12. These desiderata point to a central EU public prosecutor, supported by a network of
prosecutors within national systems (and subject to national rules) operating under his/her
instructions and taking decisions with effect throughout the whole territory of the EU.  It is
important to emphasise the hybrid nature of model which emerges, which will in effect be as
national as possible, with its Community structure kept to a bare minimum. However, it is
essential that the ultimate authority on EU-fraud cases be the EU public prosecutor, who must
be able to have a bearing on how prosecutions are selected, prioritised and conducted
independently of instructions emanating from within national services.  Unless the prosecutors
in Member States are able to proceed in accordance with European priorities, prosecutions will
quickly fall foul of the lack of coordination between Member States that characterise them now.
Corpus Juris50
5.12.13. An effort to describe a system of the sort outlined in the preceding subsections, and
notably an EU Public Prosecutor’s Office, is contained within Corpus Juris  (the exception being
the arrangements for the supervision of OLAF, which it does not cover).  The Corpus Juris is
the result of a project for a "European Legal Area" launched following considerable preparatory
consultations and reports and indeed interparliamentary conferences.
5.12.14. The departure point for the Corpus Juris provisions relating to criminal procedure
(Articles 18-35) is the establishment of a single legal area for the purposes of investigation,
prosecution, trial and execution of sentences for the offences described in the Criminal Law part
of the Corpus, this legal area comprising the territory of all the Member States of the European
Union.  For this purpose, it proposes the creation of a European Public Prosecutor (EPP), made
up of a European Director of Public Prosecutions and European delegated Public Prosecutors
residing in the capital of every Member State.  This EPP is indivisible, implying that any act of
any of its members in any Member State is taken as an act of the EPP itself (Article 18).  It
further implies that members of the EPP have competence across the EU and that warrants for
arrest , transfers of persons under arrest and judgements have full effect across the EU (Article
24).
5.12.15. Other key features of the Corpus Juris are that:
(i) the decision to prosecute is taken by the EPP (Article 19);
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"Corpus Juris: introducing penal provisions for the purpose of the financial interests of the European
Union" edited by Mireille Delmas-Marty. (Paris, 1997)
DOC_EN\DV\381\381230EN.doc 38
(ii) it is up to the EPP to investigate cases and to do so neutrally, i.e. seeking evidence of
innocence as well as of guilt (Article 20, which also details the powers of
investigation) and, when the investigation is complete, either to bring or decide not to
bring the prosecution (Article 21);
(iii) it is for the EPP to present the prosecution before the court of trial, which shall be one
of the 15 single national courts designated for this purpose by each Member State (in
order to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, the case shall be heard in the Member State (a)
where most of the evidence is found, (b) where the effects of the offence are greatest
or (c) where the accused is resident - with any disputes as to jurisdiction to be settled
by the European Court of Justice) (Articles 22, 26 and 28);
(iv) it is for the EPP, alongside the competent national authority, to oversee the
implementation of sentences in the Member State designated as the place of execution
of the decision (Article 23);
(v) judicial control, throughout the preparatory proceedings (i.e. from the initial
investigation until the decision to prosecute) is exercised by a "judge of freedoms"
appointed by each Member State from the court where the EPP is based (Article 25)
5.12.16. The Corpus Juris solution contains a coherent solution for the problems posed by the
prosecution of offences affecting the financial interests of the European Communities and other
EU related criminal offences. However, its wish to effect far-reaching amendments in one step
makes it subject to a range of potential legal, political and even constitutional difficulties,
already apparent in the context of the follow-up studies.
5.12.17. Rather than rehearse again here the arguments which surround Corpus Juris, the
Committee prefers to address the question of a new legal framework in terms of the practical -
and practicable - steps which could be taken towards the creation of a genuine European legal
area for EU-related financial offences. It should not be excluded that the end destination of this
process would resemble the system proposed in Corpus Juris as it would be based on the same
underlying principle of a single “area of freedom, security and justice” (Article 29 (ex K.1)
TEU).
5.13 The new legal framework - gradual implementation
5.13.1. The following schema for the gradual creation of a new legal framework would apply to
the prosecution and sentencing in the criminal courts of the Member States of fraud and other
criminal offences as defined in European Acts and Conventions.  The first two stages could, in
the view of the Committee, be implemented within the framework of the existing treaties,
notably the so-called "third pillar" (Title VI of the TEU "Provisions on Police and Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal Matters").  The third and final stage should be the subject of further
progress in the context of the next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), before the accession of
new Member States.
The starting point: desiderata
The Member States should ratify the existing Convention on the protection of the financial
interests of the European Communities and the associated protocols.  This would provide a first
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stage in arriving at common definitions of the relevant criminal offences and in ensuring an
equivalence of treatment through the Member States.  Further definitions of the same, or other,
EU criminal offences (basically those referred to in Article 29 (ex K.1) TEU) would in time have
subsequently to be developed, by using first pillar regulations or directives (Article 280 (ex
209a) TEC) or third pillar legal instruments (conventions or framework decisions under Article
34 (ex K.6) TEU).  In a similar fashion, common standards of criminal investigation should be
agreed (though in the light of the fact that all Member States are signatories to the European
Convention on Human Rights, this should be largely a technical process). In respect of such
common definitions and standards, jurisdiction should be given to the Court of Justice.
5.13.2. Budgetary support could be made available from the European Union to the Member
States to assist them in putting in place the structures proposed below, at 5.13.5, and in
providing the necessary human resources.
First Stage
5.13.3. In order to improve the investigation and prosecution of EU fraud by members, officials
and other agents of European institutions and bodies, the following steps are proposed:
• the EU would appoint a high-level official responsible for the coordination of prosecutions
of EU fraud - European Public Prosecutor. S/he should possess the qualifications required
for appointment to the highest judicial office and have extensive experience in the
administration of criminal justice in one of the Member States.
• The European Public Prosecutor would have guaranteed independence from all European
institutions.  S/he would work in close cooperation with the Director of OLAF, who would
report directly to him/her in connection with criminal cases.
• During the first stage, the European Public Prosecutor would only hold jurisdiction
regarding internal criminal offences, i.e. those committed by members and staff of
Community institutions and bodies. S/he would refer cases for further prosecution and
judgement to the appropriate judicial authorities.
• The  European Public Prosecutor would have direct, unrestricted jurisdiction over the
members, staff and premises of EU institutions and bodies, without any requirement for
waivers of immunity, etc.
• The legality and proper control of OLAF investigations and of decisions of the  European
Public Prosecutor would be supervised by the new chamber referred to in 5.12.9.
Second stage
5.13.4. During the second stage, all criminal prosecutions in matters referred to in Article 29 (ex
K.1) TEU and  including fraud and corruption affecting the financial interests of the European
Communities, would take place, as now, according to national procedures.  At this level the
Committee proposes:
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• On the basis of a framework decision of the Council or, if necessary, a convention51 between
Member States, each would establish, according to national law and procedures, a
Prosecution Office for European Offences within its national prosecution services.
• These national Prosecution Offices for European Offences would each be concerned with
the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences referred to in Article 29 TEU,
including fraud and corruption affecting the financial interests of the European
Communities. They would also be concerned with the investigation and prosecution of
wider criminal offences which are intertwined with these.
• The Prosecution Offices for European Offences would be competent for the entire territory
of their Member States.  In Member States where different systems of criminal justice exist,
different offices may be created.
• The Prosecution Offices for European Offences would act through national police forces and
before national criminal courts, on the basis of the powers accorded by national law and in
conformity with national criminal procedure.
• The Prosecution Offices for European Offences would be integrated within the relevant
national structure, subject to exactly the same hierarchical authority, constitutional
constraints, rules of professional conduct, etc. as all other national prosecutors.
• Each Prosecution Office for European Offences would be under an obligation to achieve
maximum cooperation, where appropriate, with its counterparts in other Member States and
with OLAF, particularly in view of the need to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction. Each should
possess a specialised judicial police unit, competent for its entire territory concerning EU
cases and operating under the responsibility and upon the instructions of the national
Prosecutions Office for European Offences.
5.13.5. In order to facilitate and make effective cooperation between Member States and with
OLAF within the framework of (particularly) Article 6 of the Convention on the Protection of
the financial interests of the European Communities, the European Public Prosecutor referred to
under 5.13.4 would at this stage:
• be given all information liable to give rise to criminal prosecutions in the possession of
OLAF and would be responsible for referring it, with appropriate advice, to the competent
national authorities, generally the national  Prosecution Offices for European Offences.
• offer advice to national Prosecution Offices for European Offences and act as a liaison
between them.  In cases involving either more than one Member State or any Member
State(s) plus any European Institution(s), OLAF would be bound to follow his/her advice
while the Prosecution Offices for European Offences would be expected to do so, unless
there are clearly motivated grounds for derogating therefrom.
• offer advice - in order to prevent conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States - to the
Prosecution Offices for European Offences involved as to which jurisdiction should take
precedence for the investigation and prosecution of a specific offence, making use of criteria
                                                
51 TEU Article 34 (ex-K.7) paragraph 2(b)
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like those set out in Article 26, para. 2 of the Corpus Juris (see above, 5.12.15 (iii)) would
be used. The Prosecution Offices for European Offences involved would be expected to
follow such advice,  unless, again, they have clearly motivated grounds for derogating
therefrom.
• hold jurisdiction to request the urgent authentication by the competent national authorities of
judicial investigation and prosecution acts taken by the competent authorities in one Member
State for use in another.  If such authentication has not occurred within a period of three
months following the request, the national authorities must give reasons, duly motivated, for
not following it up.
• be required each year, on the basis particularly of the advice given to national authorities
pursuant to the preceeding paragraphs, to publish an Annual Report to be submitted to all
EU institutions summarising the cases handled during the year, highlighting the action taken
by national Prosecution Offices for European Offences and the results achieved.  This report
should be as detailed as possible without compromising due legal process.  The Prosecution
Offices for European Offences should provide the European Public Prosecutor with all
information necessary for the preparation of this report.
5.13.6. At the latest during the second stage, Member States would designate the national
court(s) where the national Prosecution Offices for European Offences is located and to be
responsible for the supervision of the legality and proper conduct of the proceedings of its
national Prosecution Offices for European Offences during the preparatory stages, i.e. from the
initial investigation until the decision to commit the case to trial.  Acts carried out during these
preparatory stages by OLAF and by the European Public Prosecutor would be supervised as
provided for in paragraph 5.13.4, last indent by the new chamber referred to in 5.12.11.
Third Stage
5.13.7. Arrangements set up in the first and second stages should be transformed during the third
stage into a system similar to that proposed in the Corpus Juris, allowing the European Public
Prosecutor and the Prosecution Offices for European Offences to develop into an indivisible
and independent European Prosecutions Office with delegated public prosecutors in the Member
States in possession of jurisdiction for both internal and external criminal offences and of which
OLAF and the national investigation units would be part. This last stage in the reform should
establish the European Union as a single legal area for the purposes of investigation,
prosecution, trial and execution of sentence concerning EU offences.  Acts of the European and
national branches of the European Prosecutions Office should be subjected to judicial review
during the investigation stage by independent judges at the Community and/or national level.
Time schedule
5.13.8. The gradual implementation of the legal framework described above should occur in
accordance with a well-established time schedule.  Of the three stages, the last should be
decided by  the next IGC or at an ad hoc IGC shortly thereafter, whilst the first should be
implemented in the near future, with the second to follow as soon as possible thereafter.
5.13.9. In order to prepare the reforms and to implement them within the desired time-schedule,
a working group should be established forthwith by the Council, Commission and Parliament to
formulate detailed proposals as to the legal instruments needed and their content.
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5.14 Recommendations
5.14.1. The Committee found that the current legal framework for combating fraud against the
financial interests of the European Communities is as yet incoherent and incomplete, largely
because the Commission (i.e. UCLAF/OLAF) possesses only administrative law powers and
competences, which however have important implications in the area of criminal law.  Thus the
existing framework (i) fails to recognise and accommodate the true nature of UCLAF/OLAF, (ii)
leaves the legal instruments for the investigation, prosecution and punishment of fraud
ineffective and (iii) fails to provide sufficient guarantees of individual liberties.
5.14.2. The independence of OLAF vis-à-vis the Commission in particular must be and remain a
fundamental point of principle if the organisation is to play its role, which is substantially of
criminal investigation, fairly and effectively. (5.11.4-8)
5.14.3. OLAF must earn the respect, and thus wholehearted cooperation, both of EU institutions
and personnel and of Member States’ investigative and judicial authorities through ensuring that
its inquiries are – and are seen to be – independent, rigorous, objective, procedurally correct,
reasonably rapid and ultimately productive of results. (5.9.4-7)
5.14.4. OLAF’s activities must be subject to the supervision of a judicial authority  in order to
guarantee due legal process in the course of investigations and the protection of the civil rights
of persons affected, directly or indirectly, by inquiries.  In this context, the existing Supervisory
Committee of OLAF, though fulfilling a useful transitional role, cannot be considered adequate
and should be replaced by a special chamber of the Court of First Instance created for this
purpose (and, on appeal, also by a chamber of the Court of Justice). (5.12.5-5.12.9)
5.14.5. With a view to its role as a central data and criminal intelligence collation point, OLAF
must take action to overcome the failings of UCLAF (identified by the Court of Auditors in
particular) in the exploitation of information technology.  While respecting the data protection
requirements of Community and Member State legislation, it should also do the utmost to
maximise the potential synergies with national authorities and with Europol in this area (5.9.5,
5.11.10)
5.14.6. OLAF must possess adequate human resources to deal with its case-load at least as
effectively as an equivalent Member State service.  It should also ensure that certain lacunae in
the staffing of UCLAF are remedied, notably through the recruitment of adequate specialist
expertise, beyond its core investigative personnel, in the fields of (a) auditing, especially
“forensic accountancy”, (b) information technology, (c) prosecution and (d) judicial procedures
in Member States.  All OLAF staff should moreover be selected strictly on the basis of their
suitability for OLAF’s purposes, which should preclude any “automatic” transfer of UCLAF
staff to the new organisation. (5.11.9-13)
5.14.7. In preparation for the introduction of the new legal framework described hereafter, the
Member States should (i) ratify the Convention on the protection of the financial interests of the
European Communities (ii) further develop common definitions of relevant criminal offences
and procedures, and (iii) formally agree common standards of criminal investigation within the
context of the European Convention on Human Rights (5.13.2)
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5.14.8. With the foregoing principles in mind, the Committee recommends a three-stage
introduction of a new legal framework for the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences
affecting the financial interests of the European Communities in accordance with the proposal
set out in this report (section 5.13), summarised as follows:
• Stage 1: Appointment of an independent European Public Prosecutor (EPP).  The EPP
would hold unrestricted jurisdiction (i.e. without the obstacle of official immunity or
confidentiality) for offences committed by  members and officials of EU institutions and
bodies.  S/he would work closely with the Director of OLAF and prepare prosecutions as
appropriate. Prosecutions would be referred to the appropriate national court.  The legality of
OLAF investigations and of EPP decisions would be supervised by a special chamber of the
Court of First Instance (5.13.4)
• Stage 2: Creation in each Member State of a national Prosecution Office for European
Offences (POEO) which would be competent for its entire territory.  A POEO would be
established within each national prosecution service specifically to deal with cases wholly or
partially affecting the financial interests of the European Communities.  POEOs would act
through national police forces and before national criminal courts in conformity with
national criminal procedure. The legality of the POEO’s activities would be supervised in
each Member State by a single court, the same court at which it is located.  (5.13.5, 7)
The EPP would receive from OLAF all information liable to give rise to criminal
proceedings and be responsible for referring it, with appropriate advice, to the appropriate
POEO.  The EPP would moreover act as liaison between the POEOs of different Member
States, notably advising them on possible conflicts of jurisdiction on cases involving more
than one Member State and making recommendations for their resolution.  The EPP would
report annually to the EU institutions on its activities and on the action taken by the POEOs
as a result of its recommendations. (5.13.6)
• Stage 3:  Creation, on the basis of the EPP and POEOs, of a single, indivisible European
Prosecution Office (EPO) with delegated public prosecutors in the Member States holding
jurisdiction for all offences affecting the financial interests of the European Communities.
The EPO would operate through OLAF and national investigation units.  In terms of EU
fraud, this stage of the reform would create the single “area of freedom, security and justice”
foreseen by the Treaty (TEU Art. 29) (5.13.7)
5.14.9. Preparation of the three-stage introduction of a new legal framework should begin
immediately and implementation achieved within the following timescale:
• First stage: within one year
• Second stage: as soon as possible thereafter,
• Third stage: to be agreed at the next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), or at an ad hoc
IGC shortly thereafter.  (5.13.9-10)
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ANNEX 1 - HISTORY OF UCLAF - CHRONOLOGY
Date
Reference Development
1984-89 Repeated requests from the Committee on Budgetary
Control of the European Parliament for the constitution of a
"flying squad" able to carry out on-the-spot checks in
Member States in cases of suspected fraud affecting the
financial interests of the Community.  Backing from
Council and the Court of Auditors.
20.11.87 COM(87)572 &
COM(87)PV891
On the basis of an internal report on its anti-fraud activities,
the Commission decides to establish a central anti-fraud
coordination unit, UCLAF (Unité de Coordination de la
Lutte Anti-Fraude) and to generalise anti-fraud cells in the
main spending/revenue services.
July 1988 UCLAF becomes operational
May 1989 45-point work programme for fraud prevention,
cooperation with Member States, etc. presented to te
Member States.  Annual report published from 1989
onwards.
Nov.1992 SEC(92)2045
of 4.11.92
On the basis of Parliament recommendations in the 1990
discharge, UCLAF's role is strengthened, though still on the
basis of shared responsibility with anti-fraud cells in DGs
VI (Agriculture), XIX (Budget), XX (Financial Control)
and XXI (Customs and Indirect Taxation).  UCLAF staff
totals 32, anti-fraud staff in DGs 89.
Early 1993 Political responsibility for UCLAF transferred to the
Commissioner responsible for the Budget, Mr
Schmidhuber.
Dec. 1993 European Parliament adopts 1994 budget, including 50 new
posts (35 temporary - 15 permanent) specifically for
UCLAF. Prior to this decision, total staff = 50
July 1994 Note
SG(94)D/141.662
Division of competences and terms of reference agreed
between UCLAF and DG XX (Financial Control)
Up to early
1995
Under pressure from European Parliament (postponement
of 1992 discharge), Commission recruits the additional
UCLAF staff foreseen, though 8 seconded national experts
withdrawn. (Net gain 42 staff)
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Jan. 1995 UCLAF placed under the responsibility of the
Commissioner specifically responsible for the fight against
fraud (and for financial control), Mrs Gradin.  (Budgetary
matters, financial control and the fight against fraud
previously all under the responsibility of a single
commissioner)
1.2.1995 Note
SG(95)D/141.038
The Secretary-General informs all services of UCLAF’s
right to initiate inquiries on its own initiative on the basis of
information from any source. Obligation on services to
inform UCLAF of any suspicion of fraud in their areas of
competence.
Feb – June
1995
SEC(95)249 of
10.2.95
All operational anti-fraud activities centralised in UCLAF.
40 staff (of 72 working in relevant units) transferred from
DGs VI and XXI to UCLAF.  Division of responsibilities
between UCLAF and line DGs defined.  Constitution of
specialised units dealing with non-agricultural expenditure.
26.7.95 95/C 316/03 Council act drawing up the Convention on the protection of
the European Communities' financial interests. Common
definition of fraud, criminalisation of anti-EU fraud in all
Member States (not yet ratified - not yet in force)
18.12.95 Reg. 2988/95 Adoption of Council regulation on the protection of the
European Communities' financial interests, providing
general framework for Commission's activities in the fight
against fraud.
26.2.1996 SEC(96)345 First reminder to services of obligation to communicate
suspected irregularities/fraud to UCLAF
1.4.1996 Note from
secretary-general
Following experience of documents having been withheld
by officials, the Secretary-general authorises UCLAF
directly to access documents held by authorising officers in
Commission departments, with the prior approval of the
secretary-general and the director-general for staff on a
case-by-case basis.
25.7.96 Letter from Mr
Weber, member
of the Court
Agreement between the Commission and the Court of
Auditors on the exchange of information relating to fraud
or suspected fraud detected by the Court in the course of its
work.
27.9.96 96C 313/01 First Protocol to Convention on protection of European
Communities' financial interests: corruption of Community
and national officials. (Not yet ratified or in force)
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11.11.96 Reg. 2185/96 Adoption of Council regulation providing overall
framework for on-the-spot checks in Member States by
UCLAF in the context of its inquiries.
14.4.97 SEC(96) 345/2
(replaces version
of 26.2.96)
The Secretary-general issues second reminder of the
obligation of services to inform UCLAF of suspected cases
of fraud.  Individual officials given the option of informing
their superiors or going directly to UCLAF.
19.6.97 97/C 221/02 Second protocol to the Convention on the protection of the
European Communities’ financial interests: liability of legal
persons, confiscation, money laundering and cooperation
between Commission and Member States. (Not yet ratified
or in force)
June 1997 SEC(97)1293
of 25.6.93
Secretary-general and the director general of the legal
service confirm the rules on dealing with national judicial
authorities and UCLAF’s responsibility for contacts on
fraud matters.
18.11.1997 SEC(97)2198 Commission communication on "Sound Financial
Management - Improving Action against Incompetence,
Financial Irregularities, Fraud and Corruption" proposes
strengthening of UCLAF, the formalisation of its powers
and the reinforcement of its independence within the
Commission
1.5.98 UCLAF becomes a "task force".  Total staff now 141 (118
statutory, of which 21 temporary, 13 seconded national
experts and 10 auxiliary/interim/consultant)
14.7.1998 On the basis of an internal communication, Commission
decision formalising the powers, competences and
responsibilities of UCLAF and regulating the conduct of its
inquiries.
7.10.1998 A4-0297/98 European Parliament calls for creation of "OLAF" (Bösch
report)
4.12.1998 COM(98)717 First Commission proposal for creation of OLAF
9.12.1998 Implementing decision for decision of 14.7.98 with
"detailed rules of application"
17.3.1999 COM(99)140 Amended Commission proposal for creation of OLAF
28.4.1999 SEC(1999)802 Commission decision to create OLAF
6.5.1999 A4-0240/99 European Parliament adopts Bösch report on creation of
OLAF and related legislation (co-decision procedure)
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25.5.1999 Reg. 1073/1999
IIA 1999/352
Adoption of regulation concerning the investigations of
OLAF and of the interinstitutional agreement concerning its
internal investigations.
19.7.1999 1999/C220/01 Decision appointing the supervisory board of OLAF
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A N N E X   2  - S U M M A R I E S   O F   L E G A L   A N D   R E G U L A T O R Y   T E X T S
Administrative provisions (First pillar) Criminal provisions (Third pillar)
External Internal
T R E A T I E S
EC Treaty Article 280 (ex 209a)
Article 280 (ex Article 209a)
1.  The Community and the Member States shall counter fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the
Community through measures to be taken in accordance with this Article, which shall act as a deterrent and be such as to afford effective
protection in the Member States.
2.  Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community as they take to counter
fraud affecting their own financial interests.
3.  Without prejudice to other provisions of this Treaty, the Member States shall coordinate their action aimed at protecting the financial
interests of the Community against fraud. To this end they shall organise, together with the Commission, close and regular cooperation
between the competent authorities.
4.  The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, after consulting the Court of Auditors, shall adopt the
necessary measures in the fields of the prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community with a view
to affording effective and equivalent protection in the Member States. These measures shall not concern the application of national criminal
law or the national administration of justice.
5.  The Commission, in cooperation with Member States, shall each year submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on
the measures taken for the implementation of this Article.
EU Treaty Article 29 (ex Article K.1)
Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union’s
objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area
of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the
Member States in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters and by preventing and combating racism and xenophobia.
That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime,
organised or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and
offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking,
corruption and fraud, through:
— closer cooperation between police forces, customs authorities and other
competent authorities in the Member States, both directly and through
the European Police Office (Europol), in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 30 and 32;
— closer cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities of
the Member States in accordance with the provisions of Articles 31(a)
to (d) and 32;
— approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the
Member States, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31(e).
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For information
EC Treaty (Maastricht) Article 209a – Previous Version (i.e. before Amsterdam amendments)
Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community as they take to counter
fraud affecting their own financial interests.
Without prejudice to other provisions of this Treaty, Member States shall coordinate their action aimed at protecting the financial interests
of the Community against fraud. To this end they shall organise, with the help of the Commission, close and regular cooperation between
the competent departments of their administrations.
EU Treaty Article 30 (ex Article K.2)
1.  Common action in the field of police cooperation shall include:(a) operational cooperation between the competent authorities, including
the police, customs and other specialised law enforcement services of
the Member States in relation to the prevention, detection and
investigation of criminal offences;(b) the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant
information, including information held by law enforcement services
on reports on suspicious financial transactions, in particular through
Europol, subject to appropriate provisions on the protection of personal
data;(c) cooperation and joint initiatives in training, the exchange of liaison
officers, secondments, the use of equipment, and forensic research;(d) the common evaluation of particular investigative techniques in relation
to the detection of serious forms of organised crime.
2.  The Council shall promote cooperation through Europol and shall in
particular, within a period of five years after the date of entry into force of the
Treaty of Amsterdam:(a) enable Europol to facilitate and support the preparation, and to
encourage the coordination and carrying out, of specific investigative
actions by the competent authorities of the Member States, including
operational actions of joint teams comprising representatives of
Europol in a support capacity;(b) adopt measures allowing Europol to ask the competent authorities of
the Member States to conduct and coordinate their investigations in
specific cases and to develop specific expertise which may be put at the
disposal of Member States to assist them in investigating cases of
organised crime;(c) promote liaison arrangements between prosecuting/investigating
officials specialising in the fight against organised crime in close
cooperation with Europol;(d) establish a research, documentation and statistical network on cross-
border crime.
EU Treaty Article 31 (ex Article K.3)
Common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall include:(a) facilitating and accelerating cooperation between competent ministries
and judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation
to proceedings and the enforcement of decisions;(b) facilitating extradition between Member States;(c) ensuring compatibility in rules applicable in the Member States, as may
be necessary to improve such cooperation;(d) preventing conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States;(e) progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to
the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the fields of
organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.
EU Treaty Article 32 ( ex Article K.4)
The Council shall lay down the conditions and limitations under which the
competent authorities referred to in Articles 30 and 31 may operate in the
territory of another Member State in liaison and in agreement with the
authorities of that State.
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EU Treaty Article 33 (ex Article K.5)
This Title shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon
Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the
safeguarding of internal security.
EU Treaty Article 34 (ex Article K.6)
1.  In the areas referred to in this Title, Member States shall inform and
consult one another within the Council with a view to coordinating their
action. To that end, they shall establish collaboration between the relevant
departments of their administrations.
2.  The Council shall take measures and promote cooperation, using the
appropriate form and procedures as set out in this Title, contributing to the
pursuit of the objectives of the Union. To that end, acting unanimously on the
initiative of any Member State or of the Commission, the Council may:(a) adopt common positions defining the approach of the Union to a
particular matter;(b) adopt framework decisions for the purpose of approximation of the
laws and regulations of the Member States. Framework decisions shall
be binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved but
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.
They shall not entail direct effect;(c) adopt decisions for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of
this Title, excluding any approximation of the laws and regulations of
the Member States. These decisions shall be binding and shall not
entail direct effect; the Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall
adopt measures necessary to implement those decisions at the level of
the Union;(d) establish conventions which it shall recommend to the Member States
for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements. Member States shall begin the procedures applicable
within a time limit to be set by the Council.
Unless they provide otherwise, conventions shall, once adopted by at
least half of the Member States, enter into force for those Member
States. Measures implementing conventions shall be adopted within the
Council by a majority of two-thirds of the Contracting Parties.
3.  Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority, the votes of
its members shall be weighted as laid down in Article 205(2) of the Treaty
establishing the European Community, and for their adoption acts of the
Council shall require at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members.
4.  For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its
members.
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O T H E R   R U L E S   A N D   R E G U L A T I O N S
Regulation 2988/95
Main Provisions:
General rules are introduced concerning the checks to be carried out and
the administrative measures and sanctions to be applied by the Commission
relating to irregularities affecting the financial interests of the European
Communities. (Art. 1)
Administrative checks, measures and penalties are introduced.  These shall
be determined by Community law.  Their application shall be governed by
national law. (Art. 2)
A limitation period for such checks, measures and penalties is introduced.(4 years, with numerous provisos) (Art. 3)
"Wrongfully obtained advantages" shall be either recovered (monetary
amounts) or otherwise withdrawn (e.g. entitlements).   Additionally,
administrative fines and/or other sanctions (e.g. temporary or permanent
exclusion from Community schemes) may be applied by the Commission.(Arts. 4-5)
The administrative measures provided for in this regulation shall be
suspended in the event of criminal proceedings related to the same facts.(Art. 6)
Member States shall take measures to ensure the regularity and reality of
transactions involving the Communities’ financial interests, including by
carrying out checks and inspections.  The Commission shall also have the
right to carry out checks and inspections within the scope of the existing
sectoral regulations.  A general regulation enabling such checks and
inspections by the Commission will be introduced later. (Arts. 8-10)
Early "ad hoc" rules and decisions:
Examples:
Notes from the Secretary-General concerning the obligations of officials
vis-à-vis UCLAF and the latter's access to information.  The first of these
notes incidentally confirmed the right of the Director of UCLAF to "initiate
any investigation" as he saw fit.
"Demarcation" agreements, specifying the competences of different
services:
. Division of responsibilities between UCLAF and DGs VI and XXI on
fraud-related matters (SEC(95)249 of 10.2.95)
. Cooperation and complementarity between Financial Control and
UCLAF. (Note SG(94)D/141.662 and annex of 6.7.94)
Agreement with the Court of Auditors on the exchange of information
relating to possible fraud. (Exchange of letters between Mr Weber,
responsible member of the Court (25.7.95) and Mrs Gradin, responsible
commissioner (4.10.95))
Convention on the Protection of the
European Communities’ financial interests
Main Provisions
Establishes a shared definition of fraud affecting the
Communities’ financial interests (Art. 1)
Establishes that offences meeting this definition will be
treated as criminal offences punishable by criminal
penalties, including custodial sentences for serious cases.(Art. 2)
Establishes the criminal liability of heads of businesses in
respect of decisions they take fraudulently affecting the
financial interests of the European Communities (Art. 3)
Provisions are included to ensure that rules on jurisdiction
and/or extradition between Member States cannot provide
loopholes to avoid prosecution for fraud. (Arts 5-6)
Member States are placed under an obligation to
cooperate in the fields of investigation, prosecution and
sanction of fraud affecting the financial interests of the
European Communities (Art. 6).
Principle of ne bis in idem (Art 7)
Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in resolving disputes
between Member States as to the interpretation of the
Convention (Art. 8)
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Regulation 2185/96
Main provisions:
Without prejudice to either the existing sectoral rules or to Member States’
administration of justice, this regulation shall apply to all areas of
Community activity. (Art. 1)
On-the-spot checks may be carried out: (i)  to detect serious irregularities or
irregularities with a transnational dimension, (ii) in response to a weak
control environment or (iii) at the request of the Member State.  Overlaps
with checks carried out by the Member State shall be avoided.(Arts 2-3)
The Commission shall prepare and conduct on-the-spot checks in
cooperation with the relevant national authorities, which shall receive
adequate advance notification.  Officials of the Member State may
participate in the inspection, or joint inspections may be organised if the
Member State so wishes. (Art. 4)
All economic operators covered by regulation 2988/95 may be the subject
of on-the-spot checks and must grant Commission inspectors access to
premises, land, means of transport or other areas used for business
purposes. (Art. 5)
On-the-spot checks shall be carried out on the Commission’s authority and
responsibility by duly empowered officials or other servants, including
national experts on secondment.  They shall be required to provide written
authorisation for inspections carried out.  They may seek the assistance of
national officials. (Art. 6)
In the course of inspections, Commission inspectors shall have the same
access to documentation and other information under the same conditions
as national administrative inspectors. (Art. 7)
Information gathered during inspections shall be covered by professional
secrecy and protected in accordance with the laws of the Member State
concerned.  The Commission shall report any indication of irregularity to
the authorities of the Member States concerned.  Inspection reports shall be
drawn up in conformity with the legal requirements of the Member State in
question and shall have exactly the same status and value as a report drawn
up by equivalent national inspectors (including as admissible evidence in
Court). (Art. 8)
Commission Decision of 14 July 1999
Main provisions:
UCLAF’s investigations are of an administrative nature. (Art. 1)
UCLAF shall cooperate with and assist Member States’ authorities. (Art. 3)
The Director of UCLAF informs the competent Member State authorities
of facts and suspicions indicating fraud. UCLAF shall remain the direct
interlocutor of such authorities. (Art. 4)
Information gathered in the context of investigations is confidential and is
only communicated on a need/right-to-know basis. (Art. 5)
Directors-general and heads of service are required to report to UCLAF all
information giving rise to the presumption of fraud.  Officials may inform
either their director-general/head of service or UCLAF directly of such
information.  No official may suffer any inequitable or discriminatory
treatment as a result of acting under these provisions. (Arts. 6-8)
Investigations shall respect the principle of equity, the right of reply of
individuals and proper standards of evidence. (Art. 9)
Internal investigations shall be initiated at the initiative of the director of
UCLAF.  He shall inform the secretary-general at the same time. (Art. 10)
UCLAF inspectors, who shall properly identify themselves and state their
purpose, shall enjoy the full cooperation of all Commission officials and
unrestricted access to all information and documentation, including the
power to copy or remove it. (Arts. 11-14)
The Director-General or the Head of Service concerned shall be informed
in advance of a requirement for access to premises or documents.
Exceptionally, if this is not desirable in the context of the inquiry, the
Secretary-General and the Director-General for staff and administration
shall be informed. (Art 15)
Investigations shall be proportionate to the circumstances and complexity
of the case. They shall not normally exceed one year. (Art. 17)
If indications arise of the personal involvement of a Commission official
arises, the Secretary-General and the Director-General for staff and
administration as well as the Director-General or Head of Service shall be
informed before the investigation continues.  Unless the investigation
would be thus compromised, the individual concerned shall be informed,
and shall in any case have the right to give his views before conclusions are
drawn.  This right may be deferred where the investigation is under the
authority of national judicial authorities and in agreement with the
Secretary-General. (Arts. 18-19).
Where disciplinary action is indicated, a report shall be sent by the Director
of UCLAF to the Secretary-General and the Director-General for staff and
administration. (Art 21)
Where criminal charges within the Commission are indicated, the Director
of UCLAF shall inform the President of the Commission, the
Commissioners responsible for staff and administration and the area
concerned as well as the Secretary-General.  He shall notify the relevant
national judicial authorities as soon as possible. (Art. 22)
The Director of UCLAF shall advise the Commission on any request from
national judicial authorities for the waiver of official immunity. (Art. 23)
The Director of UCLAF shall inform the Committee on Budgetary Control
of the European Parliament of the course of investigations while respecting
the requirements of confidentiality and the rights of individuals. (Art. 24)
The provisions of this Decision shall apply also to persons who, though not
officials of the Commission, act directly or indirectly on behalf of the
Commission. (Art. 25)
The above provisions subsequently clarified by "Detailed Rules of
Application" (Dec. 1998)
First Protocol to the Convention on the
protection of the European Communities’
financial interests (Corruption)
Main features:
Shared definitions of active and passive corruption of
Community and national officials damaging to the
European Communities’ financial interests are
established.  (Arts 2-3)
Member States undertake to ensure that their criminal
provisions relating to corruption by holders of public
office or public officials apply equally to holders of
national and European office and to national and EU
officials Art. 4)
Member States undertake to apply appropriate and
proportionate criminal penalties for acts of corruption as
defined in the protocol (Art. 5)
Provision relating to jurisdiction (Art. 6)
Comptence of Court of Justice to resolve disputes
between Member States concerning interpretation of the
protocol (Art. 8)
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Regulation 1073/1999 (OLAF investigations)
Main characteristics:
In the context of the fight against fraud, OLAF is empowered to exercise the powers of investigation conferred on the Commission by the various relevant
sectoral and horizontal regulations.  It shall assist Member States’ authorities and facilitate coordination between them.  It shall also carry out investigations
within the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Community in order to fight fraud and other serious matters liable to lead to disciplinary or
criminal proceedings. (Art. 1)
OLAF shall carry out administrative investigations. These shall be sufficient to establish the irregular character of the activities under investigation. (Art.
2)
Externally, OLAF shall exercise the powers of the Commission under regulations 2185/95 and 2988/96 (Art. 3)
Internally shall be empowered to carry out investigations within and relating to European institutions and bodies.  Its powers shall include the right to carry
out unannounced visits and unrestricted access to persons, documentation and premises.  Members and staff of institutions and other bodies shall be under
an obligation to cooperate with OLAF. The civil rights of individuals shall be protected. (Art. 4)
Inquiries shall be opened at the initiative of the director of OLAF (Art. 5)
The director of OLAF shall direct the conduct of investigations.  Office agents shall adopt an attitude in line with the rules governing equivalent national
officials.  Member States shall ensure the cooperation of their competent authorities.  (Art. 6)
European institutions and bodies are placed under an obligation to supply all relevant information to its agents and to communicate to OLAF any
information concerning possible fraud. Member States, insofar as their laws allow, shall communicate all pertinent information to OLAF. (Art. 7)
Data protection and confidentiality shall be ensured (Art. 8)
OLAF reports shall be drawn up in such a way as to respect the procedural requirements of the Member States concerned.  Copies of reports of external
investigations shall be given to the competent authorities of the Member State concerned, those resulting from internal inquiries to the institution in
question.  (Art. 9)
OLAF may at any time provide the competent authorities of Member States with information obtained in investigations, and shall provide information
liable to result in criminal proceedings.  (Art. 10)
OLAF’s activities will be monitored by a Supervisory Committee, composed of five suitably qualified independent persons, nominated by common accord
of the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament.  Its task will be to give a general opinion on the activities of the Office, either on its own
initiative or at the request of the Director of OLAF.  It shall not interfere in investigations in progress. It shall report, annually at least, to the institutions.(Art. 11)
The Director of OLAF shall similarly be appointed by common accord of the institutions, for a fixed five-year term (renewable once), on the basis of a
shortlist submitted by the Commission.  He/she shall report to the institutions on the activities of OLAF, without compromising the confidentiality of
investigations. (Art. 12)
OLAF will be funded by way of a separate budget section in Part A (administrative appropriations) of the Commission budget. (Art. 13)
Any official whose interests adversely affected in the course of an OLAF investigation may complain to the Director and thereby cause OLAF’s actions to
be submitted to judicial review by the Court of Justice, pursuant to articles 90-91 of the Staff Regulations (Art. 14)
In the third year of effect of the regulation, the Commission shall report on OLAF’s progress and make appropriate proposals for the future development of
the Office. (Art. 15)
Second Protocol to the Convention on the
protection of the European Communities’
financial interests (various)
Main features:
Money laundering" to be made a criminal offence in all
Member States. (Art. 2)
Legal persons to be made criminally liable for offences of
fraud against the financial interests of the European
Communities and shall be subject to effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. (Arts. 3-4)
The proceeds of fraud against the financial interests of the
European Communities to be subject to confiscation.
(Art. 5)
The Commission and Member States are explicitly
required fully to cooperate, both by exchange of technical
and operational assistance and by participating in the
exchange of information, "so as to make it easier to
establish the facts and to ensure effective action against
fraud, active and passive corruption and money
laundering" (Arts 6-7)
Data protection provisions (Arts. 8-11)
Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice for resolution of
disputes of interpretation of the protocol (Art. 13)
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Interinstitutional agreement on internal OLAF inquiries
Main features of the IIA:
The European Parliament, Council and Commission agree the following in
relation to internal inquiries of OLAF:
- to adopt common rules on the conduct of internal investigations of
OLAF.  Investigations shall be aimed at (i) fighting fraud, corruption
and any other illegal activity detrimental to the financial interests of
the European Communities or (ii) bringing to light any other serious
situation relating to professional misconduct susceptible to lead to
criminal or disciplinary proceedings. (Para. 1)
- to apply such rules by adopting an internal decision conforming to a
model decision annexed to the IIA (para. 2)
- to refer all requests for waivers of immunity to OLAF for opinion (para.
3)
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6.  MATTERS RELATING TO STAFF
6.1. Introduction
The structure of this chapter
6.1.1. Point 9.4.8.of the first report states: ‘The Committee has not had time to consider staff
management or any changes which might be made to the Staff Regulations. However, it
notes that a number of Commissioners have, unprompted, expressed their conviction that no
genuine improvement in the way the Commission works will be possible without in-depth
consideration of these points’.
6.1.2 In this second report, the Committee deems it necessary to develop this review for it to
complete its analysis and propose recommendations for the future.
6.1.3. This chapter of the report therefore reviews those aspects of the European civil service
which currently constitute the most serious problems inside the Commission to the extent
that they reflect – to use the European Parliament’s own terminology – ‘allegations of fraud,
mismanagement and nepotism (detection and treatment), and with the treatment by the
Commission of cases of fraud, mismanagement and nepotism involving staff;’52.
The challenges faced by the European civil service
6.1.4. In general terms, the problems faced by the European civil service are quite similar to those
that the national civil services have been encountering for some years now.
6.1.5. In a global society which has become increasingly characterised by a spirit of openness,
dynamism and competitiveness, the European civil service must also face up to problems
concerning the modernisation and rationalisation of its structures, justify its existence and
the exercise of its powers and responsibilities by demonstrating the efficiency and quality of
the services which it is required to deliver to European citizens and to taxpayers.
6.1.6. In the case of the European civil service, these problems are exacerbated by difficulties
connected with its multinational character and by some specific developments which have
occurred over the years as the integration process has progressed.
6.1.7. At this juncture, suffice it to say that the constant increase in the number of Member States,
and, above all, the spectacular multiplication of the powers and responsibilities of the Union
have profoundly affected the nature and scope of the institutions’ activities. That trend looks
set to continue with the prospect of the accession of new Member States.
6.1.8. However, from another angle, we might refer to the greater attention being paid by the
general public to the sound administration of the European institutions and to their
accountability and call not only for high-quality service exclusively based on the recognition
of individual merit to be provided to the public but also for compliance with the principles
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 Resolution of the European Parliament of 23 March 1999, paragraph 4.
DOC_EN\DV\381\381230EN.doc 58
of integrity and legality in a context which may guarantee the greatest possible degree of
transparency.
The general scope of the problems
6.1.9. We would make it clear from the outset that the problems to which we have referred are
broadly common to all the institutions of the European Union.
In practice, we have noted a kind of institutional individualism, in so far as each institution
has tried to find solutions by developing its own procedures and practices, its own ‘philosophy’, as
it were.
6.1.10. However, it remains appropriate, while taking account of the more specific requirements of
each institution, to define uniform, or at the very least coordinated, solutions for all the
institutions, partly in order to ensure parity of treatment for staff but also with a view to
being able to deploy joint efforts in order to succeed in making genuine reforms.
The specific requirements of the Commission
6.1.11. It is, furthermore, true that, as far as the European Commission is concerned, the need for
major changes in staff organisation and staff policy is becoming even more acute.
6.1.12. Indeed, no other institution has had to cope so directly with the consequences of the
developments that have affected the Union in recent years. In particular, no other institution has had
entrusted to it, and has accepted, a whole raft of new tasks and objectives which are not only more
numerous than in the past but also qualitatively different compared with the traditional role played
by the institution, such as management activities. It is not only the extent but also the very nature of
the Commission’s tasks which have profoundly changed: instead of being the body for considering
the need for and monitoring legislation it once was, the institution has now become essentially a
management body.
6.1.13. Despite those developments, neither the overall structure, nor the organisational criteria and
arrangements, nor practices and procedures have been adapted to address the new situation.
In a word, everything around the Commission has changed, but it has largely remained a
spectator of such change.
6.1.14. Certainly, the problems described here have been analysed over a period of years within the
Commission, and a considerable number of studies and reports have been drawn up by
various internal Commission bodies - and even by external bodies53. Modernisation,
decentralisation and rationalisation have become buzzwords that appear in virtually all these
analyses. Unfortunately, they have not led to a coherent and accepted overall review, and
have frequently not even been translated into operational follow-up measures (or at least
incipient measures).
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 For example, the 1979 Spierenburg report, more recent reports by the Inspectorate-General on TAOs (February
1998) and decentralisation (February 1998), the MAP 2000 Programme (30 April 1997), the Caston report (early 1998),
the Williamson report (6 November 1998), the codes of conduct (April 1999) and, most recently, the Inspectorate-
General’s report entitled ‘Designing tomorrow’s Commission - DECODE’ (7 July 1999).
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6.1.15. Yet, at this juncture, the implementation of reforms no longer constitutes an option for the
institution. They have become a total and urgent necessity, even a sine qua non for ensuring
the efficiency of the Commission’s activities and for maintaining its traditional role as the
driving force behind European integration.
6.2. The general problems of staff policy
6.2.1. It is undeniable that the Commission’s staff policy has not been on a par with the best
examples set by national administrations, and that it suffers from numerous shortcomings.
6.2.2. In the following pages, we shall briefly outline a few of these shortcomings, starting with
some of a more general and horizontal nature, before going on to consider some more
specific issues.
The problem of the revision of the Staff Regulations
6.2.3. The Staff Regulations were drawn up more than thirty years ago when a single text was
adopted to cover all the categories of staff employed by the European Community54.
6.2.4. Despite adaptations of individual parts of the Staff Regulations and the development of
general principles through the case law of the European Court of Justice and of the Court of
First Instance, the system has, in its application, been diverted to some extent from its initial
objectives. This does not alter the fact that its broad outlines (protection and strengthening
of the independence of the staff, attractive and competitive working conditions, recognition
of merit, specific system of individual guarantees) still remain valid.
6.2.5. As a result, the real issue is not one of amending radically the current Staff Regulations
system, but of correctly applying the rules and principles thereof.
No analysis of requirements and priorities
6.2.6. Of all the general grounds which have prevented the principles laid down in the Staff
Regulations from being properly applied, the foremost is the fact that there has never been
any genuine analysis of the institution’s requirements and priorities.
6.2.7. The entrusting to the Commission of new tasks (and its acceptance of those tasks) was not
preceded or even accompanied by a rigorous appraisal of existing human, financial and
organisational resources and by an in-depth assessment of the priorities and requirements
connected with the tasks for which the institution was responsible or was planning to
become responsible in the future.
6.2.8. However, only an assessment of that nature can provide reliable instruments and the basis
for future programming with respect to the structural reforms to be carried out and, where
necessary, to a request for an appropriate increase in its resources. As the Commission itself
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 Regulation 259/68 (OJ L 56, 4.3.1968) laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of
Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities, adopted on 29 February 1968 after the entry into  force
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Communities.
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stated in the DECODE document already referred to, such an assessment would have helped
the institution ‘in discharging its functions in an efficient manner in a continuing context of
very limited growth in resources’.
6.2.9. On the contrary, no screening of the organisation and the operation of this institution was
carried out until November 1997 – and even then with limited purposes in view. It resulted
quite recently in the document referred to.
6.2.10. That document clearly demonstrates serious shortcomings in the institution’s organisation
and practices, particularly services that do not reflect current powers and responsibilities,
fragmentation of areas of responsibility, inefficient use of human resources or obsolete and
inefficient working methods.
Consequences for the organisation and redeployment of staff
6.2.11. With particular regard to staff policy, the lack of any assessment of the institution’s
resources and actual requirements has adversely affected both the organisation of the staff
and the conditions required for the development of a genuine quality policy.
6.2.12. With regard to the first aspect, for lack of such an assessment, the institution has been
unable to initiate the reforms required to invest the system with efficiency and rationality. In
particular, it has been unable to  redeploy staff in an attempt to achieve optimum allocation
of its existing resources  and increase staff output and efficiency.
To that end, the Commission should have defined – on the basis of the priority of
requirements and of a critical review of the structure of the Establishment Plan and any
organisational malfunctioning  - the tasks allotted to each service, the number of and
qualifications required for the posts needed for the carrying out of those tasks, the available
resources and the resulting surpluses or shortfalls.
6.2.13. Over time, such a policy would have enabled, and would enable, the institution to cope with
an extension of its activities even during a period of zero-growth as regards the
Establishment Plan and, hence, with a fixed number of staff.
6.2.14. And in fact the few attempts at redeployment encountered serious problems, beginning with
a certain unwillingness in the directorates-general to allow staff (sometimes their most able
officials) to leave their services. Some staff were unwilling to change posts. That
unwillingness is all the more comprehensible when, as we shall see, such transfers are often
not backed up in the appropriate manner.
6.2.15. But experience has above all shown, as confirmed in the DECODE report referred to above,
that ‘the concept of prioritisation and, in particular, the notion of negative priorities do not
form part of the Commission’s processes, and have not entered into its way of thinking’ (p.
VIII).
6.2.16. It follows that, inside the Commission, there has been no genuine redeployment. The
Commission did not decide until 1997 to redeploy each year 1% of the posts on the
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Establishment Plan (i.e. about 150 posts per year), although the DECODE report took the
view that it could have doubled that percentage.
6.2.17. Yet only an organisation which assigns its staff in a rational and efficient manner can create
the conditions where all officials and other servants may feel motivated and that they have
been given responsibility in their work, in that they are encouraged to seek or accept the
tasks which they feel are most commensurate with their own abilities.
‘National balances’
6.2.18. In this context we should recall that serious difficulties in the European civil service stem
from the constraints imposed by compliance with what are called ‘national balances’.
6.2.19. It is indisputable that a European civil service drawn from the widest possible geographical
basis is required to run the decision-making process of the European Union. It is only
through the employment of a staff of different nationalities working together and over a
lengthy period of time that the problems of cultural, linguistic and national identity in
general may be minimised.
6.2.20. Furthermore, the growing and imperative need to have available a sufficient number of
officials and other servants with a knowledge of the various languages and an understanding
of the political and social structure of several countries must be weighed against the
consideration that the European institutions are not organisations where quotas involving
nationality, culture or language are primordial, since all officials and other servants are, in
principle, Europeans.
6.2.21. As the Herman report55 emphasises: ‘The essential need, …, is for narrow national and
partisan political considerations to play less of a role than at present in the Commission of
the future, not least in the appointments process at all levels. Up to a certain point the
presence of these factors is … inevitable. … The current balance, however, appears to be
wrong. In particular, the need to find “a geographical balance” between the nationalities of
the senior office holders in the Commission appears to be compromising the independence
of the European civil service, and ability and relevant experience should play a greater role
in the appointments process. Moreover, this problem, if left untouched, is likely to become
even more acute in the future with a large-scale enlargement of the European Union. …’
6.2.22. Indeed, despite almost 50 years of integration and of a practice of working together in
multinational structures, the national balances requirements, far from decreasing, have
become stronger. Over time, demonstrations of their influence have become even more
glaring and frequently lie at the root of nepotism and maladministration.
6.2.23. On formal grounds, the significance of national balances in the selection of officials or in the
development of their careers seems to contradict the principle which prohibits any
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 Report dated 26 March 1999 by the European Parliament’s Committee on Institutional Affairs on improvements in
the functioning of the Institutions without modification of the Treaties, Part B, point 25 of the Explanatory Statement
(PE 229.072/fin. – Doc. A4-0158/99). See also point 7.3.4. of this report.
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discrimination based on nationality, i.e. a general and fundamental principle of Community
law (cf. Article 12, formerly Article 6 of the EC Treaty). Derogations from that principle are
admissible on the grounds of specific national characteristics and the need to ensure that all
the cultures of the Member States are represented. However, being derogations, they must
be supported by a legal basis and, in accordance with the unwavering case-law of the Court
of Justice, be exceptional and subject to testing to establish need and proportionality.
6.2.24. That conclusion is also confirmed by the Staff Regulations of Officials themselves, where
the requirement to maintain a certain geographical balance is hedged around with serious
reservations.
6.2.25. Accordingly, Article 7 thereof lays down: ‘The appointing authority shall, acting solely in
the interest of the service and without regard to nationality, assign each official by
appointment or transfer to a post in his category or service which corresponds to his grade’.
6.2.26. Subsequently, Article 27 of the Staff Regulations lays down: ‘Recruitment shall be directed
to securing for the institution the services of officials of the highest standard of ability,
efficiency and integrity, recruited on the broadest possible geographical basis from among
nationals of the Member States of the Communities. … No posts shall be reserved for
nationals of any specific Member State’.
6.2.27. Community case-law has also confirmed those conclusions even more precisely. In the
Lassalle judgment, the Court of Justice stated: ‘The interests of the service and regard for
the eligibility of officials for the career bracket in question would be compromised if the
administration, in order to secure a geographical balance, could reserve a post for a
specific nationality without such action’s being justified on grounds connected with the
proper functioning of the service. However, it is not incompatible with these requirements …
that, where the qualifications of the various candidates are approximately equal, the
administration should allow nationality to play a decisive role when it is necessary to
maintain or to re-establish a geographical balance among its staff’56. In the Marenco
judgment, it also ruled: ‘The need for the administration to remedy a geographical
disequilibrium in the posts within its departments when recruiting must give way to the
requirements of the interests of the service and the consideration of the personal merits of
the candidates’57.
6.2.28. It is high time therefore that we reverted to the spirit of European integration and at least
attempted to reduce the significance of national balances.
6.2.29. To that end, we might consider a few remedies that would be both specific and realistic. For
example, and in very general terms, professional training courses might be designed in such
as way as to strengthen the ‘European’ nature of the civil service in the institutions and,
hence, to reduce the significance of national origin (see the section on ‘Training’).
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 Judgment of 4 March 1964, Case 15/63, Lassalle v. Parliament, ECR [1964] p. 31.
57
 Judgment of 29 October 1975, Joined Cases 81 to 88/74, Marenco v. Commission, ECR [1975], p. 1247. See also
ground 6 of the judgment of 29 September 1976 in Case 105/75, Giuffrida v. Council, ECR [1976], p. 1402 which
recalls that ‘Article 29 of the Staff Regulations lays down the necessary recruitment procedures … so that vacant posts
may be filled by officials chosen on the basis of objective criteria and only in the interests of the service’. See also the
judgment of 30 June 1983 in Case 85/82, Schloh v. Council, ECR [1983], p. 2105.
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6.2.30. More specifically, and following the same train of thought as that announced by the
President–designate of the Commission, we should be encouraging the genuine
‘multinationalisation’ of Commissioners’ cabinets and ensure that they revert to their
original role (see point 7.12 of this report).
6.2.31. We might also propose a revision of the number of directorates-general and the allocation of
tasks among them, in accordance with the institution’s genuine requirements rather than
national balances.
6.2.32. We might also think about the development of flexibility in the current system of ‘national
quotas’, which would enable ability and professional experience to play a more decisive role
in the appointments procedure (see below, section on ‘Appointment of the most senior
officials’). At all events, that criterion should be applied with respect to the – somewhat
‘atypical’ - post of Secretary-General of the Commission.
6.2.33. More frequent rotation of staff from directors-general down to heads of unit, especially
where they act as authorising officers, would also be useful in order to avoid any kind of
‘nationalisation’ of posts.
The risk of disappointment
6.2.34. We cannot conceal the fact that the problems connected with the current staff policy have
resulted in a certain degree of disenchantment, not to say discontent, among the staff
themselves. The delays in implementing the increasingly necessary and urgent reforms and
the fallout from certain scandals and their negative impact on the image and reputation of
the European civil service among the general public have fuelled dissatisfaction, not to say
frustration, among the staff. This is undoubtedly a major problem, since any reform
designed to improve and strengthen the Commission depends principally on the sincere
commitment of all the staff.
6.2.35. Yet (virtually all) members of staff simply want to be able to work in an institution where
the social dialogue is effective and productive and where quality of work and
conscientiousness are acknowledged and openly appreciated. In this respect, more broadly-
based and more frequent consultations of staff would contribute to a better understanding of
the problems and to the devising of solutions to those problems.
6.2.36. It is up to the competent authorities to address these demands efficiently and swiftly.
The role of the trade union organisations
6.2.37. It is clear that proper social and trade union relations are essential. Of course, the
administration must acknowledge the role of the trade union organisations; for their part,
however, the latter must avoid any temptation to seek to set up a kind of alternative
hierarchy designed to encroach upon the powers and responsibilities of the bodies which are
officially responsible.
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6.2.38. In this respect, the Committee wishes to emphasise the extent to which the trade union
organisations exercise a responsibility that is crucial for the success of the plan to change
and modernise the European civil service. If the service is to be reinvigorated, all the values
that underpin its quality and efficiency must be rigorously promoted. Those values must be
accepted, not only in terms of their principles but also of their practical consequences. The
trade union organisations representing members of the European civil service will succeed
only if they encourage that approach.
6.3 .  Objectives and instruments of staff policy
6.3.1. Having an effective and forward-looking staff policy implies making every effort to
recruit, train and retain a body of officials of the highest quality.
6.3.2. The Staff Regulations of the Community institutions are concerned to establish the
necessary conditions for pursuing these objectives. However, the provisions of the Staff
Regulations are not of themselves sufficient: they must be followed up by coherent
practices capable of dealing with recent developments.
Recognition of merit
6.3.3. One essential instrument required to create a real staff policy is the creation of a system
of recognition of merit. There is no provision for a system of financial incentives in the
European civil service, and this is the result of a desirable and understandable choice.
There is then all the more reason for other forms of motivation to be used, which we will
consider later.
6.3.4. Recognition of merit cannot be a mere slogan with no consequences in practice. It is a
principle which must affect all aspects of staff policy. A policy of merit will raise the
quality of the organisation as a whole; applied at all levels of the hierarchy it will have a
copy-cat effect, encouraging motivation and improving output. Moreover, a culture of
quality strengthens the feeling of participation and loyalty to the institution and may help
weaken national idiosyncrasies, thus enhancing the confidence of citizens in the Union.
6.3.5. A policy of recognition of merit requires recruiting mechanisms which meet high
standards of efficiency and rigour, efforts to improve personal and professional abilities,
a correct and selective system of assessment for promotions, and an effective and
credible method for penalising errors.
Training
6.3.6. It is in the administration’s interest to be able to rely on motivated and qualified staff,
just as much as it is in the official’s interest improve his own training and professional
abilities and thereby improve the quality of his work and his opportunities to further his
career.  Training and mobility  have an essential role in achieving these objectives, and
these aspects are closely linked.
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6.3.7. First of all, a policy of training and professional conversion should be conceived as a
process, starting with the probationary period and forming an ongoing, compulsory
element throughout the official’s career. This means that the Commission must commit
itself to training measures, even going beyond the current provisions of the Staff
Regulations58
6.3.8. As early as the probationary period59, the training of new officials should be adapted to
take account of their future duties, placing particular emphasis on the need to work in a
multinational team, developing a genuinely ‘European’ spirit and culture.
6.3.9. Every effort should then be made to develop the official’s abilities and their adaptability.
Thus they should be given the opportunity of spending short periods in departments other
than the one in which they are currently working, or even outside their institution.
6.3.10. A programme of specific seminars should also be drawn up, designed to meet the needs
of the various categories of staff. In this connection, one might even consider founding a
European Union college (or at least a training centre) or setting up, again at the
instigation of the European Union, a network of external colleges to train the staff of all
the Institutions.
6.3.11. For all officials, participation in training courses should be a factor to be taken into
account in staff reports with a view to promotion60. In other words, training should
promote career development, preparing officials for greater responsibilities. Apart from
this, more specific training should be provided for the exercise of particular duties. This
is true in particular of duties relating to the management of human and financial
resources, since people management is an essential element in the strategy of
administrative modernisation.61 An aptitude for management should also be cultivated at
the beginning of the official’s career, not just when he or she is being given management
duties, and should be specifically assessed in staff reports. One might even consider
giving specific training to staff who are required to assess their subordinates (e.g.
reporting officers and members of selection boards).
6.3.12. At present the Commission is developing a number of training programmes, but its
efforts are centred – in respect of about half the training appropriations62 – on language
courses (which should concentrate on cases where training is in the genuine interests of
the service and, in this context, should be organised in as effective a way as possible). On
the other hand, appropriations for non-linguistic training fell considerably in 1996 and
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 Article 24, third paragraph, of the Staff Regulations lays down that the Communities ‘shall facilitate such further
training and instruction for officials as is compatible with the proper functioning of the service and is in accordance
with its own interests.’
59
 It will be recalled that Article 34 of the Staff Regulations lays down that ‘Officials other than those in Grades A1 and
A2 shall serve a probationary period before they can be established. The period shall be nine months for officials in
Category A, in the Language Service or in Category B, and six months for other officials.’
60
 According to Article 24, fourth paragraph, of the Staff Regulations, ‘Such training and instruction shall be taken into
account for purposes of promotion in their careers.’
61
 Apparently the Commission will be reorganising its programmes to this effect.
62
 see Annex 6. The Commission’s training policy is funded by two budget headings: A-4030 for language training and
A-7060 for professional training (or computer training). See Annex 7 for the main branches of  non-linguistic training.
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1997. This trend was fortunately reversed by an increase in 1998 and another in 1999,
taking account of the first stage of the management training programme and, more
generally, of the increase in the number of training instruments in connection with the
MAP 2000 (Modernisation of Administration and Personnel for 2000) programme.
6.3.13. Even taking account of these most recent increases, the appropriations allocated to
training activities seem inadequate since they represent only 0.57% of  the total
appropriations allocated to salaries, while the average in national administrations seems
to be of the order of 2% and that in the private sector is generally much higher,
particularly at times when the organisation is restructuring (as should be the case with the
Commission at present).
6.3.14. It goes without saying that these efforts should be monitored by setting up – perhaps in
cooperation with the other institutions – an evaluation system making it possible to
analyse the effectiveness of training measures.
Mobility
6.3.15. Mobility problems are closely linked to staff training, since the more adequately the
training is organised, the easier mobility becomes. Like training, mobility benefits both
staff and the institution, given that the institution’s main interest in this context is to
encourage the official’s flexibility and ability to adapt to carry out different types of
duties.
6.3.16. In fact, a regular change of duties or tasks guarantees the continued flexibility,
motivation and productivity of staff. As Mr Priestley, Secretary-General of the European
Parliament, stressed in his letter of 26 September 1997, the stability which results from
keeping the same officials in the same posts is positive in the short and medium term
because it facilitates acquisition of expertise,  but harmful in the long term, since it can
lead to stagnation. Mobility should thus be sought by the individual or prompted by the
institution when stability is achieved and before stagnation sets in.
6.3.17. There are several provisions in the Staff Regulations which allow for and even provide
the means for mobility (transfer, secondment etc.). In reality, however, this mobility is
not adequately put into practice. On the one hand it is not sufficiently encouraged by the
institution, and on the other hand many officials do not aspire to it, often having a
tendency to remain in their original department, or at least in similar departments which
do not involve reassessing their knowledge and their working methods. The result of this
is that some officials never acquire a wide range of experience.
6.3.18. Mobility should be encouraged, and no exceptions should be allowed, and after a certain
time it should become compulsory to change jobs. It might even be desirable to establish
maximum lengths of service for all grades and functions. At any rate, flexibility should
be recognised as a quality taken into account in connection with promotion. For Category
A officials in particular, mobility should be an essential precondition for duties involving
leadership or management of staff.
DOC_EN\DV\381\381230EN.doc 67
Empowerment and decentralisation
6.3.19. Empowerment is also an important element of staff policy and, more generally, of the
organisation of the European civil service. Empowerment means enhancing staff
members’ professional awareness, their attachment to the institution and their feeling of
involvement in the life and problems of their own administration. In other words,
involving them more closely in their own work. However empowerment also means
making officials clearly and directly responsible for their own activities and for
accomplishing the duties allocated to them.
6.3.20. However, in the Commission, the conditions for genuine empowerment do not seem to
be present. As this Committee remarked in its first report (para. 9.4.25), ‘The studies
carried out by the Committee have too often revealed a growing reluctance among the
members of the hierarchy to acknowledge their responsibility.’
6.3.21. Empowerment requires first and foremost that everyone’s duties should be clearly
defined, which means eliminating the ambiguities which exist in this connection at all
levels of the Commission (see in this connection Chapter 7 of this report). It also requires
that the efforts made to carry out the duties allocated to the official, and the results
obtained, are encouraged and rewarded. This in turn means that each person’s work
should be ‘visible’, that is identifiable as being the individual official’s own work by his
immediate superior and not lost in the anonymous output of a group in which no-one
knows (or is in a position to know) who does what.
6.3.22. In other words, it must be possible to identify the each link in the hierarchical chain in its
individuality and specific function. This is all the more important since the wider and
more important the tasks allocated to the official, the heavier the responsibilities on them.
6.3.23. In this context of empowerment, decentralisation (or perhaps one should say
‘deconcentration’) plays an important part. As the Commission’s draft Third Code of
Conduct for Officials points out, decentralisation and the allocation of wider powers to
officials will encourage them to be more responsible in both senses of the word:
assuming personal responsibility for the tasks allocated to them, and committing their
personal responsibility towards the institution and ultimately towards the people. With
this in mind, it is not desirable to create or maintain posts with no real responsibilities (or
corresponding workload). In this connection, we should refer in particular to the situation
of deputy Directors-General and advisers, which has justly given rise to a considerable
amount of criticism. Not only do the distinctions among officials in the A1 grade seem to
be justified rather by reasons of national balances than by real needs, they are also not
always accompanied by a real allocation of duties.
6.3.24. For some years now, initiatives towards greater decentralisation have been taken within
the Commission, though on the basis of practices which vary somewhat between the
Directorates-General. However, in order to succeed, decentralisation must take place in
an ordered manner – as the new Commission envisages in a rather ad hoc way63 – ‘in
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 See the document distributed by the new Commission on 12 July 1999 entitled “The operation of the Commission”,
Annex 3: “Principles of internal coordination.”
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order to guarantee the coherence and effectiveness of the Commission’s action and the
quality of its initiatives’. But it is also necessary to ensure that there is genuine
leadership, exercised correctly and indeed firmly. As Mr Priestley remarks in his above-
mentioned document: ‘Good quality management is not incompatible with public
service; on the contrary, it is the key to its success. Sound administrative practice is
essential, but so is efficient management, which is not the same thing. […M]anagement
staff must be given real responsibility, through decentralisation, and they must set an
example to their staff in terms of commitment, competence, punctuality,
conscientiousness, respect for rules etc.…In general, all staff must be aware that, in
addition to rights, they also have obligations towards the institution.’
6.3.25. The responsibility of staff in management roles thus extends to the completion of tasks
they have allocated to their subordinates and which they are supposed to supervise and
monitor. This means that realistic objectives should be set and periodically updated, and
that there should be effective and regular controls, with a monitoring system to check
results.
Career incentives
6.3.26. It is regrettable that there is no real careers policy in the Commission. It is quite clear that
career incentives are essential for a policy seeking to guarantee the motivation,
effectiveness and quality of staff.
6.3.27. Looking at career structure, it is clear that the career brackets are rigid, in the sense that
the Staff Regulations allocate staff to four distinct categories (A-B-C-D)  the divisions
between which are relatively hard to cross except by an internal competition, but also and
particularly in the sense, as we will see, that in practice movement from one grade to
another within these categories tends to be automatic and based on length of service,
rather than being based on a genuine assessment and recognition of merit.
6.3.28. It is also a short career structure within each category. Excluding the limited percentage
of officials reaching the peak of their career (A1 and A2), the normal career development
covers 5 or 6 grades (from A8/A7 to A4/A3), which means that for the great majority of
staff it covers a period of 20-25 years. On average, then, an official reaches the end of his
career development at the age of around 50-55 with the prospect of staying there more
than ten years. The career is even shorter for B and C category staff, moving through a
total of only 5 grades.
6.3.29. Such a system may involve serious risks of stagnation and growing inflexibility. On the
one hand, career incentives seeking to stimulate the commitment and ambitions of staff
seem very limited. On the other hand,  there is no effective mechanism to encourage a
redistribution of staff or the departure of those who, since they have no further career
prospects, are less motivated. One might even say that to some extent the current system
these officials to stay on (e.g. increased pension rights for each year worked between the
ages of 60 and 65).
6.3.30. Solutions should therefore be considered to reduce the risks of stagnation which this
situation entails.
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6.3.31. This set of problems (as well as reasons of a budgetary nature) may be linked to the
introduction in 1988 of a ‘middle management’ system which involved separating grade
from function in supervisory posts. In other words, a given grade does not always involve
the same duties; on the contrary, they can be carried out by staff in different grades,
resulting in management duties being allocated to a wider range of grades (A5/4/3). This
has the advantage of not holding up some officials from progressing on the promotion
ladder, while enabling other lower-ranking officials to carry out duties for which they are
obviously already competent or prepared.
6.3.32. This practice, which is likely to encourage officials in lower grades, could be
considerably developed, while eliminating some problems raised, as we shall see, by the
promotion arrangements used in this connection (see below, under the heading
‘assessment and promotion’).
6.3.33. One might also consider genuine early retirement measures, similar to those used when
new Member States join the EU. In particular, this solution could be considered as a part
of the structural reforms announced by the new Commission. This early retirement
scheme should be set up for 3-5 years to permit the Commission to implement a wider-
ranging strategy.
6.4 Organisation of the staff
The various categories of staff
6.4.1. The Commission’s staff may be classified according to various categories: those who
are or are not employed under the Staff Regulations, internal and external staff,
permanent or temporary, contractual or non-contractual, employed under private or
public law, etc.
6.4.2. For purely practical purposes we will use in this chapter two distinct notions, though
in the case of auxiliaries and local staff these do in fact overlap, namely:
- staff employed under the Staff Regulations, including officials and other
servants (temporary staff, auxiliary staff, local staff and special advisers);
and
- external staff, including the remaining contractual staff (temporary staff,
service providers, detached national experts, etc.)64, but also, in some
respects, the abovementioned auxiliaries and local staff.
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 The judgment of 6 December 1989, case 249/87, Mulfinger and others. v. Commission, ECR 4127, may be cited,
where it states: ‘The Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants do not
constitute an exhaustive body of rules prohibiting the employment of persons otherwise than within the framework of
those rules. On the contrary, the Commission’s powers to conclude contracts governed by the law of a Member State
extends to contracts of employment or contracts for the provision of services.’
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Staff employed under the Staff Regulations
6.4.3. Staff employed under the Staff Regulations are subject to a system of rules set out in
the Staff Regulations (for established officials) and the Conditions of Employment of
Other Servants (for other staff).
6.4.4. The Commission’s (1999) operating budget contains 16 511 permanent posts
(officials) and 690 temporary posts65. These two categories taken together now
account for almost 60% of the Community Institutions’ total budgetary posts.
Established officials
6.4.5. Established officials are full members of the European civil service. They hold
permanent posts in one of the categories (A, B, C or D) and in one of the grades
provided for by the Staff Regulations.
6.4.6. In principle, only established officials may carry out the duties of a civil servant.
These duties are linked to the functions of the institution which derive from the
powers conferred on that institution by the Treaties or by acts adopted in pursuance
of the Treaties66.
Other servants
6.4.7. Apart from established officials, who have a permanent employment relationship,
there was from the very outset a need to call on temporary staff to fulfil, with a
degree of flexibility, the Institution’s specific ad-hoc requirements which it was not
possible to satisfy immediately and adequately with established officials.
6.4.8. The latter constitute the category of ‘other servants’, for which a specific act (the
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants) was adopted at the same time as the
Staff Regulations in order to establish a general regulatory framework for them.
6.4.9. Given the many types of duties which these other staff are required to perform, it was
found necessary to subdivide the category of ‘other servants’. The Conditions of
Employment of Other Servants provides for several categories of staff: ‘temporary
staff’, ‘auxiliary staff’, ‘local staff’ and ‘special advisers’. The first two categories
are in turn divided into several sub-categories67.
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 See tables in Annexes 1 and 2.
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 The Court of Justice considers that the power to act in the capacity of a civil servant of the Institution can only be
conferred on external staff in exceptional circumstances, whereas for ‘other servants’ this is quite a routine occurrence.
(see judgment of 28.2.1989, joined cases 341/85 et seqq., Van der Stijl and another ECR  p. 557) In the Court’s opinion:
‘it must be pointed out that in the case of posts involving the exercise of a power to take decisions the institutions must
follow one of the legal procedures which are laid town limitatively in the Staff Regulations or in the Conditions of
Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities.’ (ground 11).
67
 See in Annex 3 the overall statistics concerning staff actually employed by category and statutory or contractual
working relationship.
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6.4.10. Temporary staff are the main category of ‘other servants’. This category includes:
staff engaged to fill a post which is included in the list of posts and which the
budgetary authorities have classified as temporary; staff engaged to fill temporarily a
permanent post in the list of posts; staff engaged to assist a person holding an office
provided for in the Treaties or the elected President of one of the institutions or
organs of the Communities or the Elected Chairman of one of the political groups in
the European Parliament; and staff engaged to fill temporarily a permanent post paid
from research and investment appropriations (Art. 2 of the Conditions of
Employment of Other Servants ). The first of these categories is the most frequent as
regards operating appropriations.
6.4.11. In accordance with the nature of the working relationship under which they are
employed, other staff are engaged by contract68. However, the first sub-category of
temporary staff (those in temporary posts) are required to go before a selection
board. Similarly, auxiliary staff in category C and D have to take an aptitude test.
The remaining staff in the ‘other servants’ category are not required to undergo any
prior selection of this nature.
6.4.12. At present, although they are governed by a specific set of rules (the Conditions of
Employment of Other Servants), what still distinguishes temporary staff from
established officials is the temporary nature of their employment.
6.4.13. It should also be noted that temporary staff have been accorded the right to
participate in internal competitions of the institutions for which they work, in order
to acquire the status of officials69.
The case of research staff
6.4.14. Within the category of ‘other servants’ at the Commission, the staff known as
research staff deserve particular mention. This is the last of the categories of
temporary staff70 referred to above.
6.4.15. These staff members are paid from the research budget. The list of research posts and
the relevant administrative expenditure are entered in part B of the budget. For each
specific programme a ceiling is set by the legislative authority, and the annual
expenditure is set and submitted to the Budgetary Authority for checking. For
example, it appears from Annex 3 that, in 1999, research and technological
development accounted for 3 638 permanent and 74 temporary posts. These staff are
divided between the Joint Research Centre (2 080 posts) and work on indirect
measures (1 632 posts)71.
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 Article 1 and 6 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants.
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 See judgment of 8 November 1990, case T-56/89, Bataille v. European Parliament, ECR II-597.
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 Article 2 (d) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants: ‘staff engaged to fill temporarily a permanent post
paid from research and investment appropriations and included in the list of posts appended to the section of the budget
relating to that institution.’
71
 See the corresponding budget statistics in Annex 4.
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6.4.16. Among research staff, who are recruited on a contractual basis, a distinction needs to
be drawn between interim staff and auxiliary staff, detached national experts and
visiting scientists, temporary staff on non-renewable three-year contracts and
temporary staff on renewable five-year contracts.
6.4.17. The system of rules applicable to these staff makes them a kind of enclave within the
general system of Commission staff, with quite specific rules and procedures,
although these are gradually being brought into line with the general system.
6.4.18. In fact, major innovations have recently been made to deal with the problems which
have appeared in practice, particularly with regard to a lack of transparency and too
many ‘temporary’ posts. These innovations are intended to align with policy
concerning staff paid from the operating budget, while preserving the specific
characteristics of research staff, particularly in the field of direct measures.
6.4.19. Specifically for the recruitment of staff on five-year contracts – currently carried out
by means of quite flexible and rapid selection procedures – a new system was
introduced in 1999 to make these procedures more transparent and more similar to
those used for the recruitment of established officials.
6.4.20. As regards the excess of ‘temporary’ posts, given that there was a need for more
permanent research staff, the new policy adopted in 1996 provides for the balance
between permanent and temporary staff to be restored.
6.4.21. The Committee recommends that these changes be put into practice effectively and
speedily and in particular that the transparency of the system be adequately
guaranteed.
The problem of the termination of other servants’ contracts
6.4.22. Regarding the problem of terminating other servants’ contracts, attention should be
drawn first of all to Article 8 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants,
which lays down  that ‘Temporary staff to whom Article 2(a) applies may be engaged
for a fixed or indefinite period’, whereas ‘Temporary staff to whom Article 2(b)72
applies shall not be engaged for more than two years, and their contracts may be
renewed not more than once for a maximum period of one year. At the end of that
time they shall no longer be employed as temporary staff.’73
6.4.23. In reality, the fact that ‘other servants’ and in particular temporary staff are treated in
the same way as officials, and the tendency for the Commission to employ staff on
short-term contracts, have given rise to serious problems. What happens is that the
user departments try to obtain exemptions from the rules governing the duration of
contracts in order to keep contract staff for as long as possible. In other words they
have shown themselves keener to maintain the number of staff they consider
essential for the service than to comply with the statutory length of the contract.
Consequently the practice has arisen of renewing fixed-term contracts for staff
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 First of the aforementioned categories.
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 See judgment of 1 February 1979, case 17/78,  Deshormes v. Commission, ECR p. 189.
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several times, or of not terminating contracts concluded for an indefinite period. The
impression has thus spread that the ‘temporary’ nature of the contract was purely a
formality in this case.
6.4.24. Serious difficulties then arose when the Commission decided in 1996 to go back to
enforcing the temporary nature of other servants’ contracts. At the end of the
transitional period it had laid down for this purpose, the implementation of the
decision resulted in the departure of a significant number of temporary staff and
created problems for the Directorates-General in which they were employed.
6.4.25. Having said that, it is clear that on principle of temporary contracts should be used
for temporary staff. One way of eliminating the disadvantages mentioned might be to
appoint temporary staff to permanent posts (Article  2(b) of the Conditions of
Employment of Other Servants) rather than to temporary posts (Article 2(a) of the
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants) included in the list of posts appended
to the section of the budget relating to that institution. This would result in an
obligation for the staff in question to leave, in accordance with those provisions, and
there would no longer be any reason for them to apply pressure.
6.4.26. At the same time, it would be advisable to reduce gradually the list of temporary
posts, and to return to the practice of allocating contracts to these posts on a case-by-
case basis in the light of the technical nature of the task and the time needed to
complete it.
6.4.27. Past practice is at the root of several difficulties. This practice led first of all to
contracts being renewed without justification, and then to their being terminated
under conditions which led several of the persons concerned to take legal action.
Since proceedings are still pending on this issue, the Committee considers it
inadvisable to make any further pronouncements on this matter.
Use of external staff
6.4.28. In addition to its staff employed under the Staff regulations, the Commission has
developed the practice of using other staff to help carry out a number of tasks calling
for skills deemed not to be available within the organisation. This is one of the
discretionary powers accorded to the Commission to organise its own operations, and
may be considered to represent flexible management of human resources.
6.4.29. However, while recognising the legitimacy of this practice, the Court of Justice also
defined its limits, ruling out the possibility of its being used, except in an emergency
and in quite exceptional circumstances, for posts involving the exercise of the
powers of a civil servant74. Recourse to external staff is thus permitted only for ad
hoc or specialist tasks, which are accessory to those involving the exercise of civil
service powers and are temporary in nature: administrative duties, technical
assistance, provision of physical or intellectual services, etc.
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 See Van der Stijl judgment, cited above.
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6.4.30. In practice, this has given rise to a plethora of categories of external staff governed
by widely varying rules as regards their legal basis (specific regulations, private law
contracts, etc.), their conditions of employment and even their place of work (work
or service contract, internal or external activities). Apart from the auxiliaries and
local staff already mentioned, these staff include  consultants, researchers, detached
national experts, visiting scientists, freelance interpreters, interim staff (having a
contract with an interim agency which has concluded a framework contract with the
Commission), staff of companies providing services, hostesses, doctors, social
workers, language teachers, etc.75
6.4.31. Over time, the use of external help has grown excessively and in a chaotic manner.
This is mainly the result of the allocation of new tasks to the Commission, beginning
in the 1980s. The Budgetary Authority also obliged the  Commission to adopt a ‘zero
growth’ policy for staff employed under the Staff Regulations.
6.4.32. This is one of the most striking consequences of the Commission’s failure to carry
out any real analysis of its needs and priorities, and thus to implement any
rationalisation leading to appropriate redeployment measures. This imbalance
between tasks and available staff is also clear from the fact that the Commission did
not even exploit all the resources offered to it by the list of posts, as the abnormally
high number of vacant posts shows. It is of course true that there is bound to be at
any given time a minimum number of vacancies which are not filled, particularly as
a result of the delays in recruitment under the Staff Regulations.  However, it is
particularly embarrassing – and hard to justify – that at a time when the Commission
needs to explain its recourse to outside staff by pleading a lack of Staff Regulations
posts, it has at the same time to advertise vacancies. It is also true that the
arrangements for filling these posts are extremely long and unwieldy and should be
speeded up considerably. Nevertheless the number of vacancies advertised is still
much higher than would be required by the exigencies and mechanisms of
replacement.
6.4.33. Moreover, the few operations aimed at restoring the balance in favour of Staff
Regulations posts have been very partial and nowhere near commensurate with the
requirements linked to the new management tasks allocated to the Commission.
6.4.34. Having said that, it should be remembered that the use of external staff is not as
advantageous as one might think. It has many drawbacks: it does not guarantee that
the powers of civil servants are exercised only by staff employed under the Staff
Regulations; it favours a lack of transparency, as well as abuses and nepotism in
recruitment; it leads to temporary staff costing nearly as much to employ as officials,
sometimes more; and it leads to unorthodox practices (with the Commission
awarding several successive contracts to the same person); but most of all, the use of
external staff is tending more and more to be used to meet structural needs, with the
result that the Commission is becoming excessively dependent on these staff.
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 A Code of Conduct for external staff was even adopted by the Commission on 5 October 1994. See statistics in
Annex 5 (pp. 48 and 51 of the 2000 PDB ).
DOC_EN\DV\381\381230EN.doc 75
The case of the TAOs
6.4.35. The possibility of getting hold of external staff, and by means of much quicker and
easier recruitment procedures, has led over time to the development of rather
unorthodox practices, such as the use of operational appropriations (intended for the
implementation of major Community policies) to cover administrative expenditure,
including the provision of contract staff under various legal arrangements (the ‘mini-
budgets’ condemned by the Court of Auditors).
6.4.36. Here, too, we must mention the cases of certain abuses which have been uncovered,
such as the award of service contracts for  project management and technical
assistance to various kinds of private law bodies (non-profit-making organisations,
commercial companies), known as ‘Technical Assistance Offices’ (TAOs) to help
the Commission in its task of implementing the Community’s major policies. This
practice is discussed above in Chapter 2.
Final observations
6.4.37. The above analysis confirms that staff organisation in the Commission has become
complex and hard to control, which could lead to serious shortcomings in the
exercise of the powers of European civil servants.
6.4.38. After all these years of the application of the Staff Regulations, there is clearly an
urgent need for an in-depth examination leading ultimately to the review of the
system and the way in which it is applied.
6.4.39. This means, following a detailed analysis of the Commission’s needs, that:
- It needs to be clearly identified which are the civil service tasks, (involving
the exercise of powers conferred by the Treaty and requiring to be
performed by officials or temporary staff), which tasks can be carried out
by other categories of contract staff, and which can be contracted out (not
privatised);
- A decision therefore needs to be made on the proportion of the
Commission’s total staff which should be made up by external support
staff;
- If redeployment is not sufficient for this purpose, and if the level of
dependence on contract staff is considered too high, while at the same time
the need for new staff is considered to be structural, the Commission must
request a new transfer of appropriations for jobs from the Budgetary
Authority;
- If, in the final analysis, temporary staff have to be called upon, the only
system for filling these posts should be that set out in the Conditions of
Employment of Other Servants, with strict limits on the use of other staff.
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6.4.40. In other words, there should be a return to the Staff Regulations and the Conditions
of Employment of Other Servants, thereby simplifying and rationalising the current
staffing structure of the Commission.
6.4.41. The Committee is well aware that a reversal of the current situation can only be
made gradually, given the scope of the necessary reforms and the difficulties
involved. Nevertheless, the new Commission should set out its guidelines in this
respect clearly and openly, and should adopt a coherent attitude to the question as
soon as it takes office.
6.5          Careers
Recruitment
6.5.1. Article 27 of the Staff Regulations stipulates that recruitment: ‘shall be directed to
securing for the institution the services of officials of the highest standard of ability, efficiency and
integrity, recruited on the broadest possible geographical basis from among nationals of Member
States of the Communities’.
6.5.2. With a view to ensuring adherence to those principles, the institutions normally recruit
staff by means of competitions. These take the form of external competitions in which all
candidates who meet the specified requirements may take part and in which selection is carried out
simultaneously in all the Member States on the basis of common qualifications and/or tests by an ad
hoc selection board which, though independent, is appointed by the Administration itself and is
often composed wholly or in part of members of the Administration76.
6.5.3. Article 29 of the Staff Regulations also refers to other procedures for filling vacancies,
the most relevant of which for the purposes of this chapter is the internal competition. Special
procedures are at the same time laid down for posts requiring special qualifications and for the
recruitment of senior officials (particularly in grades A1 and A2). We shall deal with these when we
take a look at promotion mechanisms.
Competitions
6.5.4. Despite its obvious merits, the competitions system has in practice given rise to serious
problems deriving mainly from the fact that, over the years, the number of candidates has increased
considerably: the last two open competitions organised by the Commission in 1994 and 1998
attracted 56 000 and 31 000 candidates, respectively.
6.5.5. Proper and efficient management of open competitions with such a large number of
candidates is, effectively, impossible: organisation becomes a huge problem; the duration of the
procedures places an unacceptable burden on the institution; the financial cost is too high; and it is
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  For details of competition procedures, see Article 29(1) of the Staff Regulations and Annex III thereto.
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almost impossible to ensure that the proceedings are above board. The fact that the second open
competition referred to above had to be cancelled following the discovery of irregularities merely
serves to confirm the extent of such problems.
6.5.6. Furthermore, selection cannot be carried out with due care and effectiveness in the
presence of such a large number of candidates. The selection procedure, which is conducted by
fairly diverse and heterogeneous selection boards, assisted by a large number of assessors,
sometimes inadequately qualified, results in relatively effective recruitment. The primary aim of the
procedure appears to have become the mass elimination of candidates so as to reduce numbers,
rather than the proper selection of those candidates with the skills required by the institution.
6.5.7. However, the system does not ensure that the different nationalities are properly
represented, given that some Member States yield fewer candidates (even in proportional terms),
inter alia because the desire to pursue an international career is more prevalent and the necessary
training structures better developed in some countries than others, and this is reflected in the results.
6.5.8. Despite the great efforts made by the Administration, the procedure has proved wholly
unsatisfactory and this has had an adverse effect on the public image of the competitions system.
Possible adjustments
6.5.9. While acknowledging the organisational problems which exist in this area and the
difficulties involved in reconciling diverging and sometimes opposing requirements, the Committee
considers that adjustments could be made with a view to making good the shortcomings of the
present system (or, at the very least, attenuating them).
6.5.10. For example, the pre-selection tests could be decentralised in each Member State. The
successful candidates would then go on to take part in the competition proper, held at Community
level.
6.5.11. Similarly, the practice of holding separate competitions by specialisation could be
improved by means of more detailed job descriptions. Furthermore, such competitions could be
used to promote the recruitment of older candidates who have more experience in the relevant area.
They could also be organised at interinstitutional level.
6.5.12. What is more – bearing in mind that the ideas put forward are not mutually exclusive –
separate competitions could be held by language. Competitions of this kind, which have already
been held by the Council and the European Parliament, would ensure neutrality and allow the tests
to reflect the cultural and professional differences existing between the Member States, while also
having the unquestionable advantage of enabling existing or potential deficits in certain languages
within the establishment plan to be made good. This proposal should not, of course, be
implemented at the expense of recruitment standards.
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Lists of successful candidates
6.5.13. Adjustments should also be made with a view to putting an end to another questionable
practice followed by the Commission in the recruitment field.
6.5.14. At present, the Commission does not use the method of holding a competition for a given
number of posts and then drawing up a list of successful candidates classified by order of merit, on
the basis of the results obtained in the competition.
6.5.15. It simply draws up and publishes77 a ‘reserve list’ (i.e. a list of successful candidates
classified in purely alphabetical order), from which people are taken on a case-by-case basis to fill
vacant posts (Article 30 of the Staff Regulations). This is done extremely discretely and no specific
reasons are given for the choice made.
6.5.16.  In view of the absolute lack of certainty about when the choice will be made and the
criteria on which it will be based, coupled with the fact that the decision is not publicised or
explained, this system is wholly inappropriate. It gives rise to questionable practices which are far
from transparent and which do not necessarily respect the rights of the candidates who, despite
having got through a difficult competition, are obliged to roam the Commission corridors for
months – and perhaps even years – in the hope of hearing something useful or (even better for
them) finding what they are looking for.
6.5.17. The arguments put forward in support of this system are that the Commission needs to be
able to choose a successful candidate whose profile matches the requirements of a given directorate-
general and the risk that – on the basis of the current practice – selection based solely on merit
would lead to there being too many people of one nationality, to the detriment of others.
6.5.18. The latter argument is a reflection of the growing concern over this matter, which could
be addressed more effectively by adjusting the current competitions system as suggested above (for
example, by introducing separate competitions by language).
6.5.19. As to the other argument, one should first of all re-establish the principle (which is merely a
question of sound management) that successful candidates are appointed officials of the
Commission itself, not of a given directorate-general; therefore, directorates-general do not ‘own’
the candidates whom they choose from a list. This would make the procedure less arbitrary and
enable it to be based on merit, without linking the choice to the requirements (in some cases
questionable or artificial) of a given directorate-general.
6.5.20. Consideration could, furthermore, be given to the possibility of drawing up lists based on
merit for each specialisation. If necessary, derogations from the merit-based order could be
provided for, on condition that they be granted on clear, objective grounds and justified by the
interests of the service, as, indeed, Court of Justice case law allows78.
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 Furthermore, it did not start publishing such lists until a few months ago, under pressure from the European
Ombudsman (see the lists published in OJ C 187 of 3 July 1999, p. 21 et seq.).
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 See, for example, the judgment of 15 December 1996 in Case 62/65, Serio v Commission, ECR p. 561, which states
that: ‘although it [the appointing authority] is entitled in making its selections to ignore the precise order of merit in the
competition for reasons which it is incumbent upon the administration to evaluate and justify before the Court,
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6.5.21. Whatever happens - even if it should prove necessary to retain the current system for the
time being -, that system should be revised, possibly by amending Article 30 of the Staff
Regulations in such a way as to ensure greater transparency. In particular, the list of suitable
candidates should be made public, as should the choices made in each case and the reasons for those
choices.
Internal competitions
6.5.22. External competitions are not the only means of recruiting Commission officials. The
others include internal competitions (Article 29(1)(b) of the Staff Regulations), which are organised
inter alia with a view to ‘establishing’ temporary staff and enabling officials to move from one
category to another (Article 45(2) of the Staff Regulations).
6.5.23. The general comment that should be made here is that in such competitions there is
always a risk of there being a tendency to ‘keep things in the family’, given that candidates may be
known personally to the examiners.  Consideration should thus be given to their abolition, or at least
to the introduction of mechanisms which ensure genuine transparency and selectivity, thus guarding
against this unwanted tendency.
6.5.24. Having said that, the Commission appears to have decided not to hold any internal
competitions for the ‘establishment’ of temporary staff from the year 2000 onwards79.
6.5.25. Internal competitions could, however, still be used to enable officials to move from one
category to another. However, should the Commission decide that they should not be used for this
purpose either, it should grant officials wishing to change category special rights of access to open
competitions, such as derogations from the age rule and, above all, a system of quotas of reserved
posts. Furthermore, candidates for such posts should be obliged to gain a minimum number of
points in order to be included on the list of successful candidates.
Career progression
6.5.26. In the European civil service career progression normally involves promotion to higher
grades and moving through the steps within those grades; there is also the possibility of moving
from one category to another.
                                                                                                                                                                 
nevertheless it may not destroy the very concept of competition be departing substantially from the result of the
competition without serious reasons.’ Similarly, the judgment of 18 December 1986 in Case 246/84, Kostonis v
Council, ECR p. 3989, provides that: ‘according to Article 30 of the Staff Regulations the appointing authority chooses
from the list of suitable candidates yielded by the competition those whom it intends to appoint to the vacant posts […].
[…] the appointing authority is entitled in making its selection to ignore the precise order of merit in the competition
for reasons which it is incumbent on the administration to determine and to justify before the Court (…] It follows that
the administration is not in all circumstances bound to appoint the candidate placed first but may give preference to
another candidate listed as suitable if it has reasons for doing so which can serve the interests of the service’.
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 See in this connection the Williamson report, which recommends the abolition of such competitions. However, this
raises the problem of how this is to be achieved, given that the case law established by the Bataille judgment referred to
above enables temporary staff to apply for internal competitions in the same way as other candidates. Thought should
be given to amending the Staff Regulations accordingly.
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6.5.27. As we shall see later, special mechanisms are in place for certain grades and posts.
Assessment and promotion
6.5.28. Under the Staff Regulations, career progression and development are linked to an
assessment/reports and promotions system.
6.5.29. Promotions are granted by the appointing authority by selection from among officials
who have completed a minimum period in their grade, after consideration of the comparative merits
of the officials concerned and of the reports on them (Article 45 of the Staff Regulations). Such
reports, which cover the ability, efficiency and conduct in the service of each official, are drawn up
at least once every two years (Article 43)80.
6.5.30. The choices set out in the opinion of the Promotions Committee must be based on merit
and on the staff report.
6.5.31. Merit has a decisive influence. The appointing authority’s discretionary powers do not
extend to challenging that influence; they cover only the manner in which merit is determined (for
example, recommendations made by Directors-General, acceptance of assignments which are more
complex or involve additional responsibilities, mobility, etc.). That authority therefore has the
statutory right to take promotion decisions based on an assessment of the comparative merits of the
candidates eligible for promotion, using the method that it deems most appropriate81.
6.5.32. The staff report is a vital element in the assessment of an official’s career by the
appointing authority, with a view to possible promotion82. However, as we saw above, the latter is
not bound to rely solely on staff reports but may also base its assessment on other aspects of the
merits of the candidates, such as information relating to their administrative and personal position,
which is such as to qualify an assessment made solely on the basis of their staff reports83.
6.5.33. In this context of rewarding merit, seniority in the service and age are merely subsidiary
criteria to be used for the purpose of deciding between candidates of equal merit84.
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 The promotion procedure is initiated by each director-general, who job it is to consider the merits of all officials
eligible for promotion in his service, with a view to drawing up promotion proposals. The directors’ proposals, listed by
order of priority, are posted in all the services. They are forwarded to the Promotions Committee (chaired by the
Secretary-General and comprising the directors-general and twenty staff representatives), which draws up draft lists of
the most deserving officials, using a points-based assessment method covering: the priorities laid down by the
directorates-general (these extra points are discretionary and normally have a decisive influence); staff report; seniority
in the grade and category; and age. Other criteria – mobility, equal opportunities and all other situations - are not
awarded points. The appointing authority chooses from among the officials deemed the most deserving, taking account
inter alia of a certain balance between the directorates-general and the priorities that they have laid down. The
promotion decision is set out in an individual notice signed by the Director-General for Personnel and forwarded to the
official, who may make any comments thereon which he considers relevant (Article 43 of the Staff Regulations).
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 See in this connection the judgment of 1 July 1976 in Case 62/75, De Wind v Commission, ECR p. 1167.
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 See the judgments of 5 June 1980 in Case 24/79, Oberthür v Commission, ECR p. 1743, and 17 December 1981 in
Case 151/80, de Hoe v Commission, ECR p. 3161.
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 See Court of First Instance judgment of 25 November 1993 in Joined Cases T-89/91 and T-89/92, ECR II-1235.
84
 See the judgment of 14 July 1983 in Case 9/82, Ohrgaard and Delvaux v Commission, ECR p. 2379: ‘seniority is
merely one of a number of criteria of assessment and can never take precedence over the merits of candidates’.
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6.5.34. A few remarks about the legal application of this system are necessary, since the clarity
of the above principles is in some cases undermined by the discretionary component of the merit
assessment process and by shortcomings in staff reports.
6.5.35. For example, it is a well-known fact that, owing inter alia to the lack of a genuine
performance assessment culture, staff reports contain a number of imperfections and are in some
cases poorly drawn up and inaccurate.
6.5.36. It should also be said that the approach to such matters tends to differ from directorate-
general to directorate-general. Furthermore, it would appear that the interviews held prior to the
drawing up of reports are not prepared with due care.
6.5.37. Furthermore, there is a general tendency to award an excessive number of points to all
officials in respect of their performance, which means that it is difficult to make a genuine
distinction between them when it comes to promotion. Therefore, in the absence of reliable factors
on which such a differentiation may be based, the determining criterion is likely to be age and
length of service, which, what is more, is contrary to the Staff Regulations, as we have already seen.
6.5.38. Also, the initial comparison of merits is made at directorate, rather than directorate-
general level, which carries with it the risk of the system of values being distorted if the choice is
made on the basis of a given number of officials eligible for promotion in each directorate.
6.5.39. The end result of all the above shortcomings is that the promotions system is not – or, at
least, is not seen to be – fair and reliable.
6.5.40. A revision of the reports and promotions system is therefore necessary in order to
improve the effectiveness of the selection process and restore the credibility of the careers system
within the Commission (without forgetting that the same problems also exist in the other
institutions). This should include changing the form taken by staff reports and simplifying their
headings, introducing more carefully-targeted and homogeneous assessment criteria, recommending
that marks be more clearly differentiated and that comments be more detailed and better
substantiated, and encouraging officials to take a more active and responsible part in the
proceedings.
6.5.41. Consideration could even be given to more radical solutions, such as the introduction of a
system of internal competitions for a small percentage of the posts available, with particular regard
to middle management posts, appointments to which are decided on the basis of a flexible
procedure, which obviously carries with it some risk of favouritism. Such appointments are handled
mainly by the relevant director-general, who has sole responsibility for making proposals and
presenting them to the Consultative Committee on Appointments (with which we shall deal
shortly). The Commissioner responsible confirms such appointments (which he can only oppose on
specific grounds), while the director to whom the post is to be assigned is not even consulted on a
formal basis. Conversely, the appointment of senior managers is a more collegial process.
6.5.42. The proposed system of internal competitions – which should be based on qualifications
and tests, with proceedings being conducted by external selection boards or at least selection boards
chaired by external figures – would enable officials who wish to speed up their career progression
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or who feel that they are not sufficiently appreciated by the hierarchy an opportunity to ‘have a go’.
It could also encourage the hierarchy to take greater care in drawing up staff reports, so as to guard
against any embarrassing comparisons being made.
Appointment of senior officials
6.5.43. The appointment of senior officials (A1 and A2) is a special case, in respect of which a
distinction must be made between the two types of procedure provided for in Article 29 of the Staff
Regulations. The first paragraph of that article deals with the normal promotion channel applying to
all officials, involving: first promotion or transfer, then internal competitions, followed by transfer
from another institution, and, lastly, external competitions; the second paragraph applies to senior
officials alone, for whom ‘a procedure other than the competition procedure may be adopted’. In
practice, the first channel (internal and interinstitutional procedures) is used in the first instance.
The other channel, which can lead to the appointment of external candidates, is rarely made use of.
6.5.44. The College of Commissioners is always the appointing authority in such cases. For A1
posts, a purely oral procedure is used and decisions are adopted in a meeting of the Commissioners,
on a proposal from the Commissioner in charge of personnel. For A2 posts, the opinion of the
Consultative Committee on Appointments (CCA) must also be sought. This committee is chaired by
the Secretary-General and comprises the head of the cabinet of the Commissioner in charge of
personnel, the Director-General for Personnel and three other directors-general (in addition to three
substitutes)85.
6.5.45. As everyone knows, such appointments are more bound more closely by requirements of
‘geographical balance’ – to which several references have already been made - than any other type
of appointment.
6.5.46. Without wishing to ignore those requirements, one is obliged to note that over the years
this system has shown its limits and the major risks to which it is subject, such as: questionable
selection criteria, which do not necessarily bear any relation to the qualifications and experience
required for the post; a form of ‘nationalisation’ of posts (and even of services, as a result of posts
being reserved for a given nationality) resulting from one or more people of a given nationality
holding a post for a long period of time.
6.5.47. A set of rules, or at least a code of conduct, laying down a number of objective and
transparent criteria should therefore be drawn up to cover the recruitment of such officials, so as to
reduce the risk of problems arising and to start to reverse the current trend. Thus, with regard to the
significance of national balances, the flexibility of the current ‘quota’ system could be progressively
increased, a time limit could be place on the length of service in such posts, the appointment of a
successor of the same nationality could be prohibited, and so on. As regards recruitment procedures,
more thorough selection criteria should be introduced, as should more transparent procedures.
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 It might be useful to give a staff representative a seat on the committee, inter alia with a view to making the
proceedings more transparent and given the presence of the head of the cabinet of the Commissioner in charge of
personnel.
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The new Commission’s plans
6.5.48. The new Commission recently took up some of the above ideas in its first policy
statements86, in which it announced that it intended to make appointment procedures for A1 and A2
posts subject to ‘strict, transparent rules designed to guarantee that the persons appointed […] are
of the highest calibre’, and to draw on ‘the sound practices in force in certain Member States’ in
order to do so.
6.5.49. The following procedure is envisaged: publication of vacancy notices; assessment of
candidates during a preliminary selection stage; drawing up of a clear and transparent scale of
assessment for interviews with candidates (referring to management ability, familiarity with human
and financial resource management procedures, knowledge of the area in question, etc.); wide-
ranging interview by the CCA of the candidates selected; assessment of each candidate; opinion of
the CCA and drawing up of a reasoned short-list; interview by the Commissioners of the candidates
short-listed by the CCA; and appointment by the Commission.
6.5.50. With regard to internal and interinstitutional appointments in particular, provision is
made for interviews with candidates to be held by the usual members of the CCA referred to above,
plus, in the case of A1 posts, one or two directors-general with responsibilities in the area relevant
to the post to be filled, and, in the case of A2 posts, the director-general concerned. In both cases,
the CCA must call on outside expertise, which seems to indicate that a technical opinion would be
sought from an outside figure.
6.5.51. A reasoned short-list is drawn up on the basis of the CCA’s opinion and forwarded with
the assessment sheets and the CV of each candidate selected by the Commissioners. It must be said
that, given that it is conducted entirely in house, this pre-selection process comes across as another
way of ‘keeping things within the family’.  It would be preferable for at least the Commissioner
responsible to be involved. It would also be useful for such involvement to extend to the drafting of
job descriptions.
6.5.52. As has already been mentioned, the short-listed candidates must be interviewed before
any appointment proposal is made. For A2 posts, such interviews are conducted by the
Commissioner responsible for the sector in question, and for A1 posts, by that Commissioner and
the Commissioner in charge of personnel and administration.
6.5.53. In respect of A1 posts, the Commission’s decision is taken on the basis of the CCA’s
reasoned opinion and the reasoned proposal of the Commissioner in charge of personnel and
administration, with the agreement of the President and the Commissioner responsible for the area
concerned. For A2 posts, the proposal is drafted jointly by the Commissioner and the relevant
director-general. In this connection, it would be useful for appointment proposals to be
accompanied by appropriate information to the College on the other candidates appearing on the
short list.
6.5.54. As regards external recruitment, the Commission document makes no provision for the
use of fixed-term contracts, which might in some cases be preferable.
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on 12 July 1999 under the title ‘The Operation of the Commission’.
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6.5.55. Having said that, the procedure described above applies in its entirety to external
recruitment, the only difference being that vacancy notices aimed at external candidates are
advertised more widely.
6.5.56. With regard to the profile candidates are expected to have, the document requires a
minimum of 15 years’ professional experience at a level equivalent to category A, gained after
obtaining the qualification required for admission to that category. Those 15 years must include a
minimum of 5 years’ appropriate and duly confirmed experience in the relevant area. Evidence of
practical experience in the discharge of managerial duties must also be produced.
6.5.57. It should be pointed out in this connection that the 15 years‘ professional experience
required is less than that normally required of officials seeking promotion to the grades in question.
Without wishing to question anybody’s motives, one is obliged to note that such a system is open to
the risk of people being ‘parachuted in’, particularly in view of the fact that the 5 years’ experience
in the specific area correspond exactly to the term of office of a Commissioner and, thereby, the
members of his cabinet. At the very least, the 5-year period should be extended.
6.5.58. Lastly, the idea that provision may be made for a probationary period is also rather
puzzling. In the case of internal appointments, to subject an official who has been in the
Administration for many years to a probationary period would be quite absurd; to subject
external candidates to one would be not just incomprehensible, given the type of
appointment procedure described above, but downright dissuasive, in view of the career
risks this would force them to take.
Termination of service
6.5.59. The service of officials may be terminated by resignation, compulsory resignation,
retirement in the interests of the service, dismissal for professional incompetence, removal from
post, retirement or death87.
6.5.60. Dismissal for professional incompetence is the issue that is of most relevance to this
chapter (for details regarding removal from post, see ‘Disciplinary proceedings’ below).
Professional incompetence
6.5.61. The first comment to be made in this connection is that the hierarchy only very rarely
takes appropriate action on the cases of professional incompetence or misconduct which actually
come to light, as is demonstrated by the almost total lack of any precedents and the extreme scarcity
of case law in this area. It must be said, however, that the provisions of the Staff Regulations
governing such matters are far from being a model of clarity. The only provision applying thereto
(Article 51) goes no further than to lay down the measures which may be taken should an official
prove incompetent (dismissal or classification in a lower grade).
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6.5.62. The ambiguity surrounding this matter is compounded by the relatively widespread
tendency to confuse professional incompetence with disciplinary offences. Nonetheless, despite the
fact that under the Staff Regulations the same procedure is applied to both (Annex IX), professional
incompetence and disciplinary offences are quite separate concepts. The former covers
requirements relating to quality of work, efficiency and commitment, while the latter relates to
failure on the part of officials to comply with their obligations. Disciplinary offences normally take
the form of individual punishable acts of misconduct, while professional incompetence consists of a
combination of actions that must be assessed as a whole88.
6.4.63. In the first instance, cases of professional incompetence call for a constructive approach
aimed more a solving the problems that have arisen than at taking punitive action. This means, for
example, that the administration should first check whether the incompetence is ‘structural’ or
whether it depends on the type of assignments allocated to the official (for example, managerial
duties). It should also check whether it is caused by a lack of motivation which has gradually set in
over time, owing to a lack of interest in the tasks assigned to the official (in which case it could be
tackled by means of transfer to another post), or by other difficulties of an operational or personal
nature.
6.5.64. If, despite the above efforts and, where appropriate, after transfer to another post or
service, the incompetence persists, there should be no hesitation in applying Article 51. In this
connection it should be pointed out that, although this has sometimes been forgotten in practice, the
Administration can only make use of Article 50 in cases where the profile of a director-general or a
director is not in keeping with the interests of the service.
6.5.65. Given the guarantees and procedures available, the difficulties involved in proving
professional incompetence cannot be used as an excuse for failing to take such a decision. As we
have already seen, all staff employed under the Staff Regulations are subject to a probation report
and staff reports or other forms of appraisal. A negative comment in certain headings of such
reports constitutes initial evidence of professional incompetence. If such comments are repeated
over time or in respect of different posts, Article 51 should be applied89.
6.5.66. To conclude, it should be pointed out that the difficulties arising in the application of
Article 51 derive also from the fact that the measures laid down for professional incompetence are
out of proportion to the offence: dismissal and even downgrading constitute (or may constitute)
penalties that are excessive in relation to the nature and seriousness of the shortcomings which have
been established.
                                                
88
 See Williamson report, p. 60. As stated in the Court of Justice judgment of 21 October 1980 in Case 101/79,
Vecchioli v Commission, ECR p. 3069: ‘the specific nature of Article 51 […] is in fact due not only to the grounds
justifying it but also to the measures to which it leads and the nature and effects of which, unlike those in disciplinary
proceedings, are better fitted to the situation which has to be rectified in the interests of the service’.
89
 In its judgment of 21 October 1980 in Case 101/79, Vecchioli v Commission, ECR p. 3069 (referred to above), the
Court of Justice found that: ‘the incompetence of an official within the meaning of Article 51 of the Staff Regulations
must be evaluated with particular regard to his ability, efficiency and conduct in the service, that is to say, to the factors
referred to in Article 43 of the Staff Regulations concerning periodic reports’, on the understanding that ‘the authority
[…] must be able to take into consideration the official’s career as a whole’.
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6.6.         Legal status of the staff
6.6.1. It is in the interests of all the Member States and of the institutions themselves to
maintain an independent body of officials of the highest calibre. The legal provisions applying to
the status of Community staff were drafted with a view to both setting in place conditions and
incentives which would make the European civil service attractive and competitive and imposing a
range of obligations consistent with the duties the staff is expected to discharge in an independent,
multinational organisation.
Entitlements and benefits
6.6.2. The entitlements enjoyed by the staff of the Community institutions are largely
commensurate with those granted to civil servants in almost all of the Member States.
6.6.3. Special conditions are provided in order to both encourage people to enter the European
civil service and take account of the difficulties which such a choice entails, including those
deriving from moving to another country.
6.6.4. The working conditions of Community staff are criticised from time to time. However,
such criticisms derive less from a perception that the benefits are excessive than from the fact that
those benefits are not always justified in the light of the quantity and quality of the work performed.
Such criticisms should be answered by means of a rationalisation of structures and a clear,
transparent and effective distribution of work among officials.
Immunities
6.6.5. The ‘privileges and immunities’ enjoyed by officials are intended to safeguard the
independence of the European civil service.  They therefore do not constitute ‘rights’ held directly
by officials, given that they are accorded exclusively in the interest of the Communities and are
designed solely to prevent the operation and independence of the Communities from being hindered
in any way. Each Community institution is therefore required to waive the immunity accorded to an
official or other servant wherever that institution considers that the waiver of such immunity is not
contrary to the interests of the Communities90.
Duties and obligations
6.6.6. The Staff Regulations lay down the values and duties to which staff of the Community
institutions are required to adhere in the performance of their duties (and even after termination of
service)91.
                                                
90
 Article 18, subparagraph 2, of the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Communities.
91
 See inter alia Articles 11 to 23.
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6.6.7. In this connection, the Commission has drawn up a code of conduct for staff aimed at
preventing, or at least reducing the scope for, abuses. It must be said, however, that this code
basically repeats the provisions of the Staff Regulations and the principles implicit therein. What is
more, the code’s provisions appear to be more a set of moral guidelines than genuine rules that can
be implemented in a practical, effective manner.
6.6.8. Furthermore, they make no reference to various situations of incompatibility (in the
broadest sense of the term) which have emerged in practice over the years, such as
incompatibilities concerning those involved in the budgetary procedure, those authorised to draw up
and sign contracts and anyone likely to have an influence over such persons. In such cases, with the
exception of Article 14 of the Staff Regulations92, there are no detailed rules governing possible
conflicts of interest (ties of kinship or business relations) which might arise among officials
responsible for expenditure and third parties (natural or legal persons, partners, shareholders or
directors of companies and other persons or entities under contract, such as TAOs).
6.6.9. Another example is that of Community officials from certain Member States who held a
post in the national civil service prior to entering the service of the European Communities. Such
officials work for the Communities under administrative arrangements equivalent to special leave,
which enable them not to lose their status as national civil servants, subsequently to return to their
previous post in their country of origin and even, in some cases, to continue to receive certain
allowances to which national civil servants are entitled. Situations are quite obviously likely to give
rise to problems of inequality and of incompatibility with the status of Community official.
Lastly, with regard to situations of incompatibility which may arise after the termination of service,
Article 16, subparagraph 1, of the Staff Regulations stipulates that: ‘an official shall, after leaving
the service, continue to be bound by the duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the
acceptance of certain appointments or benefits’. The second subparagraph states that: ‘each
institution shall, after consulting the Joint Committee, specify what posts debar officials who have
held them from engaging in any occupation, whether gainful or not, for a period of three years after
leaving the service, except in accordance with the following provisions’  (declaration made to the
institution and, where appropriate, approval granted by the institution).
6.6.10. The Commission has yet to draw up a list of such occupations (and the same is true of the
other institutions). In the absence of such a list, the institutions are obliged to deal with each case on
an ad hoc basis.
Liability of officials
6.6.11. Given that the obligations incumbent on officials (and former officials) are extremely
varied in nature and scope, the consequences of failing to comply with those obligations also vary
widely.
                                                
92
 This article – which, moreover, does not go into any great detail – requires officials to declare any interests likely to
impair their independence, as follows: ‘Any official who in the performance of his duties is called upon to decide on a
matter in the handling or outcome of which he has a personal interest such as to impair his independence shall inform
the appointing authority’.
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6.6.12. In the cases where failure to comply with an obligation does not constitute actual
misconduct, those consequences may be felt at the staff report or promotion stages.
6.6.13. If, however, such a failure comes about ‘intentionally or through negligence’ (Article 86
of the Staff Regulations), disciplinary proceedings will be opened and may lead to the imposition of
penalties on the official concerned. Articles 86 to 89 of the Staff Regulations and Annex IX thereto
establish a fairly detailed framework for such cases, list the relevant disciplinary measures and set
out the substantive conditions and procedural arrangements for their application.
6.6.14. Furthermore, officials may be held liable to payment of compensation for any damage
suffered by the Communities as a result of serious misconduct on their part in the performance of
their duties (Article 22 of the Staff Regulations). This principle is confirmed by the Financial
Regulation (Title V, Articles 73 to 77) in respect of authorising officers, financial controllers,
accounting officers, and administrators of advance funds, owing to the fact that they have specific
responsibilities in respect of the management of the Community’s finances. The Financial
Regulation merely establishes the principle of such liability, referring the reader to Article 22 of the
Staff Regulations for the conditions under which such liability may be determined (see Chapter 4).
6.6.15. Lastly, it should be remembered that failure on the part of an official to comply with his
obligations may lead to him being held criminally liable under the national law of the Member State
in which that failure occurred.
The difficulties of the system
6.6.16. Having said that, it may be noted that the provisions of the Staff Regulations concerning
staff misconduct seem to be fairly clear and precise. From this point of view, it might
well be said that there is a well-worn path for reacting appropriately to such misconduct.
However, the way in which the system works is far from satisfactory, as practice over
recent years has shown.
6.6.17. With regard to the principle of liability to pay compensation, it may be noted that, at least
where those managing Community finances are concerned, it has only rarely been
applied.
6.6.18. Criminal liability, in turn, is very difficult to enforce owing to the limits imposed by
national laws (pending the entry into force of conventions concluded between the
Member States93)  regarding the punishability of offences which breach Community
interests (see Chapter 5)
                                                
93
 See in particular the Council Act of 26 May 1997 drawing up, on the basis of Article K.3(2)(c) of the Treaty on
European Union, the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or
officials of Member States of the European Union (OJ C 195 of 25 June 1997). This convention, which has not yet
come into force, requires the Member States to treat as criminal offences under their national legislation certain types of
conduct (active and passive corruption) which are damaging to the Communities’ financial interests and are defined in
the convention itself.
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6.6.20. Finally, where disciplinary liability is concerned, implementation of the system has
shown its limitations in terms of speed and effectiveness.
6.6.21. Restricting ourselves here to disciplinary issues, it may be noted that the Commission
itself (on the basis of the experience gained, in particular, over the past few years, which
have seen an increasing number of cases) is planning to propose major changes to the
current system to make it more effective and to speed up procedures, while respecting the
rights of the defence.
6.6.22. In some cases, such a reform would require changes to the Staff Regulations. In others,
on the other hand, improved application of the Staff Regulations would suffice. We shall
now briefly review the main aspects.
The disciplinary procedure and its shortcomings
6.6.23. First of all, it must be borne in mind that, with the exception of very minor measures,
disciplinary measures are imposed by the appointing authority after the ad hoc
proceedings described in Annex IX to the Staff Regulations have been completed.
6.6.24. In particular, it is provided that a report is submitted to the Disciplinary Board (which
will be discussed shortly) by the appointing authority, stating clearly the facts
complained of and, where appropriate, the circumstances in which they arose. The report
(which is drawn up by an official of at least the same grade as the official charged) is
communicated to the chairman of the Disciplinary Board, who brings it to the attention of
the members of the Board and of the official charged. After completing its deliberations,
the Board delivers an opinion on the disciplinary measure which it deems appropriate to
the facts. The opinion is transmitted to the official concerned and to the appointing
authority. The latter, after first hearing the official, decides on the disciplinary measure to
be applied. Throughout the proceedings, the institution must respect the official’s
individual rights and, in particular, his rights of defence49. The official must therefore
first be heard and may be assisted throughout the proceedings by a lawyer50, which is not
possible for the Administration51.
In practice, this procedure has revealed serious shortcomings, in several respects.
                                                
49
 As the Court has stated: 'Thé right to a fair hearing in disciplinary proceedings must be observed not only in the
course of proceedings before the Disciplinary Board pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 87 of and Annex IX to
the Staff Regulations but also in the course of disciplinary proceedings before the appointing authority governed by the
first paragraph of Article 87.' (judgment of 19 April 1988, Case 319/85 Misset v Council [1988] ECR 1861). See also
Court judgments of 4 July 1963, Case 32/62 Alvis v Council [1963] ECR 99; 8 July 1965, joined Cases 27/64 and 30/64
Fonzi v Commission [1965] ECR 481;  7 May 1969, Case 12/68 X. v Commission [1969] ECR 109; and
17 December 1981, Case 115/80 Demont v Commission [1981] ECR 3147.
50
 All the more so because Article 4 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations provides that '…before the Disciplinary Board
[the official] shall have the right to submit observations in writing or orally, to call witnesses and to be assisted in his
defence by a person of his own choice.'
51
 As the Court of Justice has found: 'Article 4 of Annex IX entitles the official charged to be assisted in his defence by a
person of his own choice before the Disciplinary Board, but no similar right is given to him in respect of a hearing by
the appointing authority' (judgment of  16 December 1976, Case 124/75 Perinciolo v Council [1976] ECR 1953).
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The rules concerning the formal circumstances of and arrangements relating to the
procedure and the protection of individual rights are fairly vague and brief, which opens
up the possibility of applying to the courts.
6.6.24. This applies as from the opening of the procedure and the investigation stage, in respect
of which the Commission itself has noted the lack of a legal basis in the Staff
Regulations and the lack of appropriate rules.
The Disciplinary Board
6.6.25. There are likewise problems with regard to the composition and workings of the
Disciplinary Board. In the current system52 the Board consists of a chairman and four
members who are of at least the same grade as the official charged. They are appointed
by lot, drawn annually from two lists drawn up by the Administration and by the local
Staff Committee, respectively. The Board’s membership thus varies in each case, which
may be detrimental to its continuity of action and to the development of administrative
’case-law’ and common practice.
To alleviate this problem, one possibility might be to appoint at least some members for a
minimum period of three years, thereby affording a degree of stability. In addition, to
guarantee the impartiality and credibility of proceedings, consideration should also be
given to making the composition of the Board less ’internal’.
6.6.26. Annex II to the Staff Regulations requires members of the Disciplinary Board to be
officials, but the same requirement does not apply to the chairman. He could thus be a
person from outside the institution (such as a former Director-General or a former
member of the Court of Justice or the Court of First Instance). An interinstitutional
Disciplinary Board might also be considered, which would be a first step forward making
it possible to move away from the situation of ’keeping things in the family’.
6.6.27. The Commission itself is contemplating such options and would, it appears, go so far as
to propose entrusting that part of the proceedings which currently takes place before the
Disciplinary Board to a committee consisting of persons from outside the institution. The
Committee considers that this idea is worth exploring, particularly where senior grades
are concerned.
6.6.28. Where the workings of the Disciplinary Board are concerned, it should be noted that no
representative of the appointing authority takes part in its work, which is an anomaly. An
appointing authority representative should consequently be permitted to attend during all
the stages of the proceedings in which the official and/or his adviser are present.
                                                
52
 See Articles 4 to 6 of Annex II to the Staff Regulations.
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Correlation between misconduct and disciplinary measures
6.6.29. In this connection, it will be recalled that the current Article 86 of the Staff Regulations
lists a whole range of disciplinary measures, but does not lay down any correlation
between misconduct and those measures.
6.6.30. As the Court of First Instance has stated: ’Once the truth of the allegations against an
official has been established, it is for the appointing authority to choose the appropriate
sanction. In view of the fact that Articles 86 to 89 of the Staff Regulations do not specify
any fixed relationship between the measures provided for and the various types of
failures by officials to comply with their obligations, the determination of the sanction to
be imposed in each individual case must be based on a comprehensive appraisal by the
appointing authority of all the particular facts and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances peculiar to each individual case’53.
6.6.31. However, in the absence of any ’disciplinary scale’, i.e. a scale of acts of misconduct and
corresponding disciplinary measures, the result in practice is that very different sanctions
may be applied to identical shortcomings. A relatively fixed framework serving to some
extent to lay down such correspondences would have the benefit of consistency and legal
security.
Duration of proceedings
6.6.32. The average duration of disciplinary proceedings has proved to be too long. It is roughly
four months if a case is not referred to the Disciplinary Board, and slightly more than 12
months if a case is referred (one month for hearing the official concerned, four months
for the disciplinary inquiry and the report to the appointing authority, six months’ work
within the Disciplinary Board and one month for the decision by that authority). This
does not include recourse to legal proceedings which, as we shall see, are open to
officials and may even have suspensive effect. Such proceedings actually extend the
genuine completion of disciplinary proceedings by several years.
6.6.33. Such time-scales are far too long for it to be possible to regard the proceedings as
genuinely effective and exemplary, and doubly so in cases of fraud, which call for
particularly speedy action.
6.6.34. In addition, it must be borne in mind that any suspension that the appointing authority
may decide in the case of serious misconduct alleged against an official may not exceed
four months: once that period is over, the official must be reinstated. Consequently, this
implies - as the Commission itself is contemplating doing - either extending that period
                                                
53
  Judgment of 17 October 1991 in Case T-26/89 De Compte v Parliament. See also, among others, the judgment of
5 February 1987 in Case 403/85 F. v Commission [1987] ECR 645 and the judgment handed down by the Court of First
Instance on 26 November 1991 in Case T-146/89 Williams v Court of Auditors [1991] ECR II-1293.
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or abolishing this provision. Moreover, under Article 88 of the Staff Regulations, if an
official is prosecuted, disciplinary proceedings are suspended until a final verdict has
been reached by the court hearing the case.
6.7.           Recommendations
An in-depth reform of Staff policy is required. Practices and procedures must be changed in order
to ensure that the Commission can operate effectively and retain its traditional role as the driving
force behind European integration. What is really required is not an overhaul of the Staff
Regulations themselves, but simply correct application of the rules and principles set out therein.
The Commission should vigorously enforce the principle of rewarding merit. This will improve
standards throughout the organisation, which will in turn serve as an example to all and lead to a
positive atmosphere at all levels of the hierarchy.
With this in mind the Commission should formulate a dynamic careers policy so as to foster greater
commitment and ambition in its staff and head off all risk of stagnation.
6.7.1. Proper social and trade-union relations within the Commission are essential. The
Administration must recognise the role played by the trade unions, but the latter must in turn avoid
any temptation to set up a kind of alternative hierarchy and must focus on the responsibilities they
exercise which are crucial to the success of the plan to change and modernise the European civil
service (6.2.34-38).
6.7.2. The significance of national balances within the Commission should be reduced by:
designing professional training courses in such a way as to strengthen the ‘European’ nature of  the
civil service in the institutions; encouraging the genuine ‘multinationalisation’ of Commissioners’
cabinets; reconsidering the number of tasks and their distribution among the Directorates-General,
according to real needs, rather than national balances; making ‘national quotas’ more flexible; and
rotating staff more frequently (6.2.18-33).
6.7.3. Training and professional conversion should be seen as an ongoing process, starting with
the probationary period and forming a regular,  compulsory element throughout an official’s career.
The Commission should step up the financial resources allocated to training measures (6.3.6-14).
6.7.4. Mobility should be encouraged and no exceptions should be made. It should be made
compulsory to change posts at the end of a given period of time. This means that flexibility is a
quality which is valued and rewarded in terms of promotion. Furthermore, mobility should be an
essential precondition for duties involving leadership or management of staff (6.3.15-18).
6.7.5. Empowerment of staff requires that everyone’s duties should be clearly defined and that
the efforts made and the results obtained by each official in carrying out the duties allocated to him
are recognised, encouraged and rewarded (6.3.19-22).
6.7.6. Decentralisation plays an important role in enhancing the sense of responsibility felt by
staff. However, the tasks that are decentralised must be clearly defined and effective.
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Thus the practice of creating or maintaining posts with no real responsibilities (or corresponding
workload) should be regarded as contrary not only to the rationality and effectiveness of the system
but also to the principle of empowerment.
Decentralisation should not become synonymous with confusion. The process of decentralisation
must be accompanied by a reinforcement of programming and  internal coordination and genuine
leadership must be exercised (6.3.23-25).
6.7.7. The practice under which ‘other servants’ of the Commission – in particular, temporary
staff – have ‘permanent temporary status’ should be brought to an end. Temporary staff should be
appointed to permanent posts, which would oblige them under the Staff Regulations to leave within
three years. At the same time, the list of temporary posts should be gradually reduced (6.4.22-27).
6.7.8. The use of external help should be reduced so as to decrease the institution’s dependence
on external staff, who should only be used in exceptional circumstances, on the basis of better
regulated conditions and procedures (6.4.28-41).
6.7.9. The system of open competitions for the recruitment of Commission staff needs to be
thoroughly reviewed, since the number of candidates has increased considerably over
time and the procedures followed have proved inadequate. One might consider
decentralising pre-selection tests in each Member State, increasing the practice of
holding specialist competitions with more precise job descriptions, and holding
competitions for each language.
In order to prevent the lack of transparency in practice which occurs between drawing up
the reserve list and recruitment, a list of candidates who have passed a competition
should be published in order of merit reflecting the results of the competition. Any
divergence from the order on the list when the actual recruitment takes place should be
justified and made public.
Internal competitions for the establishment of temporary staff should be abolished. On the
other hand, internal competitions to enable officials to move from one category to another
should be retained. (6.5.4-25)
6.7.10 A reform of the staff reports and promotions system is necessary in order to demonstrate
that these are genuinely selective and restore the credibility of the career structure. To
that end there is a need to strengthen the assessment culture, review the form of the
reports and simplify their headings, draw up more specific and balanced assessment
criteria, award more clearly differentiated marks and provide more detailed comments
with better justifications, and encourage more active and responsible participation by the
officials concerned.
One might even consider a system of internal competitions for a limited number of
available posts, particularly for professional and managerial staff, whose appointments
are decided upon by a flexible procedure which is thus open to dangers of favouritism.
This competition, based on qualifications and examinations, and carried out by external
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selection boards or chaired by an external examiner, would the most ambitious and
motivated officials an alternative means of trying their chances other than promotion
under the Staff Regulations. (6.5.28-42.)
6.7.11 Over the years rather serious shortcomings have been revealed in the appointment of
senior officials (A1 and A2). It is essential to establish rules, or at least a code of conduct,
for their recruitment. As for national balances, one might consider gradually increasing
the flexibility of quotas, placing a time-limit on the term of office, or banning the
appointment of a successor of the same nationality. As for the recruitment arrangements,
more rigorous selection criteria and more transparent procedures should be introduced
within these quotas.
Although improvements will have to be made later, as regards the procedure to be
followed, and the criteria and arrangements for selection, the Committee considers that
the reforms envisaged by the new Commission are a step in the right direction (6.5.43-
58).
6.7.12 Professional incompetence should be the subject of a more clear and precise system of
rules. A procedure distinct from the one for disciplinary hearings should be introduced
(6.5.61-66).
6.7.13 Practice in the field of disciplinary responsibility should be amended. It has shown severe
limitations in terms of effectiveness and speed, with negative consequences for the
European civil service and its image.
In particular:
- the rules on the formal conditions and procedural arrangements, as well as
the protection of individual rights, should be specified;
- the membership of the disciplinary board should be much more stable and
less internal to the Commission, particularly its chairman. An inter-
institutional disciplinary board might also be a possibility. The idea of
entrusting the part of the procedure which currently takes place before the
disciplinary board to an external body should also be considered,
particularly as regards the higher grades;
- a member of the Appointing Authority should be involved in the work of
the disciplinary board, at least for all the stages of the procedure at which
the official and/or his representative are present;
- disciplinary scales setting out a relatively standard correspondence
between errors and penalties should be set to prevent widely diverging
penalties from being imposed for identical failings (6.6.11-34).
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6.8 Annexes
I. Table showing the Commission’s ’training budget’
II. Tables showing non-language training programmes
III. Budget table showing staff of the Community institutions
IV. Budget table showing Commission staff/administration
V. Table showing staff working for the Commission as at 31.12.1998
VI. Budget tables showing Commission staff/research and technological development
VII. Table showing Commission external staff
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Annex I
6.9.  Training budget
1. 7. A07060
Non-language training
2. 8. A04030
Interinstitutional language
training
3. 9. TOTAL
1994 3 357 000 3 650 000 7 007000
1995 3 662 000 4 061 000 7 723 000
1996 3 471 000 4 000 000 7 471 000
1997 3 035 000 3 725 000 6 760 000
1998 3 175 000* 3 730 000 7 539 000
1999 4 500 000 3 960 000 8 460 000
2000
(requested)
5 500 000 4 150 000 9 650 000
* (Excluding two special activities, namely DG XIX SINCOM training and SCR economic
and financial analysis)
NB: Computing-related training activities are financed under Title A5 of the budget.
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Annex II (1)
1998 (  1999 (  2000 ( 
Training linked to institutional priorities and career development
944 000 1 045 000 1 200 000
° Entry into service 218 000 300 000
° Career development and retraining 251 000 250 000
° Specific posts (selection boards, safety at work, internal instructors, etc.) 262 000 250 000
° Mainstreaming and equal opportunities 53 000 75 000
°SEM and MAP 2000, finance, auditing* 142 000 150 000
° European news 18 000 20 000
Management training** 375 000 1 250 000 1 600 000
° Top management 250 000
° Middle management 750 000
° Other managers 200 000
° Further technical training 50 000
* A number of training courses are organised in-house
** Because course structures were different in 1998, courses cannot be broken down in the same way as in 1999 and 2000.
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Annex II (2)
1998 (  1999 (  2000 ( ***
Training linked to specific practical needs of departments
981 000 1 225 000 1 500 000
°Negotiating 44 000 50 000
°Conducting meetings 26 000 50 000
°Public speaking 62 000 60 000
  Speed reading/Memory training 43 000 40 000
°Note taking 32 000 30 000
°Media presentation techniques 50 000 75 000
° Information and public relations 52 000 50 000
  Time management 74 000 60 000
°Project management 106 000 150 000
°Basic principles of economics 84 000 90 000
°Library/Archives/Documentation 17 000 20 000
°Specialised individual activities 301 000 350 000
  Analysis and drafting 15 000 50 000
° Customer service 0 100 000
  Miscellaneous 75 000 50 000
Targeted activities in specific fields organised by DGs
505 000 600 000 800 000
Support
370 000 380 000
Logistics 120 000 100 000
Technical and teaching aids 170 000 180 000
Multi-media library 80 000 100 000
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TOTAL
3 175 000 4 500 000 5 500 000
** The figures for the year 2000 are intended purely for guidance at this stage.
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Annex III
C. STAFF
Authorised Staff
1998 1999
Institution Permanent
posts
Temporary
posts
Permanent
posts
Temporary
posts
Parliament and Ombudsman 3 490 620 3 491 611
Council 2 514 20 2 584 37
Commission :
- administration 16 344 750 16 511 690
- research and technological development 3 598 114 3 638 74
- Office for Official Publications 525 - 525 -
- European Centre for the Development of
Vocational Training
52 29 52 29
- European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions
83 - 84 -
Court of Justice 727 226 727 234
Court of Auditors 460 93 458 94
Economic and Social Committee and
Committee of the Regions and joint
organizational structure
711 28 709 28
(Source : OJ L 39, 12.2.1999, p. 129)
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Annex IV
Section III - Commission
Administration
1999
Category and grade
Permanent posts
Of which permanent
posts in the Supply
Agency
Temporary posts
A 1 28 - -
A 2 194 - 22
A 3 554 2 32
A 4 1 323 3 154
A 5 1 240 1 133
A 6 898 2 41
A 7 998 - -
A 8 100 - -
                         Total 5 335 8 382
LA 3 54 - -
LA 4 527 - 1
LA 5 486 - 2
LA 6 352 - 2
LA 7 448 - 8
LA 8 36 - -
                          Total 1 903 - 13
B 1 786 1 46
B 2 668 2 52
B 3 852 1 58
B 4 526 3 31
B 5 467 - -
                         Total 3 299 7 187
C 1 1 351 6 24
C 2 1 274 1 42
C 3 1 362 - 20
C 4 710 2 9
C 5 514 - 13
                         Total 5 211 9 108
D 1 463 - -
D 2 230 - -
D 3 70 - -
D 4 - - -
Total 763 - -
        Grand Total 16 511 24 690
(Source : OJ L 39, 12.2.1999, p. 138)
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Annex V
Staff working for the Commission as at 31/12/1998
Category Status under the Staff Regulations or contract
FP FS TC TP TT TR AUX END PriM Total
A 5 144 278 79 71 223 1 060 196 730 7 781
B 3 450 125 21 70 121 470 212 4 475
C 5 552 126 88 81 1 688 817 7 353
D 815 21 6 0 0 28 91 961
LA 1 764 69 0 73 3 0 1 909
PriM 568 568
Total 16 725 619 194 295 348 2 252 1 316 730 568 23 047
FP Permanent official
FS Probationer
TC Member of the temporary staff working in a cabinet
TP Member of the temporary staff in permanent employment
TT Member of the temporary staff in temporary employment
TR Member of the temporary staff in permanent employment (research)
AUX Member of the auxiliary staff
END National expert on secondment
PriM Extramural service provider
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Annex VI (1)
Research and technological development
Joint Research Centre
1999
Category and grade Scientific and
technical
Administrative Total
A 1 1 - 1
A 2 10 1 11
A 3 38 8 46
A 4 177 13 190
A 5 150 8 158
A 6 167 3 170
A 7 137 2 139
A 8 13 1 14
                         Total 693 36 729
B 1 178 36 214
B 2 146 20 166
B 3 90 12 102
B 4 103 8 111
B 5 64 5 69
                          Total 581 81 662
C 1 233 147 380
C 2 56 31 87
C 3 47 24 71
C 4 29 22 51
C 5 29 32 61
                          Total 394 256 650
D 1 12 13 25
D 2 5 3 8
D 3 5 1 6
D 4 - - -
Total 22 17 39
    Grand total 1690 390 2 080
(Source : OJ L 39, 12.2.1999, p. 141)
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Annex VI (2)
Indirect action
1999
Permanent posts Temporary posts JET
Category and
grade
Scientific
and
technical
Administrative Total
Scientific
and
technical
Aministrative Total
A 1 1 - 1 - - -
A 2 17 2 19 - - -
A 3 71 8 79 2 - 2
A 4 278 27 305 5 4 9
A 5 245 24 269 11 3 1
4
A 6 129 17 146 3 - 3
A 7 76 4 80 - - -
A 8 9 2 11 - - -
Total 829 84 910 21 7 2
8
B 1 44 35 79 8 1 9
B 2 22 37 59 5 - 5
B 3 4 56 60 2 - 2
B 4 7 35 42 - - -
B 5 1 19 20 - - -
Total 78 182 260 15 1 1
6
C 1 - 90 90 - - -
C 2 - 90 90 - - -
C 3 - 106 106 - - -
C 4 - 87 87 - - -
C 5 - 45 45 - - -
Total
- 418 418 - - -
D 1 - - - - - -
D 2 - - - - - -
D 3 - - - - - -
D 4 - - - - - -
Total - - - - - -
Grand Total 904 684 1 588 36 8 4
4
(Source : OJ L 39, 12.2.999, p. 143)
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Annex VII (1)
Balance in 1998 compared with the initial appropriation and out-turn in 1997
External staff employed Appropriation
1998
before
CAP
deduction
Difference Out-turn
1997
Difference
98/97
Resources Appropriations 98
(1)
(2) (3) = (1)-(2) (4) (5) = (1)-(4)
Auxiliaries 692 734 -42 775 -83
Temporary
staff
296 244 52 360 -64
END 576 579 -3 564 12
Providers 407 286 121 398 9
TOTAL 1 971 1 843 128 2 097 -126
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Annex VII (2)
EXTERNAL RESOURCES FINANCED UNDER TITLE A-7 (FORMER A-1) OF THE BUDGET
AND BY BALANCES TO BE SETTLED FROM 1997
(in man-years)
FIELD OF ACTIVITY
BALANCE
1992
BALANCE
1993
BALANCE
1994
BALANCE
1995
BALANCE
1996
BALANCE
1997
BALANCE
1998
Internal market 782 637 496 475 497 458 443
Social area 512 729 549 521 369 301 258
Flanking policies 405 376 314 273 239 201 193
Economic development and 164 135 130 111 103 121 125
Structural operations 0 0
Common policies 78 95 70 50 35 56 37
External relations 407 434 414 410 463 466 407
Coordination 390 378 289 292 307 267 246
Finance and control 56 35 36 35 38 36 35
Administration and 199 206 200 161 147 140 127
Data processing 0 0
Languages 41 42 43 41 39 51 100
0 0
TOTAL 3 034 3 067 2 541 2 369 2 237 2 097 1 971
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7 INTEGRITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN EUROPEAN
POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LIFE
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7.  INTRODUCTION – THE CULTURAL FRAMEWORK
7.1 Opening remarks
7.1.1. In accordance with the Committee’s mandate, the bulk of this report examines concrete
aspects of the Commission’s systems, practices and procedures. It is therefore able to arrive at
recommendations aimed at resolving particular weaknesses.  However, as the mandate also
reflects, such weaknesses cannot be dealt with in isolation, but must be set against the backdrop
of a particular administrative “culture” prevailing in the Commission.
7.1.2. It is impossible to discuss the Commission’s culture in the same way as one can discuss,
say, financial control arrangements or contracting procedures, as a culture is, by its very nature,
intangible and lies beyond the scope of explicit rules, procedures and legislation. Nevertheless,
it is equally impossible – and utopian to boot - to ignore the influence that a given collective
culture may have over the manner in which rules, procedures and legislation operate in practice.
7.1.3. This chapter attempts no systematic analysis of the prevailing culture in the
Commission. Though perhaps entertaining, it would serve little purpose to do so.  For present
purposes, it suffices that the central “cultural” area of concern has already been identified:
integrity, responsibility and accountability, going hand-in-hand with transparency and openness.
7.1.4. The concept of responsibility, as discussed in the Committee’s first report, is an
amalgam of a range of related ideas, ranging from personal integrity and good conduct to the
operation of formal processes of institutional accountability.  The objective of this chapter is to
look at these related ideas with a view to finding ways of reinforcing them and making them
work.  The exercise is based on the premise that it is not possible to legislate for a culture of
integrity, responsibility and accountability, but that it is possible to take action to nudge a
organisational culture in a positive direction by identifying its core values.  It should be
remembered that the tools for doing so – the classic mixture of “carrot and stick”, in the form of
rules, codes, training, career incentives, sanctions, etc. – are not ends in themselves, but means
to an end.  Too often in bureaucracies and organisations everywhere, respect for form (e.g. the
existence of codes of conduct, of sanctions for misconduct, training schemes, etc.) is confused
with respect for substance.  The Committee is fully aware, in making the proposals included in
this chapter, that their value can only ultimately be judged by their long term effects.
7.1.5. This chapter falls into three main subject areas:
• Standards of personal conduct applying to commissioners, their cabinets, director-
generals and the officials working under them.
• The chain of responsibility from the President of the Commission, through the
Commission itself to individual commissioners and their cabinets, thence to the
senior levels of the hierarchy and the officials and other agents below them.
• Institutional accountability of the Commission, commissioners and officials vis-à-vis
the democratic institutions of the European Union, notably the European Parliament,
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both positively (giving account) and negatively (being held to account).
7.2 The fundamentals
7.2.1. "Corporate culture" is made up of both the tangible (rules, structures, working habits)
and the intangible (attitudes, perceptions, mentalities).  The cultural foundation of the EU
institutions and their administrations is provided by shared ethical and political values and
priorities flowing primarily from the concept of human dignity. These have been given formal
expression in various international and European acts, particularly the European Convention on
Human Rights and in national constitutional rules and traditions. They are based on the
principles of democracy and respect for the citizen and on the rule of law, now confirmed by
Articles 1 (ex A) and 6 (ex F) of the TEU, which read:
“This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an even closer union among the
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as
possible to the citizen”
and
"The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, principles which are common to the
Member States".
7.2.2. Building on this basis, fundamental concepts of ethics and standards of behaviour are
increasingly being formalised in written rules and codes of conduct, drawn up for example by
international organisations, such as the OECD, as well as the institutions of the Community and
of the Member States. From the outset, these concepts should be reflected in sound, therefore
simple, administrative procedures, structures and working methods and in a clearly defined set
of competences and responsibilities.
7.2.3. Within the institutional structure of the European Union, the European Commission is
uniquely vested with a mix of legislative, executive and administrative tasks. These have grown
in complexity due to the Community’s geographic enlargement and the diversification of its
activities. In contrast to the Council, where national interests are transformed, for better or for
worse, into Community interests, the Commission is the prime actor in the preservation of the
Community spirit and in strengthening the “acquis communautaire”.  Thanks to its right of
legislative initiative, and the substantial direct and delegated legislative powers assigned to it,
and to its function as the Community’s executive, it remains the engine behind the development
of Community policy and Community law.
7.2.4. The growing role of the European Parliament has made significant changes to the
Commission’s constitutional position. The Commission must now come to terms with both
Council and Parliament where these share legislative competence, but more importantly, it must
familiarise itself with a more stringent notion of the accountability inherent in parliamentary
control. Recent events have highlighted that the Commission can no longer consider itself
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immune either from intense parliamentary scrutiny or its consequences.  The end result should
not only be a stronger European Parliament, but also a stronger European Commission, provided
that the new Commission draws the right lessons from past experience.  It must opt unreservedly
for openness and transparency, for responsibility and accountability in its relations towards the
other institutions and towards those over whom it exercises power. These fundamentals must
permeate its culture in all areas and at all levels; they are the basic essentials for creating
credibility in the exercise of power.
7.2.5. In conclusion, the remarks in this chapter are made in the light of the fact that the
Commission is situated at the heart of a modern European democratic structure built upon deep-
rooted political and ethical values. In this framework the Commission plays the part of the
executive branch and holds sole power of legislative initiative. It thus bears especially well-
developed duties of responsibility and accountability towards the other participants in the
political structure: Parliament and Council, and, above all, the citizens of Europe.
7.3 A multi-cultural environment
7.3.1. In contrast with national administrations, any attempt to reform the Commission must
take account of its multi-national and multi-lingual environment.  This makes it difficult simply
to “transplant” national management practices and regulatory frameworks, however successful
they may be “at home”.  European problems need European solutions.
7.3.2. Arguably, the multinational character of the Commission itself lies at the heart of some
of its problems.  Firstly, it can lead to differences in the interpretation of procedures, practices,
rules and laws within the Commission which potentially give rise to a culture of moral
flexibility and permissiveness.
7.3.3. Secondly, unhealthy national allegiances can cut across the formal structures of the
Commission.  During the first phase of its work, the Committee, in examining files, in
interviews with officials and in correspondence received from outside sources, not infrequently
encountered the existence of national reflexes, and even of national networks, within the
Commission.  It found that some commissioners, and/or their private offices, are not immune
from such reflexes.
7.3.4. This problem is linked to the policy of appointing Directors-General and civil servants
immediately beneath them, albeit for understandable reasons of proportionality, on the basis of
national "shares".  This practice can (and does) result in the creation of national “fiefdoms”
unless special measures are taken to avoid such an outcome. If allowed to develop, it will
ultimately undermine Europe as a concept.94
                                                
94 See also the EP "Report on improvements in the functioning of the Institutions without modification of the
Treaties" - A4-0158/99 adopted 15.4.99 (Herman report)
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INTEGRITY AND CONDUCT IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LIFE
7.4 Codes of conduct in public life
7.4.1. One means to attain uniformity in the interpretation of legal rules and, more importantly,
to shape a culture reflecting high standards of behaviour notwithstanding national differences, is
the elaboration of codes of conduct.  This has become common throughout the public sector as
one technique “to restore respect for the ethical values inherent in the idea of public service,”
while recognising that though “formal procedures have a role to play, (…) in the end it is
individuals’ consciences that matter”95.  Codes of conduct are not “formal procedures”, but are
designed to provide an ethical reference point for officials and holders of a public mandate.
They aim to assist them in living up to the principles of conduct which provide the foundations
for public life and which have been defined as: selflessness, integrity, objectivity,
accountability, openness, honesty and leadership96.
7.4.2. The growing need for high standards of conduct in public service is widely recognised at
all levels and in different sectors.  Leaving aside its intrinsic value, this trend is in part driven by
a phenomenon which, in a restrained form, is visible in the Commission, namely towards
privatisation, outsourcing and delegation of administrative tasks to an array of agencies and
quasi-governmental organisations, thereby provoking the widespread use of “new” financial
management techniques such as contracting out and competitive tendering.
7.4.3. To find an example of a major international organisation adopting a code of conduct, one
recent illustration is provided by the adoption by the Council of the OECD on 23 April 1998 of
a set of “Principles for Managing Ethics in the Public Service”97.  Its twelve principles deserve
to be restated in full.  They are:
1. Ethical standards for public service should be clear;
2. Ethical standards should be reflected in the legal framework;
3. Ethical guidance should be available to public servants;
4. Public servants should know their rights and obligations when exposing
wrongdoing;
5. Political commitment to ethics should reinforce the ethical conduct of public
servants;
6. The decision-making process should be transparent and open to scrutiny;
7. There should be clear guidelines for interaction between the public and private
sectors;
8. Managers should demonstrate and promote ethical conduct;
9. Management policies, procedure and practices should promote ethical
conduct;
10. Public service conditions and management of human resources should
promote ethical conduct;
11. Adequate accountability mechanisms should be in place within the public
service;
                                                
95 Standards in Public Life, First Report of the (Nolan) Committee, vol.1 May 95, p.16.
96
 See the Committee’s first report, para. 1.5.4, referring to Nolan Committee.
97 See website www.oecd.org. (This website also contains summary reports of ethical provisions in various
Member States including the Netherlands, Finland, Portugal and the United Kingdom.)
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12. Appropriate procedures and sanctions should exist to deal with
misconduct.
7.4.4. The principles intend to prevent misconduct “by a range of integrated mechanisms,
including sound ethics management systems”.  They address different points of concern, some
of which have a direct bearing on subjects dealt with in the Committee’s present and/or first
report.
7.4.5. Principles 1 and 2 indicate that, although standards for public service may be of an
ethical nature, and therefore do not constitute legal (i.e. judicially enforceable) rules, they must
nonetheless be reflected in the formal legal framework.  In other words “the legal framework is
the basis for communicating the minimum obligatory standards and principles of behaviour for
every public servant... (Therefore) laws and regulations ... should provide the framework for
guidance, investigation, disciplinary action and prosecution”98.  The point is that a code of
conduct cannot exist in isolation, but must, though not law itself, be underpinned by and
consistent with a coherent legal framework based upon the same underlying values and
principles.
7.4.6. Shortly before its resignation, the EU Commission proposed two codes of conduct99. The
first lays down rules of conduct for Members of the Commission, who are not covered by the
Community's Staff Regulations. The code contains non-binding rules of a self-regulatory type.
That is not necessarily inconsistent with the principles above, which are only formally
applicable to officials.  Moreover the code is based on Treaty provisions (see 7.5.1). If, as it
should, the new Commission pursues the intention of laying down codes of conduct, it must
ensure that the formal legal framework, in the form of binding laws and regulations  is adequate.
(This would include, for example, the clarification of the legal protection to be given to
whistleblowers, as required by Principle 4 of the OECD code).
7.4.7. In the following sections we will first deal with the (proposed) code of conduct for
members of the Commission and thereafter with the code of conduct for officials.
7.4.8. In this connection, it should be stressed that though the Committee’s mandate only
concerns the Commission, it believes that members and officials of other EU institutions fall
under similar obligations of good conduct and that similar provisions should equally be applied
to them.
                                                
98 Explanatory comment under Principle 2.
99
 For a European political and administrative culture. See www.europa.eu.int. A third code, on officials, is
still under preparation, while the incoming Commission has already amended and supplemented the first
two codes with proposals of its own (to be adopted formally when it takes up office).  These too have been
posted on the Commission’s website.
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7.5 Code of conduct for members of the Commission
Principles
7.5.1. The code of conduct prepared by the outgoing Commission rightly takes the Treaty
articles concerning the Commission (see TEC Article 213 (ex 157)) as a starting point, making
particular reference to the independence enjoyed by the members of the Commission, who are
required to discharge their duties in the general interest of the Community.  It continues to state:
“In the performance of their duties they must neither seek nor take instructions from any
government or from any other body.  The general interest also requires that in their official and
private lives Commissioners should behave in a manner that is in keeping with the dignity of
their office”.
7.5.2. The remainder of the code is devoted to setting limits to commissioners' outside
activities (including the delivery of speeches or taking part in conferences against payment, the
holding of posts or being an active member of political parties or trade unions) as well as to
interests which could jeopardise their independence (declaration of financial interests and assets,
and of activities of  spouses).  It lays down rules for missions, receptions and professional
representation and acceptance of gifts, decorations or honours.  More important matters concern
the principle of collective responsibility and the composition of Members’ private offices, dealt
with below.
7.5.3. The proposed codes of conduct are a first, albeit modest, step in the right direction. The
prohibition - or at least declaration - of situations giving rise to a possible conflict of interest is
essential for good governance, just as it is to lay down the principle of collective responsibility.
However, the codes define the latter notion as implying only a prohibition on Commissioners
“[making] any comment which would call into question a decision taken by the Commission,”
or “disclosing what is said at meetings of the Commission”.  The principle of collective
responsibility should also involve the definition of how the Commission as a whole bears a
responsibility for decisions taken collectively and how, in practical terms, individual
commissioners must assume responsibility for decisions taken collectively. The Committee
recommends the Commission to re-define collective responsibility in that direction in light of
the Committee’s findings in its first report (see further in 7.10.1-2).
7.5.4. The question of collective responsibility is part of a much broader issue in that it
concerns not only the relations between commissioners, but also relations with (and between)
their departments.  It also concerns the accountability of commissioners vis-à-vis Parliament and
their relations with the Council.  These broader issues are not dealt with in the outgoing
Commission’s code of conduct which limits itself mainly to issues of personal integrity. These
broader issues will be discussed in later sections where further recommendations will be
formulated.
Appointments to cabinets
7.5.5. The Commission’s proposed code of conduct for commissioners puts forward specific
rules on the composition of cabinets, for which the President of the Commission named
appointing authority.  The rules are intended to “secure an appropriate balance between officials
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and temporary staff as well as in terms of nationalities and equal opportunities”. Further, “at the
end of their period of secondment to Member’s Offices, officials shall be reinstated in
Commission departments in accordance with standard procedures laid down in Staff
Regulations.  No commitment shall be given to temporary members of staff in respect of
continued employment in the Commission after the Commissioner’s term of office expires”.
7.5.6. The importance of these rules cannot be overstated.  The role of commissioners' cabinets
is highly significant, and is further discussed below.  In the present context of standards of
conduct for Commissioners, it suffices to recall that the inclusion of externals as members of a
private office, or as special advisers, has been the occasion of appointments based not on merit
but on friendship, even family links, sometimes in violation of standing rules.  The Committee
recommends that objective rules be established concerning the appointment of personal relations
to their cabinets or elsewhere, be they directly proposed or induced by commissioners, to ensure
that they are clearly based on merit.  Obviously, this should not lead to discrimination against
such persons where merit can objectively be ascertained.  However, in such instances, rules of
transparency declaring the nature of the relationship must be laid down.
Size of cabinets
7.5.7. There are vast differences between the Member States as to the use of private offices or
cabinets by members of the government.  In some, private offices are unknown and ministers
fully rely on their administration.  In others, ministers have sometimes very large cabinets
composed of personal collaborators of the Minister, handpicked by him/her from within, but
often also from outside, the administration.  The Member States in between allow for a number
of “advisors” who serve as political or policy experts to the Minister, help them to prepare long-
term policies and short-term decisions and to function as a first sounding board for ideas.
7.5.8. Here is not the place for a general discussion of the pros and cons of private offices.  It
suffices to say that the Committee subscribes to the view that large cabinets are damaging in
that they become a "counter-administration", demotivate regular officials, lead to
“parachutages” of outsiders within the administration and contribute, generally, to an
administrative culture based on party, ideological and/or regional/national divisions.  The
Committee therefore recommends that the size of cabinets be kept to, at most, six category A
members.  It approves both the outgoing Commission’s proposals in this respect and the
president-designate’s determination to promote multi-national private offices, to limit (even
exclude) the appointment of outsiders and to exclude unduly favourable treatment of members
of cabinets at the end of their term of office.
Nationality considerations
7.5.9. The issue of nationality arises in the codes in the requirement that commissioners ensure
balance in terms of nationalities (and gender) in their cabinets.  Nationality as a general criterion
for appointment, though aimed at securing Member States a proportionate share in Community
decision-making processes, inevitably gives rise to informal quota provisions100.  Such “quotas”
                                                
100 Whether this system is consistent with Community law is doubtful, given that the ECJ has held that job
allocation should not be predetermined and should be decided on merit: "sur la base de critères objectifs de
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do not in principle apply to appointments in cabinets, where commissioners have wide
discretion to select persons who have their full confidence.  However, even there, that wide
discretion may not be unrestricted, as the proposed code correctly suggests.  It is unacceptable
that cabinets - which are involved in policy making in the Commission (but see 7.12.1ff.) -
should be composed exclusively or predominantly of persons of the same nationality as the
commissioner.  That would put the Community character of the commissioner’s work too much
at risk.
7.5.10. Nationality may only be a criterion insofar as it is permitted by law101.  Outside the realm
of such (Community) law, the use of nationality amounts to impermissible discrimination.  This
principle applies not only to appointments but also to all other areas of decision making, most
particularly where financial incentives or subsidies are involved.  Commissioners who, in the
exercise of their office, use undue influence to favour their national interests should be deemed
in serious breach of their obligation of independence.
Political affiliation
7.5.11. In this connection, the Committee emphasises that the use of other discriminatory criteria
such as political affiliation of the person to be recruited, or selected or to receive any other
advantage, is also to be considered a serious breach of the obligation of independence.
Commissioners themselves, though appointed by common accord of the governments of the
Member States (essentially on the basis of political considerations), must subsequently carry out
their duties in full independence - meaning that they must act, and be seen to act, with political
neutrality. The proposed code of conduct should not allow commissioners to “be active [i.e., in
the Committee’s understanding, office-holding] members of political parties or trade unions,
provided that this does not compromise their availability for service in the Commission”
(emphasis added).  It is not availability, but political neutrality, which should be the decisive
criterion102, at least under present Community law where the Commission, unlike a national
government, is not the emanation of an elected political majority.
7.5.12. The events surrounding the resignation of the outgoing Commission illustrate how the
political affiliation of commissioners contributed to a distortion of the European Parliament’s
power of censure, in that political groups were influenced by the actual or perceived political
affiliation of the commissioners involved.  Although it is normal for a directly-elected
Parliament to react on the basis of political considerations, it is inconsistent, under present
Community law, for the same to apply to the commissioners, who should not be perceived as
being part of a political grouping of any kind.
Concluding remark
7.5.13. It emerges from the above that a code of conduct for commissioners must cover a
broader range of issues than those dealt with in the draft prepared by the outgoing Commission.
Because they relate to the public image of the Community as a whole, moreover, the issues in
                                                                                                                                                           
sélection et dans le seul intérêt de service" (Cf Art 29 Staff regulations): Case 105/75, Giuffrida v. Council
[1976] ECR 1395, par 6.
101 See Chapter 6
102 The proposed code rightly prohibits commissioners from holding any outside public office.
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question are of direct concern not only to the Commission, but also to the other institutional
players in the European Union.  It is therefore recommended that when the new Commission
prepares a new and, it is hoped, more comprehensive code, it will take the prior advice of
Council and Parliament as well as the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors.
7.6 Rules of conduct for officials of the Commission
Principles
7.6.1. It falls to the new Commission to adopt a code of conduct for its officials.  This should
be done following the principles laid down in other international or supranational documents,
for example those adopted by the OECD Council (see 7.4.3), and in similar codes used in EU
Member States. It is for the Commission to “create legislative and institutional arrangements
that reinforce ethical behaviour and create sanctions against wrongdoing”103.  Again, the other
Institutions should be consulted, also with a view to achieving a degree of uniformity with
similar codes of conduct for officials of those Institutions.
7.6.2. A code of conduct for officials, together with the rules and legislation underpinning it,
should comprise a comprehensive set of standards regulating their conduct, not only indicating
“official actions which will not be tolerated”, but also “articulating public service values that
employees should aspire to”104.  It should also emphasise the use of “basic principles, such as
merit, consistently in the daily process of recruitment and promotion (which) helps (to)
operationalise integrity in the public service”105.  Mechanisms must exist to promote the
accountability of officials for their actions to their superiors and, more broadly, to the public.
These should focus not only on compliance with rules and ethical principles, but also on the
achievement of results”106.  Effective “mechanisms for the detection and independent
investigation of wrongdoing such as corruption and provide reliable procedures and resources
for monitoring, reporting and investigating breaches of public service rules, as well as
commensurate administrative disciplinary sanctions to discourage misconduct”107 must also be
in place.  Many of these points have been discussed elsewhere in this report and
recommendations made.
Openness v. Secretiveness
7.6.3. Three points relating to the conduct of the Commission, both college and services, are of
major concern to the Committee.  The first is “the whole tradition of secretiveness” which
characterises both the Commission and the other EU institutions, above all the Council108.
Secretiveness must not be confused with the need for confidentiality in certain instances.
Secretiveness means a lack of openness in matters where no real justification for confidentiality
exists.  Confidentiality must be the exception, not the rule.  Openness is not in the first place a
                                                
103 Explanatory comment to Principle 5 of the OECD set of principles.
104 Explanatory comment to Principle 9.
105 Explanatory comment to Principle 10.
106 Explanatory comment to Principle 11.
107 Explanatory comment to Principle 12.
108 Thus EU Ombudsman, Mr. Söderman in an interview with European Voice, (22.4.99)
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question of legal texts109 or codes of conduct, but a question of mentalities and attitudes, arising
from the basic principle that the public has a right to know how public institutions use the power
and resources entrusted to them.  Accordingly, “public scrutiny should be facilitated by
transparent and democratic processes, oversight by the legislature and access to public
information.  Transparency should be further enhanced by measures such as disclosure systems
and recognition of the role of an active and independent media”110.
7.6.4. There exists a “Code of Practice on access to Council and Commission documents”111
which is a step in the right direction.  Public scrutiny has also been strengthened by the creation
of the office of Ombudsman appointed by the Parliament who is “empowered to receive
complaints from any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a Member State concerning instances of maladministration in the activities
of the Community institutions or bodies"112 as well as by the right, contained in Article 194 (ex
138 d) of the Treaty, for such natural or legal persons to "address (...) a petition to the European
Parliament on a matter which comes within the Community’s fields of activity and which affects
him, her or it directly”.  It should be noted moreover that the Ombudsman is himself in the
process of preparing a “Code of Good Administrative Behaviour”, much of which deals with the
need for openness and transparency on the part of officials vis-à-vis the public.
7.6.5. These mechanisms cannot in themselves bring about a change in mentality.  In the first
instance, it falls to the new Commission, and above all its President, to give an example by their
own behaviour of a move away from the present mentality of secretiveness into one of
openness.
7.6.6. It is important to appreciate that the thoughtful preparation of decision-making within
the Commission should not however be hindered. Like all political institutions, the Commission
needs the “space to think” to formulate policy before it enters the public domain, on the grounds
that policy made in the glare of publicity and therefore “on the hoof” is often poor policy.
Openness and transparency do not therefore imply routine and invasive public access to the
inner counsels of the Commission in the course of its work, but complete openness as to all
political and administrative acts of the Commission, the justification for these once they have
been taken and as to the formulation of policy once it is sufficiently definitive to be laid before
the public.  It is for the Commission to establish internal guidelines – which should themselves
be public – establishing when deliberations on policy are sufficiently advanced to be shared with
the public.
7.6.7.  The press, and media in general, clearly have a key role in this process.  By and large,
the contribution of the press in respect of the Commission, including in the course of recent
events, has been a positive one: constantly pushing for greater transparency and openness in the
implementation and examination of Community legislation and policy by the Commission and
participating in the exposure of problems which would otherwise never have been addressed.
                                                
109 Legal texts are not infrequently interpreted, by virtue of an “old-fashioned view of privacy” (thus the
interview with the Ombudsman) to curtail transparency.
110 Explanatory comment to Principle 6 of the OECD set of principles.
111 OJ L340 of 31.12.93. The validity of this code is confirmed by inter-institutional agreement (Judgement of
Court of Justice of 19.3.96: case C-25/94, Commission v. Council (1996) ECR I – 1496 and judgement of
30 April 1996 in case C-58/94, Netherlands v. Council (1996) ECR I-2169.)
112 TEC Article 195 (ex 138e), para. 1
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However, recent events have also underscored the wider public interest in the Commission
developing a more effective press and information policy,  whereby, through establishing a
balanced relationship with the press, it would better handle some of the intense media pressure
to which it is subject.
Whistleblowing
7.6.8. The second point of concern to the Committee is the need to delineate the obligation for
officials to “expose actual or suspected wrongdoing within the public service ... [to] include
clear rules and procedures for officials to follow... Public servants also need to know what
protection will be available to them in cases of exposing wrongdoing”113.
7.6.9. The events leading up to the resignation of the former Commission demonstrated the
value of officials whose conscience persuades them of the need to expose wrongdoings
encountered in the course of their duties. They also showed how the reaction of superiors failed
to live up to legitimate expectations.  Instead of offering ethical guidance, the hierarchy put
additional pressure upon one such official.  This clearly flouts the principle referred to above, as
well as with the third of the OECD principles, according to which “(i)mpartial advice can help
create an environment in which public servants are more willing to confront and resolve ethical
tensions and problems. Guidance and internal consultation mechanisms should be made
available to help public servants apply basic ethical standards in the workplace”.
7.6.10. This does not mean that officials must be encouraged to come forward in all instances
where they believe that superiors or colleagues have not acted correctly. The duty of loyalty and
discretion should not become an empty concept.  But neither must it be used to install a
conspiracy of silence. In this regard, a distinction has to be drawn between criminal behaviour,
where there is an unambiguous duty of any civil servant to report to the appropriate authorities
(particularly OLAF)114, and other breaches, which have to be reported in accordance with
departmental procedures. Nonetheless, when these procedures have not made it possible to
resolve concerns within a reasonable period of time, a mechanism should exist to allow the civil
servant to address an external authority (for example, the Ombudsman, the parliamentary
Committee on Petitions or the Court of Auditors.)
7.6.11. The Committee recommends that the Commission examine its rules, including the Staff
Regulations, accordingly. (See Chapter 6)
Outsourcing
7.6.12. As its third and final point of concern, the Committee draws attention to principle 7 of
the OECD set of principles, touching upon a subject which, as the First Report showed, creates
numerous problems.  Principle 7 demands “clear rules defining ethical standards [which] should
guide the behaviour of public servants in dealing with the private sector, for example public
procurement, outsourcing or public employment conditions... More attention should be placed
on public service values and requiring external partners to respect those same values”115
                                                
113 Explanatory comment to Principle 4 of the OECD set of principles.
114 But see Article 19 of the Staff Regulations
115 Explanatory comment to Principle 7.
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(emphasis added).  The latter requirement must be reflected in contractual or public procurement
provisions.  Observations on this subject have been made in Chapter 2.
Final remark
7.6.13. Here, the Committee would emphasise the role of the Commission‘s Legal Service.
Contrary to a legal department in the private sector, which has the role of facilitating its
principal’s requirements, the Commission’s Legal Service should always recall that its function
is to provide an independent check on the legality of the Commission’s intended action (or
inaction). In other words, the Commission’s Legal Service is of crucial importance in making
the concept of the rule of law an essential part of the corporate climate of the Commission at all
levels, including above all the commissioners and the directors-general.
7.7 How to give effect to codes of conduct?
Committee on Standards in Public Life
7.7.1. An advantage of codes of conduct is that they give guidance by way of flexible rules,
which are however as concrete as possible. Without imposing legally binding obligations, they
may exert a high degree of moral persuasion because of their widely accepted ethical content.
Such codes must have a legal basis, however, in that they should emanate from an authority
having the competence to issue them.
7.7.2. The question arises as to who should prepare codes of conduct, and how they should be
made as effective as possible. The answer to these questions, in the Committee's view, is that
there should be a general code of conduct in which basic standards are laid down, applicable to
all officials and servants of the Community institutions and bodies, but which leaves sufficient
leeway to allow more specific codes in the light of the individual characteristics of the
institution or body or persons for whom they are designed.
7.7.3. It is to be recommended that, in order to supervise the general standards, a Committee of
Standards in Public Life be set up, under an interinstitutional agreement, and that specific codes
of conduct would be drawn up by each institution concerned, in complement to the general
standards.
7.7.4. The question remains as to whether such a committee should be "ad hoc" or take a more
permanent form. The answer depends on whether it would be asked to come up not only with a
set of standards, but also to update them regularly, monitor their application and implementation
in more specific codes of conduct, and to give advice on specific particular issues or questions
which are brought to its attention. If the latter were the case, as this Committee recommends,
such a committee would develop over the years a body of practical rules, reflected in its annual
reports, and acquire the moral authority that would help to establish and restore the credibility of
the Community Institutions, both internally and externally.  Recent events, involving a member
of the outgoing Commission, have again emphasised the importance of this point.
7.7.5. It should further be noted in passing that such credibility is now seriously affected not
only by allegations of abuses in the Commission, but also in the other institutions.
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Training and consciousness-raising
7.7.6. Notwithstanding the fact that codes of conduct are, in the opinion of this Committee, a
necessary basis for the transformation of the Commission’s culture, and that both a legal
framework and a Committee on Standards are vital to underpin such a transformation, they do
not in themselves suffice.  Hearts and minds are not, as it were, won with either rules or good
intentions, and hearts and minds are the crux of any discussion of organisational culture.  The
problem is thus to ensure that the codes of conduct discussed above become a pervasive part of
the Commission’s culture rather than an external imposition.
7.7.7. No simple answers exist to this problem.  However, just as it is possible to bring about
"cultural" change in other fields by public education programmes, a clear example set from
above, well-directed management action, training, information and consciousness-raising all
have the potential to help the principles set out in a code of conduct take root in the
Commission’s administration.
7.7.8. Examples may help illustrate this point. Staff might be obliged to participate in (a
limited number of) seminars or workshops at which the practical implications of codes of
conduct could be examined ("What would you do if...?") and the ethical implications of
particular working situations discussed.  Such seminars might also serve to inform staff about
"danger areas", how things can go wrong, the warning signs to watch out for and what to do
when a case of suspected fraud/corruption arises.  By the same token, more senior grades should
receive professional training in the management techniques involved in inculcating a certain
professional culture, identifying weaknesses/individuals "at risk" and so on.
7.7.9. For all that such training exercises risk being perceived amongst Commission staff as
tiresome impositions which can achieve little more than state the obvious, they are common,
accepted and fruitful practice throughout modern private-sector organisations.  Such
organisations have a clear incentive - in the form of the so-called "bottom line" - to make
maximum use of such techniques.  It is for the Commission, in this case together with staff
organisations, to undertake an active role in finding an equivalent incentive in shaping its
corporate culture, rather than trusting to undefined notions of public service.
RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMISSIONERS, DEPARTMENTS AND CABINETS
7.8 The issue of responsibility revisited
7.8.1. In its first report, the Committee stated (at 1.6.2), regarding the responsibility of the
Commission as a body or of commissioners individually, that:
“The responsibility ... this Committee is dealing with concerns ethical responsibility, that is responsibility
for not behaving in accordance with proper standards in public life, as discussed above (para
1.5.1).  Such responsibility must be distinguished from the political responsibility of the
Commission dealt with in Article [201,ex-]144 of the EC Treaty which is to be determined by
the European Parliament, and from the disciplinary responsibility of individual Commissioners
dealt with in Article [216,ex-]160 of the EC treaty, which is to be determined by the Court of
Justice, on application of the Council or the Commission [footnote omitted].  That does not
however, prevent the institution concerned, when determining political or disciplinary
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responsibility, from basing its assessment in part on the findings of the Committee concerning
the collective or individual behaviour of the Commission or of Commissioners.”
7.8.2. Here again the Committee wishes to turn to this issue, and more particularly to the
distinction between ethical and political responsibility as applied to commissioners.116
7.8.3. Ethical responsibility is about (non-)compliance, intentional or negligent, with ethical,
professional, legal rules of conduct on the part of an individual to whom blame can be
attributed, individually or collectively.  Political responsibility, on the other hand, is about (i)
the political consequences arising from ethically, professionally, or legally reprehensible
conduct, (ii) the nature of those consequences and (iii) the authority by which the consequences
are decided.
7.8.4. An important question regarding the notion of political responsibility of commissioners
is whether it can be applied only in respect of the (personal or professional) conduct of a
commissioner him/herself, or whether it can also apply in respect of conduct of persons (mainly
officials, but possibly also third parties to whom tasks have been ‘outsourced’) for whom
Commissioners are held to be politically responsible. As a rule, only persons carrying out tasks
which fall within the legal competence of a commissioner are able to engage the latter's political
responsibility.
7.8.5. This section will deal with the relations between commissioners and their departments,
mainly their directors-general, and with the relations between commissioners.  The role of the
secretary-general and cabinets will be examined in connection with both of these relationships.
7.8.6. The distribution of tasks amongst commissioners and directorates-general determines the
competences, and therefore (legal and ethical) responsibilities of both. Issues of political
responsibility will be discussed later, mainly in connection with the European Parliament (7.14).
7.8.7. As a general remark on commissioners' and director-generals' responsibility, the
Committee wishes to emphasise that no responsibility can be imposed, or assessed correctly, if it
does not go hand in hand with a clear definition of competences, means, hierarchical structure,
control systems and sanctions.
7.9 Commissioners, their director-generals and departments
Formulation of policy v. implementation of policy
7.9.1. The Committee’s first report observed that commissioners sometimes evade
responsibility for acts or omissions of their services on the pretext that commissioners are
responsible only for laying down policy, while director-generals implement policy. This
distinction, if strictly interpreted, is tenable neither in law nor in fact.  It is not tenable in law,
                                                
116
 As indicated in the first report, ethical liability must also be distinguished from legal non-contractual
liability (based on Article 288 (ex 215 ), par. 2) which is part of the provision in the EC Treaty on judicial
review of administrative and legislative action of the Community institutions before the Community
Courts.
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because it would mean that the whole area of implementation of policy would escape scrutiny
by Parliament.  It could be argued that, since the commissioner concerned lacks legal
competence, he/she cannot be held accountable to Parliament for the implementation of policy,
whereas, at the same time, the director-general and his services only owe (executive or
management) responsibility to their commissioner and have no direct (political or constitutional)
responsibility towards Parliament. Nor is the distinction tenable in fact, as, as is generally
agreed, the distinction between formulating and implementing policy, i.e. between policy and
operational matters, is a falsely rigid one, difficult to define in principle and even more difficult
to apply in practice.
7.9.2. The (second) code of conduct of the outgoing Commission, relating to commissioners
and departments, after recalling that, “Relations between Commissioners (their Offices) and
departments shall be based first and foremost on loyalty and trust”, states that “Commissioners
shall assume full political responsibility.  Directors-general shall be answerable to their
Commissioner for the sound implementation of the policy guidelines laid down by the
Commission and the Commissioner”.
7.9.3. The Committee accepts this principle if it is taken to mean that, in the internal
relationship between commissioner and director-general, the latter assumes prime responsibility
for the implementation of policy, and the former lays down policy. Such an internal division of
labour does not however preclude the commissioner being operationally responsible too for the
sound implementation of “his/her” policy, just as it does (or should) not preclude the director-
general, and his services, being involved in policy formulation. The “full political
responsibility” assumed by the commissioner should then be understood as an obligation to be
fully accountable firstly to the Commission as a body, and then to Parliament for his/her own
actions and for those of the director-general and other officials of his/her department.  These are
in turn answerable to the commissioner, and through him/her to the Commission and the
Parliament.
7.9.4. It is recommended that the above principles be better elucidated in the code of conduct,
which in its present version could be interpreted as subscribing to a strict separation of work and
competence for policy and operational matters between the commissioner and the director-
general respectively.
7.9.5. The internal relationship between commissioner and director-general is further described
in the Commission’s code of conduct.  In line with what is indicated above, it is for the
departments to “implement the priorities and policy guidelines set at political level” but also to
help to prepare those policy guidelines “by proposing strategy options advising the
commissioner on individual political decisions and providing all the necessary background
information”.  Furthermore, “(T)hey shall provide the commissioner with information, reporting
on any important event in departments, in the Member States or in international bodies which
might have an impact on the management of his or her portfolio or his or her position within the
Commission.”
7.9.6. The reverse situation, namely that the commissioner must be able to give instructions, or
at least supervise, how policy guidelines are implemented by departments - this being the
practical basis for his/her political accountability - is not given substance in the proposed code
of conduct. Indeed, the principles mentioned at the outset state that commissioners “shall be
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responsible for the efficient operation of their Directorate-General in compliance with the
distribution of powers and responsibilities laid down in the Staff Regulations, the Financial
Regulation, the Commission’s Rules of Procedure as well as SEM 2000 and MAP 2000”.  The
Committee recommends that it be made clear that such rules or regulations may not be
interpreted so as to curtail the commissioner’s managerial (not only political) responsibility for
the overall organisation of his/her department, and that they should not be allowed to confer
“immunity” upon commissioners in respect of the sound implementation of policy and the
efficient organisation of their services. This is particularly important as the Commission’s work
progressively shifts "from drafting new legislation and developing new policy initiatives
(towards) tackling the less glamorous, but increasingly important, task of managing existing
programmes"117
7.9.7. In the aftermath of the outgoing Commission’s resignation, one commissioner was heard
to complain that commissioners cannot in practice supervise the actions of their directorates-
general. That complaint must be taken seriously. It is not normal that commissioners must
assume political responsibility for acts of their departments if they have no competence
whatsoever to give instructions or at least to supervise managerial or important operational
matters.  However, the Committee does not know of any legal, or other, provision which
prohibits a commissioner from instructing or supervising their departments, provided that the
competence to do so is clearly defined.
Status of director-generals
7.9.8. This point raises the question of the status of directors-general.  Since they are appointed
for an indefinite period of time, whereas commissioners are appointed for a renewable five-year
term, there is a serious risk that directors-general become excessively dominant in their spheres
of activity. That is why, in some Member States, a “public mandate” is envisaged for heads of
departments, implying that they are appointed for a limited but renewable term.
7.9.9. The Committee appreciates the delicacy of intervening in the balance of power between
commissioners and directors-general, whereby it remains for the director-general to manage the
financial and human resources in his/her department.  Nonetheless, the matter has to be re-
considered in the light of an increasing need for commissioners to be more involved in
supervising the organisation and management of  their services (including tasks which have
been outsourced) and for the Commission, primarily its President, to regroup departments to
make directorates-general more homogeneous (in order to prevent rivalry between departments
having parallel competences). The matter must also be re-considered because of a wider
recognition of commissioners’ accountability towards Parliament. As stated above, such
accountability towards Parliament implies broader competences on the part of the
commissioners vis-à-vis their departments.
7.10 Relations between commissioners – collective responsibility
Collective responsibility in practice
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 Herman Report, B. 34
DOC_EN\DV\381\381230EN.doc 126
7.10.1. In the Committee’s first report, responsibility was attributed to a few individual
commissioners on the basis of their own personal or managerial conduct. Obviously to the
surprise of the outgoing Commission, the Committee also established instances of collective
responsibility. Collective responsibility may arise, in the Committee’s view, in connection with
decisions taken by the Commission as a body, e.g. where the Commission decides to relieve a
director-general of his function, refuses to lift immunity of civil servants at the request of a
national criminal court, or, even more importantly, where the Commission as a whole decides
policy questions or fails to react to mismanagement on the part of a colleague of which it is
aware or should have been aware. 118
7.10.2. The outgoing Commission’s proposed code on commissioners defines collective
responsibility only as an obligation for each commissioner not to call into question a decision
taken by the whole Commission, and to refrain from disclosing what is said at meetings of the
Commission.  In the Committee’s view collective responsibility should also be defined to mean
that each member of the Commission has the right and duty to keep him/herself informed as to
the activities of every other commissioner.  Thus one commissioner should not be able to evade
responsibility for decisions which have been taken by the Commission as a college - whether
nominally or in reality - by passing it to another commissioner.  Once a policy has been
announced, and once a decision has been reached, all commissioners are responsible for it.
They are also collectively responsible, in the Committee’s view, for failings and problems about
which they know, or should know, for example where questions have been raised in Parliament
or, in a credible way, in the media. All this presupposes that mechanisms are provided whereby
commissioners receive information on matters falling within colleagues' portfolios, are able to
put such matters on the agenda of the Commission.
Organisation of the Commission
7.10.3. The issue of collective responsibility is closely related to the way in which the
Commission as a college is organised, and to the position of the President, the Vice-Presidents
and the Secretary-General in allocating or overseeing tasks carried out by the commissioners. In
this context, it is frequently heard that there are too many commissioners.  This may lead to an
excessive separation of tasks and responsibilities which, especially if combined with a feeling of
responsibility only for the accomplishment of one’s own tasks, undermines any sense of
responsibility for the Commission’s work as a whole.
7.10.4. Since the Amsterdam Treaty, it is the clear responsibility of the President of the
Commission to deal with the problem of the reduction and rationalisation of Commission
portfolios, possibly through the establishment of teams of commissioners for each subject area,
especially as commissioners have been nominated with his agreement (Article 214, (ex 158),
paragraph 2 TEC). Moreover, it is also the President’s responsibility to give “political guidance”
to the Commission (Article 219 (ex 163)) and accordingly to organise the work and the
proceedings of the Commission in a way that reinforces, instead of weakens collective
                                                
118 The principle of "collegiality" is a well established principle of Community law: it “is based on the equal
participation of the Commissioners in the adoption of decisions, from which it follows in particular that
decisions should be the subject of collective deliberation and that all the members of the college of
Commissioners should bear collective responsibility at political level for all decisions adopted”:
Judgement of Court of Justice of 29.9.98, Case C-191/95, Commission v Germany, ECR(1998)I-5449,
para. 39
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responsibility. Collective responsibility requires that commissioners should be able to argue
freely in private and at Commission meetings on what they hear, or perceive, to be a colleague’s
approach in his/her sphere of competence, "and can argue freely in private while maintaining a
united front when decisions have been reached”.
7.10.5. In modern government, different techniques of self-administration or management by
contract have been developed whereby the execution of public tasks and the management of the
relevant financial envelopes are delegated to civil servants grouped in executive agencies or
working under covenants with the Minister. In the Community context, shared management
with Member States, as discussed in Chapter 3, is a well established feature of Community
policy and more recently it has become commonplace to outsource public tasks to private
entities, as discussed in Chapter 2.  Recourse to such forms of delegated and shared management
may in no way impede commissioners and their director-generals from being held responsible
for the organisation and supervision of policies implemented within their areas of competence.
7.11 The role of the Secretary-general
7.11.1. The growing importance of the management tasks of the Commission and the need for
commissioners to take joint responsibility with directors-general for the correct functioning of
the their departments, as well as the increased role of political guidance of the President of the
Commission and the necessity to reduce the role of the Commissioners’ cabinets in dealing with
management issues, are all factors which tend to emphasise the importance of the role of the
secretary-general of the Commission.  He/she should, under the political guidance of the
President, act as the interface between the political and the administrative levels of the
Commission and promote transparency and accountability of the administration in its relations
with the citizen. He/she should stimulate horizontal cooperation between the directorates-
general and above all ensure that decisions of the Commission are effectively followed up.
7.11.2. More specifically, it is the secretary-general’s task to encourage dialogue between
horizontal and operational directorates-general on administrative issues. If, because of wider
obligations, director-generals cannot participate in such a dialogue on a systematic basis, weekly
meetings should be held  “of assistants or Heads of Resources Units or the two together (to)
clear up issues of interpretation but also offer a forum for raising new issues in implementation.
This will provide horizontal services with early warning of questions which will otherwise be
dealt with under the pressure of the procedures for individual financial decisions…”119
7.12 The role of commissioners’ cabinets
7.12.1. The task of a commissioner’s cabinet should be no other than to be the emanation (“alter
ego”) of the commissioner.  It should, in other words, have no competences beyond those of the
commissioner him/herself and should act under the explicit personal instructions of the
commissioner. Its members must therefore limit themselves to preparing the personal work of
the commissioner and facilitating his/her political guidance, both vertically, i.e. towards the
departments and officials, and horizontally, i.e. towards the other commissioners and their
cabinets.
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 In the words of a Director General in a report for an administrative inquiry
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7.12.2. As to the first, vertical, aspect, members of the cabinet should beware of interposing
themselves between their commissioner and his/her department, director-general, directors, etc.
Obviously, the commissioner cannot be bothered by anyone for everything.  However, cabinets
often act as screens and fences, impeding direct communication between commissioner and
departments.
7.12.3. The code of conduct proposed by the outgoing Commission on commissioners and
departments reflects this distant, needlessly hierarchical and bureaucratic approach. It provides,
for example, that it is for the cabinet to “inform the departments [thus also the director-
general!?] about the Commission’s proceedings especially when they have a direct impact on
the departments’ own activities” (sic) just as it shall “inform the departments about decisions
taken by the Commissioner” and “keep the director-general fully informed about its contacts
with the outside on matters falling within the portfolio”. Meanwhile, “departments’ contacts
with the outside shall be co-ordinated with the Commissioner and his or her Office”.  “Working
methods and information channels shall be laid down at the start of the term of office by the
Director-General and the Chef de cabinet, who will ensure that they are endorsed by the
Commissioner”.
7.12.4. Of course, much will depend on the commissioner’s personal authority and talent for
communication, and therefore his/her ability to work with these rules.  That does not alter the
fact, however, that on paper they encourage the departments, including the directors-general to
keep at a “respectful” distance from their Commissioner.  That is not how the Committee
envisages relations between commissioners and their departments.
7.12.5. As to the second, horizontal aspect, it is the main task of members of the commissioner’s
cabinet to keep “the commissioner informed about matters outside his or her own area of
competence” in order "to ensure that the principle of collective responsibility operates correctly”
and, in the same vein, "to make the preparations for securing political agreement by the
Commission at the final decision making stage”. In other words, it depends largely on the
cabinet how well a commissioner is informed about the work of his/her colleagues.  Such
information must obviously not be obtained through “espionage”, but in all openness through
free and frank discussion between cabinets.  If difficulties within the area of competence of
other commissioners arise, the cabinet must be in a position to enable their commissioner to act.
7.12.6. Obviously, the cabinet of the President occupies a special position, as it is through this
office that issues arising within the areas of competence of other commissioners are, if not
detected, then dealt with and/or submitted to further dialogue and possible discussion in the
Commission.
7.13 Enforcement of ethical responsibility
7.13.1. As stated at the outset the individual and collective responsibility of commissioners is
substantially an ethical professional/legal responsibility (to be distinguished from political
responsibility which will be dealt with in the next section).  This holds true for both non-
compliance with rules and standards on proper personal behaviour in public life (duty of
integrity) and non-compliance with rules and standards on proper managerial conduct in high
office (duty of sound management).   Civil servants also bear ethical responsibility for non-
compliance with both sets of rules and standards.
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7.13.2. There is, however, a considerable difference between the two cases, in that
commissioners, unlike officials, are not subjected to Staff Regulations or conditions of
employment and that the only way to hold commissioners responsible, leaving aside political
responsibility120, is to bring suit against them before the Court of Justice under Article 216 (ex
160) in cases of serious misconduct or, under Article 213 (ex-157), para. 2, in cases of
infringement of their duty to “behave with integrity and discretion”.  Such action tends to
compulsory retirement or deprivation of pension or other benefits, and is brought on application
by the Council or the Commission.
7.13.3. It has been suggested that the possibility to bring proceedings of this sort should also be
given to Parliament.  The Committee does not agree, as such proceedings relate to personal
misconduct, and may thus be seen as a form of disciplinary procedure, whereas Parliament’s
role, as a democratically elected institution, relates to the enforcement of political responsibility
as described below.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY
7.14 The Commission in relation to the European Parliament
Accountability and political responsibility
7.14.1. The events preceding the resignation of the outgoing Commission showed the
importance of the European Parliament - acting on the basis of reports of the Court of Auditors,
of its own information or of articles in the press - in detecting and dealing fraud, favouritism and
mismanagement within the Community. It is therefore of the utmost importance to examine the
role of the European Parliament in its relation with the Commission. As in all parliamentary
democracies, the relationship between Parliament and the executive branch (leaving aside for
now the Commission's legislative competence) is of a dual nature: first, Parliament has a right to
be informed by the Executive, which gives account of its action (hereafter accountability);
second, it also judges the ultimate political responsibility of the Executive and draws the
political consequences (hereafter political responsibility).
7.14.2. There are important differences in the constitutional systems of the EU Member States as
to the precise form of ministerial accountability and responsibility. Moreover, the position of the
European Parliament cannot yet be entirely assimilated with the position of a national
parliament.  This does not prevent, however, national parliaments from serving as a model,
insofar as they reveal constitutional characteristics which may increasingly also shape the role of
the European Parliament.
Accountability and transparency
7.14.3. Accountability of ministers or commissioners towards Parliament is only one aspect of
transparency in general. The more transparency a constitutional and administrative system
displays towards the public at large the better citizens and the media, as a reflection of a
                                                
120 Also leaving aside penal responsibility for criminal offences committed which is a matter for the court of
the State where the offence is committed.
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pluralistic public opinion, will be in a position to allow and encourage Parliament to control the
action of the executive branch. The stronger the control by public opinion, the more forcefully
ministerial accountability towards Parliament is able to operate in a democratic society. Giving
full account to Parliament, at their own initiative, is also a form of self-defence for ministers and
commissioners against the unhappy predicament of being submitted to unfocused and
uninformed criticism by press and public opinion.
7.14.4. Pressure from public opinion plays a limited role in influencing the Commission at the
European level, as it is still primarily shaped by national viewpoints and interests, and according
to accepted standards of conduct which may vary. Moreover, criticism of individual
commissioners is easily perceived by the public opinion in the home country of the
commissioner as a criticism of the  country itself.
7.14.5. It is of the essence of accountability towards Parliament that commissioners are open
regarding policies, decisions and actions of their departments, and refuse information only, and
exceptionally, when disclosure is definitely not in the public interest. They should give accurate
and truthful information to Parliament, correcting any inadvertent error at the earliest
opportunity. Accountability however goes beyond the mere provision of information. It also
implies that the policies, decisions or actions are explained, motivated and argued before
Parliament. Officials should be expected to give information or evidence before parliamentary
committees upon request, and under the direction and political responsibility of, their
commissioner. However, it is for the minister, and only for him/her, to explain and defend
his/her action before the Parliament.
Mechanisms for accountability
7.14.6. Accountability to Parliament manifests itself through answers to oral and written
questioning and through the work of parliamentary committees.  In some legal systems, it is
incumbent upon a special Constitutional Committee to examine Ministers’ performance of their
duties and the handling of government business.
7.14.7. According to EC Treaty Article 197 (ex 140), members of the Commission may attend
all meetings of the European Parliament and shall, at their request, be heard on behalf of the
Commission. Furthermore, the Commission shall reply orally or in writing to questions put to it
by the European Parliament or by its members. It must also submit an annual general report
which the European Parliament shall discuss in open session (Article 200 (ex 143), EC). The
information collected should permit the European Parliament to exercise political control over
the Commission, which may, in extreme circumstances, culminate in a motion of censure as
provided in Article 201 (ex 144) TEC, forcing the Commission to resign as a body.
7.14.8. One of the most significant procedures available to the European Parliament to force the
Commission (or other institutions) to submit information is laid down in Article 193 (ex 138c).
According to this article the Parliament may, in the course of its duties and at the request of a
quarter of its members, set up a temporary committee of inquiry to investigate alleged
contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law121. Information to
                                                
121 Decision 95/167/EC, Euratom, ECSC of the European Parliament, Council and Commission of 19 April
1995 (OJ L/113 of 19.5.95, p.2) and Article 136 of EP Rules of Procedure.
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decide on the introduction of such a procedure may reach Parliament by a petition addressed to
it, directly or indirectly through the ombudsman (Articles 194 and 195 (ex 138d and 138e),
TEC), by “any natural or legal person... on a matter which comes within the Community's field
of activity and which affects him, her or it directly”.
The discharge procedure
7.14.9. The European Parliament's prerogative to require the Commission to give account can be
enforced most effectively in the framework of Parliament's competence to give discharge to the
Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget. Article 276 (ex 206)
7.14.10. With a view to its decision on discharge, Parliament, like Council, will examine,
among other documents, the annual report and any relevant special reports by the Court of
Auditors as well as, since the Amsterdam Treaty, its “Statement of  Assurance” (known as the
“DAS” – see Chapter 4). Article 276, ex 206, para. 2 further provides: “Before giving a
discharge to the Commission, or for any other purpose in connection with the exercise of its
powers over the implementation of the budget, the European Parliament may ask to hear the
Commission give evidence with regard to the execution of expenditure or the operation of
financial control systems. The Commission shall submit any necessary information to the
European Parliament at the latter's request”.
7.14.11.  If Parliament is not satisfied with the measures the Commission takes in light of
Parliament's (or Council's) observation and comments, it can and may, refuse discharge. This
may lead Parliament to adopt a motion of censure on the basis of Article 201 (ex 144).122
Confidentiality and accountability
7.14.12.  In the course of application of Article 276 (ex 206) to the 1996 budget, a lack of
understanding arose between the European Parliament and the European Commission
concerning the communication of information (in particular regarding the ECHO file) to
Parliament. Notwithstanding an agreement of 30 September 1998 between the Presidents of the
two institutions concerning the communication of confidential documents in order to preserve
the rights of individuals, no workable solution could be found.  The discussion bears in such
cases essentially on how to reconcile the right of Parliament under Article 276 TEC to determine
itself (as follows from the text of the article) which documents it requires from the Commission
and the need to respect confidentiality, most often to protect the rights of persons who are under
investigation for reprehensible acts, including criminal offences..
7.14.13.  In also refusing to give discharge for the 1997 budget, the European Parliament's
rapporteur re-examined the question and came to the conclusion that the existing instruments,
primarily Annex VII to Parliament's Rules of Procedure, are insufficient to prevent the
unauthorised dissemination of confidential information123.  It is recommended that an inter-
institutional instrument be concluded, similar to the one existing within the framework of
investigations carried out by committees of inquiry under Article 193 TEC, to ensure
                                                
122 In the context of recent events, recourse to a formal motion of censure was rendered superfluous by the
resignation of the Commission
123 See report  A4-0201/99 – adopted 4 May 1999
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Parliament’s unfettered right to information, subject only to the respect for basic rights and
fundamental freedoms of individuals. The conclusion and implementation of such an inter-
institutional agreement as early as possible would be a clear signal of the Commission’s
readiness to fulfil its constitutional duty to give account to Parliament.
7.14.14.  In its first report the Committee has met at least one instance, outside the field of
application of Article 276, where it noted the reluctance of Commissioners to inform Parliament
to the best of their knowledge at a point in time when Parliament needed all information
available to perform its own duties124. The Committee recommends that the new Commission
make it clear that it will give the widest interpretation possible to its duty of accountability
towards Parliament and that any member of the Commission who knowingly misleads
Parliament, or omits to correct at the earliest opportunity any inadvertent error in information
given to Parliament, will be expected to offer his/her resignation.
Political responsibility
7.14.15.  Political responsibility concerns the political consequences attached to conduct of
holders of public office, or to conduct of civil servants working under them within their sphere
of competence, by the institution or person who can hold such holders of public office to
account. Although political responsibility exists in all democratic legal systems, it exists in
different forms and at different levels depending on the constitutional structure of the legal
system concerned. Differences also exist:
- as to the extent of political responsibility: only for individual (personal or
functional) misconduct or also for misconduct of subordinate civil servants?;
- as to the nature of the political consequence: dismissal, or other consequences of
a lesser nature?; imposed collectively, or also individually?
- as to the institution or person called upon to impose the political consequence:
parliament, president or prime minister?
7.14.16.  The first distinction to be made is between the enforcement of individual political
responsibility and the enforcement of collective political responsibility.
7.14.17.  The principle of collective political responsibility of the Commission towards
Parliament follows from the right granted to Parliament, from the beginning, to adopt a motion
of censure in accordance with Article 201 (ex 144), in which case the Commission must resign
as a body. On the occasion of the Maastricht Treaty revision, this power was reinforced by the
opportunity for Parliament to set up committees of inquiry (Article 193 (ex 138c)). The political
responsibility of the Commission is also implied in its duty to give account to Parliament  in
hearings or replies to questions as laid down in Article 197 (ex 140).  It should be noted in
passing that, in order for Parliament to exercise this role credibly, it should apply the same high
standards to itself that it expects of those over whom it exercises supervision.
                                                
124 First Report, Chapter 5
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7.14.18.  As for the political responsibility of individual commissioners, no changes have been
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty, except that it has been made clear that the
Commission(ers) "shall work under the political guidance of its President" (Art. 219 EC) and
that the President, once his/her nomination by common accord between the Member States has
been approved by Parliament, will now be in a position to refuse his/her accord with the
designation of a commissioner by the Member States (Article 214, para. 2).  Note should be
taken, moreover, of  Declaration 32 adopted by the IGC where the Conference  “considers that
the President of the Commission must enjoy broad discretion in the allocation of tasks with the
college, as well as in any reshuffling of those tasks during a Commission's term of office”.
These enhancements in the role of the president point the way towards, though do not make
explicit, greater authority for the president vis-à-vis the members of “his/her” Commission.  At
the same time, Parliament’s veto over the president points to its overarching role.
7.14.19.  It is inconsistent with the need to strengthen the sense of responsibility of all persons
working in the Commission, starting at the top, that no more specific provisions regarding the
political responsibility of the Commission as a body, and no provisions at all regarding the
political responsibility of individual commissioners, are to be found in the treaties. Such
political responsibility of commissioners, whether collective or individual, must cover the whole
range of competences for which they are responsible, namely their own personal, managerial
and operational shortcomings in the exercise of their high office as well as important
shortcomings in the functioning of their departments, even when the blame for these cannot be
laid upon them personally.
7.14.20.  With these needs and lacunae in mind, the Committee would stress that political
responsibility should be enforced at two distinct levels.  First, the collective responsibility of the
Commission, under its president, is a matter for the Parliament in accordance with the current
treaty provisions.  This concept presents few difficulties and has moreover recently been
illustrated in dramatic fashion.
7.14.21.  Second, the individual political responsibility of commissioners should be enforced
through a significant strengthening of the hand of the Commission President.  Just as in most
Member States the head of the government has a constitutionally free hand to dismiss or
reshuffle the members of his/her government, the President of the Commission should be in a
similar position with regard to commissioners.  The President should be able to act, at his own
initiative and on his own responsibility, to give concrete form to the political responsibility of
commissioners.  The exact nature of the action would be for him/her to decide. It cannot be
excluded that the Parliament may itself express views on the suitability or otherwise of certain
individuals to exercise a political mandate in the Commission, but it must remain for the
President alone to establish what, if any, action should be taken in respect of that individual
taken. He/she will be answerable to the Parliament for any such action (or inaction).
7.14.22.  Treaty amendments are needed to set the principle of the President’s authority with
respect to commissioners on a firm legal footing.  However, until the necessary amendments are
possible the Committee takes note of and endorses the view expressed by the current president-
designate of the Commission that any breach of the new codes of conduct on the part of a
commissioner would indicate that the individual concerned would forfeit his/her place in the
Commission.
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7.15 The Commission in relation to the Council
7.15.1.  The role of the Council in holding the Commission to account is institutionally far less
developed than that of the European Parliament.  This, obviously, is the result of the evolution,
over the years in the role of the Council, the Commission and the Parliament in their relations
with each other and of the fact the Parliament is a directly-elected body, thus enjoying the
highest possible form of democratic legitimisation: the will of the people.
7.15.2. The continuously growing role of the European Parliament in relation to the Commission
has been mentioned already (7.14.1).  This section will briefly examine the relationship between
the three institutions, including the Council, summarising to the extreme. The Commission has a
vast array of legislative, administrative, executive and even judicial powers.  As far as the
legislative field is concerned, the most important powers of the Commission are the right of
initiative and the exercise of delegated powers.  The Council plays, from the outset, a
considerable role in the legislative process, foremost in that it has to vote its approval of
Commission initiatives before they become law, and now also in that it may be pro-active in the
process by virtue of TEC Article 208 (ex-152).  The Parliament has seen its initially purely
consultative role transformed into a substantial one in the legislative process, while its original
powers to censure the Commission and to decide on the granting of discharge for the
implementation of the budget have been strengthened, firstly, by its new right to approve a
newly-appointed Commission and, secondly, by its extended rights to monitor the activities of
the other institutions by asking questions and establishing committees of inquiry.
7.15.3. Beyond the changes contained within the treaties, it is even more important to
understand the evolution in the political culture of the institutions. Whilst the Commission has
always been, and will remain, the single most important force for political integration in Europe,
it must now learn to keep pace with Parliament and Council in a continuously evolving inter-
institutional context.  Within this context, the pro-integration perspective of the Commission
tends to create tensions with the inter-governmental perspective of Council.  These have led
Council to strengthen its own position through the growing importance of COREPER and
through the creation of an array of committees allowing it to participate directly in the
management and implementation of Community action by virtue of TEC Article 202 (ex-145)
(“comitology” – see below).  It is not for the Committee to express a view as to how the
institutional balance will evolve with respect to the two extreme models: the Commission as a
dynamic technocracy, with Council as the body required to ratify Commission action, or the
Commission as a kind of federal government, with a bicameral parliament, the Council filling
the role of second chamber representing the interests of Member States.  Within this institutional
relationship, the Parliament may even have to act as an arbitrator and intermediary between
Community and national interests, using its budgetary, supervisory and censuring powers in a
drive for openness, accountability and responsibility against not only the Commission but also
the Council.
7.15.4.  In this dynamic context of evolving inter-institutional relations, the Committee would
like to address three specific areas.
Power to take disciplinary action
7.15.5.  Mention has already been made of the Council’s power under Treaty articles 213 (ex-
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152(2)) and 216 (ex-160) to apply to the Court of Justice in respect (i) of a failure to “behave
with integrity and discretion”125, (ii) of “serious misconduct”126 by individual commissioners or
(iii) when the commissioner no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his
duties”127.  This is the sole concrete provision in the Treaties enabling sanctions to be applied by
an outside body against individual commissioners.
7.15.6. This power does not however correspond to the notion of political accountability in
discussion in this section.  First, it is not exercised directly: it is for the Court of Justice to
decide the merits of each application.  Second, it applies in cases of personal misconduct rather
than the exercise of a political mandate as such, and should therefore be regarded as a
disciplinary sanction (c.f. First Report 1.6.2 and 7.13.2 above).
7.15.7. The Committee offers no further comment on this mechanism other than to suggest that
the treaty definitions of “misconduct” and behaviour with “integrity and discretion” might
usefully be tightened up.  It remains to be seen – in the context of a case currently pending at the
Court of Justice - whether the present definitions of these terms, and procedures, are sufficiently
apt for an early determination of the matter.
The discharge procedure
7.15.8.  On the other hand, Council is a participant in a procedure, already described above,
aimed explicitly at the enforcement of political, though not purely budgetary, responsibility: the
discharge procedure.  The power to give or withhold discharge is exclusively in the hands of the
Parliament, but Council is nevertheless required to give a recommendation before it does so.
Though its power in the decision itself is purely advisory, successive Treaty amendments have
tended to upgrade the Council’s recommendation.  The last two paragraphs of Treaty Article
276 (ex-206), which deals with the discharge, reads:
The Commission shall take all appropriate steps to act on the observations in the decisions
giving discharge and on other observations by the European Parliament relating to the
execution of expenditure, as well as on comments accompanying the recommendations on
discharge adopted by the Council.
At the request of the European Parliament or the Council, the Commission shall report on
the measures taken in the light of these observations and comments and in particular on the
instructions given to the departments which are responsible for the implementation of the
budget. These reports shall also be forwarded to the Court of Auditors.
7.15.9. In other words, and slightly paradoxically, the recommendations of Council are
theoretically as binding on the Commission as those of the Parliament, even though Council
does not take the crucial decision.  However paradoxical, this situation implies a responsibility
on Council to take the discharge procedure with a degree of seriousness which has arguably not
been manifest over the years.  The Committee has already noted a lack of interest on the part of
Council in the examination of reports by the Court of Auditors (one of the cornerstones of the
                                                
125 TEC Article 213 (ex-157)
126 TEC Article 216 (ex-160)
127 TEC Article 216 (ex-160)
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discharge procedure)128 and would now add the observation that the Council’s recommendations
on discharge are usually formalistic in nature, arrive usually at the last minute and are in any
case adopted at a relatively low political level (the Budgets Committee) of Council.  In short,
they do not reveal any great belief in the importance of this mechanism for enforcing
accountability.  The Committee hopes that recent events will have impressed on Council the
need to give the discharge procedure the political weight it deserves.
7.15.10. In this context, the Committee would refer to the principle of budgetary discipline
imposed upon the Commission when putting forward any proposal for a Community act or
adopting any implementing decision likely to have implications for the budget.  It is for Council
and Parliament to monitor respect for this obligation when they act on proposed legislation.  In
its First Report, the Committee found, on the contrary, that Council and Parliament sometimes
encourage the Commission to go assume tasks which make demands going beyond the available
resources.
Committees of Member State representatives (“Comitology”)
7.15.11. In a wide range of policy areas committees of Member States’ representatives have
powers of management and supervision over the implementation of Community policies. In
some, they have the final word on the allocation of funding to projects (the Phare and Tacis
Management Committees are examples).
7.15.12.  Though perhaps not designed primarily as a mechanism for the enforcement of
accountability, these committees give the representatives of the Member States an opportunity to
exercise a high level of monitoring and supervision over the management of programmes by the
Commission. However, in practice, they tend to be a mechanism through which national
interests are represented in the implementation of Community policies, sometimes to the extent
that they become a forum for “dividing up the spoils” of Community expenditure and permit the
Member States, at times, to use their influence in programme management committees to ensure
that contractors from each Member State obtain a “fair share” of the overall funding available.
7.15.13.  The Committee has no wish to go into the complex subject of “comitology” at this
point, nor examine the rights and wrongs of the Member States attempting to accommodate
national interests within the Community framework.  However, it will allow itself to comment
on one important point.
7.15.14.  It is regrettable that a system which should introduce transparency and accountability
into the management of programmes in fact can remove responsibility from the Commission for
the management decisions taken.  Commission managers can (and do) point to the extraneous
demands of Member States as justification for management decisions which cannot be justified
according to objective financial criteria. This de facto transfer of responsibility away from those
whom are supposed to be held accountable runs counter to the entire philosophy this Committee
has propounded.
                                                
128 First Report 9.4.12
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7.16 Recommendations
7.16.1. The Committee considered that the codes of conduct elaborated by the Commission
remain insufficient and are not yet backed up by the necessary legal framework.  The attribution
of responsibilities and chain of delegation between the Commission, single commissioners and
the departments are ill-defined and ill-understood by those concerned.  Finally, the concepts of
political responsibility and accountability remain unclear and the mechanisms for their
practical application inadequate.
7.16.2. The code of conduct for commissioners should redefine the concept of collective
responsibility to encompass not only a prohibition on calling into question decisions adopted by
the college, but also the right and the obligation of each commissioner to keep him/herself fully
appraised of the activities of every other commissioner and to take action in this respect as
necessary, for example by having frank and open discussions with other commissioners both
inside and outside the college. (7.5.1-4, 7.10.1-2)
7.16.3. Commissioners’ cabinets should be limited to a maximum of six category-A officials.
The commissioner must ensure that the cabinet is multi-national in character and rules must be
introduced to exclude any unduly favourable treatment of cabinet members at the end of their
service. (7.5.7-8)
7.16.4. Clear rules should be established as to the applicable criteria to the appointment of
individuals to commissioners’ cabinets, with a particular view to eliminating the possibility of
favouritism based on personal relationships.  Full transparency as to any personal relationship
between a commissioner and a member of  his/her cabinet must be ensured. (7.5.9-10)
7.16.5. Commissioners who use undue influence to favour fellow nationals or wider national
interests in any sector for which they are competent are in serious breach of their obligation of
independence, and should be subject to an appropriate sanction. (7.5.9-10)
7.16.6. Commissioners must carry out their duties with complete political neutrality.  They
should not be permitted to hold office in any political organisation during their term of office.
(7.5.11-12)
7.16.7. The Commission must establish clear internal guidelines – to be made public – designed
to ensure maximum openness and transparency as to acts and decisions of the Commission once
taken and the processes by which they were arrived at. (7.6.3-7)
7.16.8. The rights and obligations of officials to report instances of suspected criminal acts and
other reprehensible behaviour to the appropriate authorities outside the Commission should be
established in the Staff Regulations and the necessary mechanisms put in place. The Staff
Regulations should also protect whistleblowers who respect their obligations in this regard from
undue adverse consequences of their action. (7.6.8-11)
7.16.9. An independent standing “Committee on Standards in Public Life” should be created by
interinstutional agreement to formulate, supervise and, where necessary, provide advice on
ethics and standards of conduct in the European institutions.  This Committee on Standards
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should approve the specific codes of conduct established by each institution. (7.7.1-5)
7.16.10. All Commission staff should undergo professional training aimed at raising
awareness of ethical issues and providing guidance, from both a personal and management
perspective, on how to deal with practical situations as they arise. (7.7.6-9)
7.16.11. The code of conduct on commissioners and their departments should establish that
each commissioner is responsible both for policy formulation and the implementation of policy
by his/her department(s).  The commissioner shall therefore be answerable to the Commission
as a whole for the actions of the department(s), and accountable to the European Parliament.
Officials in departments shall answer to their director-generals, which shall in turn be
accountable to the competent commissioner. (7.9.1-9)
7.16.12. The Secretary General should be considered as the prime interface between the
political and administrative levels of the Commission.  He/she should above all ensure that
decisions of the Commission are effectively followed up by the administration. (7.11.1)
7.16.13. Members of cabinets should not be permitted to speak on behalf of their
commissioners.  The primary function of cabinets is to provide information and to facilitate
communication vertically (between the commissioner and the services) and horizontally
(between commissioners).  In neither case should the cabinet prevent direct communication with
the commissioner, but rather stimulate such communication. (7.12.1-6)
7.16.14. The Commission is accountable to the European Parliament.  To this end, it is under a
constitutional duty to be fully open with Parliament, providing it with the complete, accurate
and truthful information and documentation necessary for Parliament to carry out its
institutional role, notably in the context of the discharge procedure and in connection with
committees of inquiry.  Access to information and documentation should only be refused in
exceptional, duly motivated circumstances and in accordance with procedures agreed between
the institutions. (7.14.1-13)
7.16.15. The enforcement of the individual political responsibility of commissioners should be
a matter for the President of the Commission.  The President should be empowered to dismiss
individual commissioners, modify the attribution of responsibilities between them or take any
other measure in respect of the composition or organisation of the Commission he/she deems
necessary to enforce political responsibility.  The President of the Commission shall be
accountable to the European Parliament for any action (or inaction) in this context.  These
powers of the President should be made explicit in the Treaties, but, until this is possible, all
commissioners should agree to abide by these principles. (7.14.16-22)
7.16.16. Any commissioner who knowingly misleads Parliament, or omits to correct at the
earliest opportunity inadvertently erroneous information provided to Parliament should be
expected to offer his/her resignation from the Commission.  In the absence of an offer of
resignation, the president of the Commission should take appropriate action. (7.14.14)
7.16.17. The Council should give greater political priority to the preparation of its annual
recommendation to the European Parliament on discharge, as this would reinforce the political
status of the prime institutional mechanism whereby the Commission is held accountable for
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financial management. (7.15.8-9)
7.16.18. Council and Parliament should be bound by the principle of budgetary discipline to
take into account the resource requirements attached to any policy initiative they request from
the Commission.  The Commission should be able to refuse to assume any new tasks for which
administrative resources are not available and cannot be provided through redeployment.
(7.15.10)
7.16.19. The management of Community programmes, and in particular all questions of
financial management are the sole responsibility of the Commission.  Committees composed of
Member State representatives should not therefore be empowered to take any decision relating
to the ongoing financial management of programmes. Any risk that national considerations
might affect financial management at the expense of sound financial management criteria should
be excluded. (7.15.11-14)
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8. Final remarks
8.1. Throughout this report the Committee has sought, in accordance with its terms of
reference, to analyse the specific, everyday management problems of the Commission.
Nevertheless, now that it has completed its work, it feels obliged to say that the political and
institutional dimension of the Commission’s weaknesses are lurking just beneath the surface:
often the Commission is only able to take half measures because it does not have the means, in
particular the statutory means, to perform its responsibilities in full. It was not the Committee’s
task to suggest any institutional reforms that might be undertaken, yet it goes without saying that
the Commission must have the means to perform its duties.
8.2. In this report, in accordance with its terms of reference, the Committee has
considered management practices only at the Commission. However, both the Commission and
the other Institutions could benefit from some of the recommendations made by the Committee.
The fact that this analysis was confined to the Commission does not in any way relieve the other
Institutions of the obligation to give thought to their own administrative and financial practices,
on the way in which they slot into the system as a whole and on ways and means of improving
the political culture of the Communities.
8.3. Another widespread problem that was frequently encountered is more cultural in
nature: the Community civil service tends to favour planning and negotiation at the expense of
management and monitoring which are less highly thought of. ’All material support will be
provided’ seems to be the watchword of a civil service which would prefer to think rather than to
do. There are no specific ways of dealing with a problem of mentality, but the Committee
believes it should encourage a process of reflection and internal discussion in this respect.
8.4. During the course of its work the Committee found evidence of many shortcomings
in the way the Community civil service operates. However, the members of the Committee had
the opportunity of meeting many Commission officials of widely differing levels of seniority
and doing a great variety of jobs. In most cases the Committee were appreciative of their
abilities, their spirit of public service and their sincere desire to play their part in the efforts
needed to improve the system. This wealth of human resources is one of the major achievements
of the Community. Maintaining it is one of the fundamental responsibilities of the Commission.
